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Abstract 
This study examines the rise of al-Adl wal-Ihsan in the early 1980s, its 
development, its attitude towards a number of Islamic and contemporary issues, 
and its strategy to take root in society and press for social and political reform in 
Morocco. The aim is to provide an account that reflects as far as possible what is 
perceived to be the true nature of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and, more importantly, to 
identify the factors behind its rapid growth and its ability to become the largest 
organized Islamic force in the country despite operating under an authoritarian 
regime and in an environment already populated by several Islamic groups. 
Drawing on the dialogic model of interpretation which entails, among things, 
presenting the Islamists‟ ideas, experiences and arguments using their own terms 
and categories, this study has used a wide range of primary and secondary 
sources and benefited from interviews with a variety of people, including the 
movement‟s founding leader, Sheikh Yassine, before he passed away on 13th 
December 2012, in order to achieve a better understanding of al-Adl wal-Ihsan.  
The major findings that come from this research demonstrate that al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
is a mere response, among others, based on Islamic sources and ijtihad, to 
legitimate demands of social, political and moral order. Hence, to exclude the 
moral and spiritual dimension from the analysis would not help to generate 
plausible explanations of the rise and nature of al-Adl wal-Ihsan or any other 
Islamic group for that matter. As for al-Adl‟s rapid expansion, it has been found to 
be closely related to five basic factors: a charismatic leadership, an adequate 
organizational structure, a coherent theoretical framework, an appealing reform 
strategy and special emphasis on tarbiya [education]. Thus what becomes of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan in the future seems to depend on its ability to maintain, if not to improve 
on what is deemed to be the source of its strength, which is a big challenge. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction: The Rise of AL-Adl wal-Ihsan and the Need for an 
Explanation 
1.1 Introduction 
In September 1981, about a dozen people headed by a former school inspector, 
Abdessalam Yassine, set up an Islamic association which they called Usrat-al-
Jamaa1 [The Group], a name which reflected a desire to remain open to other 
possible forms of organization and cooperation to better serve, in their view, the 
cause of Islam and press for the social and political reform that the Moroccan 
people had been awaiting for so long. It was a modest initiative in an environment 
far from supportive, to say the least, by a small number of people, most of whom 
worked in the educational sector and who, apart from Sheikh Yassine, were hardly 
known even in the cities in which they lived. Yet, this small association of Usrat al-
Jamaa, which later changed its name to Jamaat al-Adl wal-Ihsan [Justice and 
Spirituality Movement], succeeded within the span of less than two decades to 
become “the biggest and the best organized Islamic movement in the country.”2  
How did this rapid growth occur? 
It may be argued that we are here referring to the 1970s and the 1980s and, as is 
well known, it was during this period that the Arab and Islamic world witnessed the 
rise of an unprecedented wave of Islamic groups in its modern history, especially 
after the remarkable Afghan resistance to the Soviet invasion and the success of 
the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran to topple the despotic regime of the Shah. 
Thus, so runs the argument, it should come as no surprise that the movement of 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan [al-Adl] could rise to prominence so rapidly. 
This argument would be appealing if al-Adl wal-Ihsan had been alone at the time, 
with no competitors in the land. The reality is that it was not. Some Islamic groups 
had been in place much before the foundation of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, that is, since the 
1960s and early 1970s, while others came into being either at about the same time 
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or soon after. Among these groups we may cite Jam`iyat al-Ba`th al-Islami [the 
Association of Islamic Resurrection] which was founded at the beginning of the 
1970s by Ismail al-Khatib, a religious scholar and member of the League of 
Moroccan Scholars since 1968; the Jam`iyat ash-Shabiba al-Islamiya al-
Maghribiya [The Moroccan Islamic Youth Association], founded in 1968 by a 
former school inspector called Abdekarim Motii who went into exile in 1975 after 
the alleged implication in the assassination of a prominent leftist leader, Omar 
Benjelloun;  Jam`iyat ad-Da`wa al-Islamiya [the Islamic Call Association] which 
was founded in Fez in 1976 by some university teachers including Abdessalam al-
Harras, ash-Shahad al-Boushikhi and others; Al-Jam`iya al-Islamiya [the Islamic 
Association] which started in al-Kasr al-Kabir in 1976 under the leadership of 
Ahmed Raissouni before his group and other groupings got united and founded 
Rabitat al-Mustakbal al-Islami [the League of Islamic Future] in 1994; al-Jama`a 
Islamiya [the Islamic Group] was another important association founded in 1983 by 
Abdilah  Benkirane before merging with Raissouni‟s group into at-Tawhid wal-Islah 
[Unity and Reform].3 
This is not to mention some groupings which had been operating underground in 
big cities like Casablanca, Marrakech, Tangier, Agadir…, nor others which came to 
the open later such as Hizb al-Uumma [The Umma Party] and al-Badil al-Hadari 
[The Civilizational Alternative], nor other Islamic associations which, though 
apolitical, had been very active such as Jama`at at-Tabligh [Society for the 
Propagation of Islam], an offshoot of the well-known India-based Tabligh Jama`at 
movement, which found its way to Morocco in July 1975.4 The question, then, is: 
how did Yassine‟s movement get established in such a burgeoning Islamic 
environment and achieve in so short a time high popularity and a large 
membership?  
Unlike most other Islamic groups in Morocco which were tolerated, the Moroccan 
regime‟s attitude towards Yassine‟s movement was and is still far from friendly. 
From the early days of its foundation, it has been subject to various forms of 
harassment and numerous campaigns of arrests, culminating in the incarceration 
of many of its members for periods ranging from a few days at the police station to 
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many long years in prison.5 Yet the movement continued steadily its course, 
attracting more, not less, supporters and sympathizers and maintaining all the 
while its organizational as well as its intellectual cohesiveness. How has it 
managed to cope with three decades of continuous, albeit varied in intensity and 
scope, repression? 
According to one theory which is quite common even within some academic 
circles, the “secret” lies in the leader of the movement whose famous open letter, 
Al-Islam aw at-Tufan [Islam or the Deluge] to the late king Hassan II, a few years 
before starting organized action, had made history.6 In the mean time, proponents 
of this theory argue that though such a feature constitutes one of the major 
strengths of the movement, it is also one of its major weaknesses. The reason is 
that a group centred around a charismatic figure like Sheikh Yassine is likely to 
thrive as long as he is alive, but the moment he disappears, the whole edifice may 
be shaken by the struggle over the issue of succession or because of some 
dormant internal contradictions.7 Something of the sort has happened to many 
organizations, Islamic as well as secular, and there is no reason why al-Adl wal-
Ihsan should not submit to the same logic. 
On 13th December 2012, Sheikh Yassine passed away. It was indeed a hard 
moment for the movement and its sympathizers who turned up the following day in 
thousands from all over the country as well as from different parts of the world to 
form one the biggest spontaneous funeral processions in post-independence 
Morocco.8 A new era which the Moroccan regime had waited for so long seemed to 
have started now that their arch foe is no more. However, neither what the 
Moroccan regime had expected nor what the theory referred to above had 
predicted occurred, so far at least. Within less than ten days the Shura Council of 
the movement was summoned for an extraordinary session, introduced a few 
amendments to its internal laws and elected a new head for al-Adl wal-Ihsan. It 
seems that the movement passed the first test smoothly and, compared to what 
often happens to many political organizations, it could be said it is no small feat, 
and not the sole one. With regard to its organizational capacities, its attitudes and 
its strategies at the theoretical as well as the practical level, the movement has 
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been able to register some achievements the importance and implications of 
which, in all fairness, cannot be denied and needs to be investigated. In a word, 
what factors could possibly lie behind such achievements and, more importantly, 
the appeal that al-Adl wal-Ihsan has sustained over the last thirty years? These are 
some of the questions this thesis sets out to explore. 
1.2 The focus of this thesis 
It is important to note that despite the fact that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is considered the 
biggest Islamic force in Morocco whose influence has even crossed the borders of 
the country and is being increasingly felt among the Muslim Magribi communities in 
the West, very little research has been done to understand this Moroccan 
experience. Apart from few attempts which could be counted on the fingers of one 
hand, there is not, as far as I know, a single study in English which has solely 
focused on al-Adl wal-Ihsan and conducted an in-depth examination.9 Even in 
those serious endeavours that this author is aware of, only a very limited space is 
devoted to the discussion of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, which is not sufficient for the 
understanding of such an influential movement. Some writings, besides their failure 
to come to grips with this issue, have participated, wittingly or unwittingly, to 
obscure it even further. A number of errors have been incurred: some have to do 
with the time and circumstance in which the research was carried out; some relate 
to access to reliable sources and how they should be handled, whereas others 
have to do with the Arabic language in which most, if not all, of the major sources 
are written. Worse still is that to overcome such obstacles, some writers submitted 
to the easiest option, that is, to consider the subject through the lens of others 
whose declared antagonism and bias cannot be very helpful to produce an 
academic piece worthy of note.10 
There is yet another  possible reason which might explain, in part at least, why the 
whole issue of Islamism in Morocco, and not only al-Adl wal-Ihsan, has not 
received the attention it deserves from English speaking researchers, leaving 
thereby a glaring gap in the English scholarly literature dealing with the Arab and 
Muslim world. According to an assumption what is called “political Islam” or 
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“Islamic fundamentalism” or whatever to refer to the contemporary Islamic 
resurgence should be rather viewed as a monolithic phenomenon, and to seek to 
differentiate between its components does not serve any academic purpose. The 
Islamic groups are all basically the same.11 They draw on the same ideological 
sources and have the same objectives, namely to revive “the Golden Age” of the 
Islamic history and to establish a theocratic system of rule reminiscent of they what 
they term Khilafa ar-Arashida [Rightly-Guided Caliphate]. Therefore, any group 
picked up for investigation would be very representative of the whole lot.12 If this is 
the case, then it is not surprising that most studies should focus on the Middle 
East. Though some practical reasons are not to be excluded, some may assume 
that what goes for Egypt or Jordan or any other Middle Eastern country is also 
valid for Morocco. 
Putting aside how the Islamic movements are being portrayed and how much 
reflects the reality or the myth, it is wrong to lump them all into a single category 
and treat them as such, as if there is no significant differences between them. This 
blanket approach, though not supported by all scholars, which puts all Islamic 
groups in the same basket is sure to lead to gross errors and false perceptions. It 
is true that they do share some common features, but it is equally true that there 
exist differences not only across the Muslim countries but also among those within 
the same country. Even within what is termed the mainstream Islamic trend, there 
may be significant nuances. Thus, to thrust extremist views which have always 
existed and will continue to exist in all religions, cultures and civilizations with 
moderate perspectives would not facilitate comprehension but rather hinder it 
unnecessarily, unless there is some special interest in promoting 
misunderstanding! 
This thesis has a main purpose and a secondary one. The main purpose is to 
provide an explanation of the rise of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and try to identify the factors 
behind the strong appeal it has steadily sustained within the Moroccan society over 
the last three decades. The question is all the more interesting because, as we 
have seen, when  al-Adl wal-Ihsan was set up, the Moroccan Islamic landscape 
had already been populated with various Islamic associations founded by 
16 
respected scholars or well-educated Moroccan activists. It could not be said 
therefore that al-Adl wal-Ihsan rose to prominence just because Islamism was in 
vogue at the time and there was no other competitors in the land, nor could it be 
claimed that just because Abdessalam Yassine was a prominent opposition figure 
to the then monarch of Morocco, Hassan II, that the movement‟s expansion was 
achieved rapidly. Yassine was not the only critical voice of the monarchy. There 
were other well known figures, religious and secular, who were also outspoken in 
their criticism of the monarchical rule. Why should they not have garnered at least 
as much support as Yassine did?  
The core argument of this thesis is that al-Adl wal-Ihsan must have some 
distinctive features that could account for its public appeal and for the 
achievements it has proved capable of. By examining the emergence of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, its development, organization, its intellectual attitudes and its preferred 
strategies, both at the theoretical as well as at the practical level, to contribute to 
social and political reform in Morocco, this thesis seeks to unravel many 
ambiguities and to discover where those features lie. It will try to demonstrate 
whether the vision and outlook of al-Adl wal-Ihsan represent an adequate response 
to the people‟s needs at the political as well as at the moral and spiritual level. The 
secondary aim of this thesis is to challenge a number of assumptions such as the 
ones referred to above and to clarify many “gray zones” which have so far been the 
source of no small amount of misunderstanding of the Islamic resurgence in 
general and al-Adl wal-Ihsan in particular. Meanwhile, some definitions and 
clarifications are in order. 
1.3 Definitions and clarifications 
The contemporary Islamic movement has been given a variety of names and 
described by various epithets: Islamic resurgence, revival, political Islam, 
fundamentalism, radical, moderate or extremist Islamism, Islamic traditionalism, 
conservatism, fanaticism, obscurantism and many more. Most of these terms are 
not of its own invention but created and disseminated by foreign academia and 
media and only few can lay claim to an indigenous origin. However, not all of these 
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labels reflect an ideological bias or condemnation. Whereas some are used to 
describe what is considered to be “the obscurantism of a bygone age,”13 others 
appear to represent an attempt to come to terms with a phenomenon that seemed 
to have caught many analysts by surprise. Whatever the case might be and 
whatever the reasons behind the proliferation of such a variety of labels, the policy 
adopted in this thesis and in conformity with the approach to be explained below is 
to avoid those considered inadequate in reflecting the nature and objectives of the 
contemporary movements, though they may be used by respected scholars, as 
well as those which are believed to be unacceptable or even offending. Meanwhile, 
in an attempt to disentangle what looks like a bewildering maze of terms, some 
clarification will be supplied here. 
A core concept used in this thesis which needs to be defined is “Islamic 
movement”. As is usually the case with definitions, it is not easy to find one that 
cannot be challenged, especially if the phenomenon in question is so diverse and 
complex like the Islamic movement. However, this has not precluded many from 
the attempt to say what is, or should be, meant by the term. For Abdulwahhab El-
Affendi, a London-based writer and academic, “The term… is used to refer to those 
groups that are active in the political arena and call for the application of Islamic 
values and laws in the private and public sphere.”14 This definition may be in need 
of further refinement and taking into account the various attempts in this respect, I 
would propose the following:  
The concept “Islamic movement” is a term that may be applied to any organized 
Islamic group that seeks to reconstruct society and government through peaceful 
means, from a reasoned perspective, based on the agreed Islamic sources, that 
understands Islam as a comprehensive way of life, taking into consideration the 
ever changing circumstances. 
This means that those groups that are not engaged politically such as Sufi orders, 
or those that believe that violence is an inevitable means to achieve their 
objectives, or those that take the form of Islamic, cultural or socio-economic 
associations or Islamic charities are not included in this definition. 
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Though the suggested definition has tried to highlight the salient features of what is 
generally believed to be “an Islamic movement”, some may consider it to be 
unnecessarily very narrow and argue that there is no reason why other groups, 
albeit apolitical, should not come under the same category. They may serve, from 
their perspectives, the Islamists‟ objectives in a manner not to be underestimated. 
If those who are engaged politically may be the spearhead or the “vanguard”, to 
borrow from Sayed Qotb‟s terminology, of the Islamic trend, the other groups can 
promote the supportive environment where the success of Islam would be 
achievable. In some accounts they are regarded as the “strategic reserve” of the 
Islamic resurgence in the sense that if, for one reason or another, the Islamists 
operating under authoritarian regimes are harassed or even suppressed, the flow 
of the Islamic current will be maintained.15 Thus, if Islamic resurgence is not 
possible top-down, it will continue “creeping”, to use Kepel‟s words, from the 
bottom.16 Why should they be set aside then? They are equally entitled to be put 
under the same title, if only to represent “variety within unity”. 
What is at issue here, however, is not to evaluate or to downplay the activities of 
the other groups,17 but rather to take, for the purpose of analysis, the position held 
by mainstream Islamic movements which maintains that an integrated Islamic 
approach entails that the political dimension is a crucial component and 
consequently should be given due attention. Furthermore, to seek a 
comprehensive reform of society and government without getting fully involved in 
politics is like engaging in wishful thinking. No one can deny the importance that 
the state in the modern era has acquired and the role it plays in the implementation 
of political programmes and socio-economic reforms. Hence, the insistence on the 
political aspect is not considered just an Islamic requirement but a practical 
necessity. 
It is true that some Muslim thinkers have expressed concern about the increasing 
emphasis on the political aspect on the grounds that it may expose the 
contemporary Islamic movement to the risk of being sapped of its spiritual vitality 
and vigor. Khurshid Ahmed, a Pakistani economist, is one among others, who has 
raised this point stressing that it should not be forgotten that the Islamic movement 
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is “primarily a religious and ethical movement,” and although it is concerned with 
political matters, “it is mainly an effort to strengthen the Iman [belief]” and to re-
affirm the Muslims‟ commitment to God.” Khurshid goes on to regret that most 
Western literature on the subject of Islamic movements should ignore these basic 
characteristics.18 Khurshid does not intend to undermine the importance of politics, 
but what he seeks to emphasize is that Islamic movements should not lose sight of 
balance and of its own true nature. However, he does not tell us, at least as far as I 
know, how that could be achieved. 
The intention here, however, is not to delve deeper in the subject of the 
relationship between Islam and politics. It has already been covered extensively 
elsewhere. It would then suffice to underline the general consensus shared by all 
the Islamic movements concerning Islam: they believe that it is a complete way of 
life and that the idea of separating religion from politics is alien to its nature and 
paradigm. Interestingly, even some intellectuals who are very critical of Islamic 
movements like the Egyptian philosopher and writer, Hassan Hanafi, rejects the 
idea of separation. For Hanafi, for example, it means neutralizing Islam, “so that 
the authoritarian can secure himself against any opposition in the name of religion 
that may destroy him,” and it means also that the ruling elites want to govern 
according to their vested interests “with no regard to any law or rule.”19 
If the establishment of an Islamic movement is viewed as the necessary practical 
tool to revive Islam and bring about social and political reform in Muslim countries, 
ijtihad [independent reasoning] is regarded as the intellectual mechanism to 
provide answers to a number of theoretical and practical issues; hence, the 
relevance of the concept of ijtihad in the discussion of al-Adl wal-Ihsan or any other 
Islamic movement for that matter. Ijtihad may be defined as the independent 
intellectual effort to make a decision on a matter not covered by the Quran and the 
Sunnah of the Prophet but in a way that does not contravene an assured Islamic 
rule.20  The mechanism of ijtihad is perceived to be at work not only in developing 
and formulating the position towards a wide range of issues such democracy, 
modernity, and ijtihad itself, etc., but also in devising the appropriate strategies to 
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secure comprehensive reform. It is no surprise, then, that it is considered one of 
the key concepts in the thought of al-Adl wal-Ihsan as we shall see in chapter four. 
One question seems unavoidable here: if all the Islamic groups draw on the same 
frame of reference and use the same mechanisms to generate opinions where the 
Islamic sources are silent, why do they differ and in some cases significantly? Is 
there one or several “Islams”? For Muslim scholars, thinkers and jurists the issue of 
differences of opinion is neither new nor to be ashamed of. It has existed since the 
early days of Islam and has taken, over the years, various forms: schools of 
thought, jurisprudence, theology, political trends, etc. In fact, it is considered a sign 
of strength, for it provides the mind with the opportunity to be constantly engaged 
and innovate and thereby maintain its dynamism. 
Furthermore, the Islamic texts themselves allow such differences. In this respect 
scholars of Islam differentiate between two aspects: 1/ the meaning of the text; and 
2/ the way it has been transmitted, which includes the number and the integrity of 
reporters. Concerning the meaning of the text, it can be either conclusive [qatii], 
that is, clear and has one meaning and cannot be open to any other interpretation, 
or non-conclusive [dhanny], which means that it may be open to more than one 
interpretation. As for the manner of its transmission, there are also two options: if 
the chain of transmission meets the criteria of authenticity, then it is considered 
conclusive; if it does not, then it will be regarded as non-conclusive.21 
Such being the case, all the Islamic texts fall within four categories: 
The first category refers to the texts that are conclusive in both meaning and 
transmission; the second category refers to the texts that are conclusive in 
meaning but not in transmission; the third refers to the texts are not conclusive in 
meaning but conclusive in transmission; and the fourth covers those that are 
conclusive neither in meaning nor in transmission.22 
Each category entails a specific result. Any idea, practice or command or whatever 
which comes under the first category means that since it meets those two 
conditions, it is considered conclusive and no two Muslims should disagree about 
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it. The other three cases, however, are all open to interpretation. If we add to this 
matters not covered by Islamic texts, then one of the immediate conclusions that 
one cannot fail to infer here is that the space where texts are conclusive is very 
limited whereas the space for the use of ijtihad is immense indeed. On the basis of 
this, it could be safely said that most of the differences between Islamic groups 
belong to the last three categories or where the texts are silent. 
However, it must be pointed out that difference of opinion may be due not only to 
the nature of the text, but also to the abilities, skills and qualifications of the 
interpreter. People differ in intelligence, scholarship and understanding of the 
realities of the environment in which they live and the domestic and the 
international circumstances. Thus, though there are some instructions on how to 
conduct ijtihad, the character and the qualifications of the interpreter, do have their 
bearing on ijtihad outcomes. In any case, the rule is that as long as an opinion is 
based on Islamic sources and this opinion does not contradict an assured Islamic 
law or text [of the first category], it should be respected as an Islamic opinion. 
On the basis of the above discussion, however broad and brief, two remarks may 
be made. One is that though extremist groups have always existed and will 
probably continue to exist, they have never been able and will most probably never 
garner any significant public support in Muslim societies. Historically they have 
always lived on the fringe of society and though they can sometimes cause some 
mischief, they have never been and will never be able to drag Muslim societies in 
the fire of extremism, whatever its nature, creedal, intellectual, political or cultural. 
To substantiate such analysis, Muslim scholars often quote some sayings of the 
Prophet of which one reads: “My Umma will never agree upon an error.”23 The 
other remark which has been made by many scholars, Muslim and non-Muslim 
alike, is that the inbuilt mechanisms of the Islamic system of which ijtihad is just 
one among others make it possible for Islam to sustain what has been described 
as “continuity and change”. Such provisions and mechanisms have enabled Islam 
to adapt to all times and circumstances while maintaining its core and spirit 
untouched. The fact that this reality has often been disregarded may at least partly 
account for the difficulty to devise adequate theories to better understand the 
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contemporary Islamic phenomenon, a point to which we shall return in the following 
paragraphs.  
1.4 Theories and interpretations 
Over the last four decades or so, and particularly since the Islamic resurgence 
became increasingly visible and started to garner more public support at the 
political level, the question that seems of particular interest and has been a subject 
of enduring debates is: how to understand this “new phenomenon” and what are 
the reasons behind its emergence? A lot has been said and written and many 
explanations have been put forward. We will examine here the most important of 
them and see how close they have come to capture a phenomenon that some 
analysts consider “new” whereas others regard as “old” as Islam itself. 
According to a very common explanation, usually referred to as the “crisis theory”, 
the contemporary Islamic resurgence is the logical outcome of a series of 
concomitant social, political and military crises which rocked the Arab and Muslim 
world especially during the last half of the twentieth century. Richard Dekmejian, 
for example, maintains that the return to Islam is largely a response to the failure of 
the ruling elites in Islamic countries to establish a legitimate order and the failure to 
fulfill their promises of achieving development and social justice as a consequence 
of their incompetence, corruption and the inability to devise an adequate strategy 
for economic uplift and mass mobilization.24 These failures, he contends, besides 
the successive military defeats, namely in the 1967 war between Israel and Arab 
countries, have triggered what he likens to “shock waves” in the Muslim world, 
generating thereby the feelings of fear, insecurity and inferiority which in turn have 
led many Muslims to regard Islam as a viable alternative. This does not mean, 
argues Dekmejian, that it is necessarily so, but since the other approaches have 
failed, the Islamic alternative is being taken just like another option to cope with the 
prevailing crises. What makes it different, however, from other approaches is that 
Islam in the eyes of a growing number of alienated Muslims seems “to provide a 
practical political alternative as well as a secure niche and psychological anchor in 
a turbulent world.”25   
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From a descriptive point of view, Dekmejian‟s account is not to be refuted totally. 
Nobody can deny the presence of serious socio-economic and political problems in 
the Muslim societies and the failure of the ruling elite to solve or alleviate the dire 
consequences of these crises. Yet to claim that these problems can explain 
convincingly the rise of Islamism is far from the reality. If the social and political 
difficulties were to be considered a decisive factor, then we would have to prove 
why the Islamic resurgence did not occur during the colonial era, for example. The 
presence of those problems and their hard-felt effects were no less acute then than 
they are in the post colonial era. 
Furthermore, this theory does not explain why the same factors do not have the 
same effects in other situations which are very similar. Why did the Islamic 
movement not emerge in the same Arab countries at the same time despite the 
striking similarity of their conditions? If the earliest forms of the Islamic resurgence 
saw the light of day in the early 1920s and 1930s in Egypt, Palestine and Pakistan, 
why did we have to wait until the 1970s and 1980s before we could witness its 
emergence in other Muslim countries? To push this argument further, we may even 
wonder why similar religious movements did not appear in non-Muslim countries if 
we assume that social and political crises make people turn to religion for solace. 
There are a number of questions which cast doubt on this theory and its 
assumptions concerning the Islamic resurgence, though it cannot be denied that it 
does point to some pertinent aspects. 
In an attempt, perhaps, to propose a more viable interpretation, some analysts take 
a completely different direction and speak about what they call “the success 
theory”. They maintain that there is a positive correlation between successful 
events in the Muslim world and the rising of Islamic reassertion. Thus it is argued 
that events like the 1973 Arab-Israeli war, the Arab oil embargo, the boom in oil 
revenues, the triumph of the Islamic revolution in Iran and the Afghan resistance to 
the Soviet invasion all “provided a new source of pride and served as a positive 
motivation for Islamic revivalism.”26 
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The implication of this theory is that given the prevailing Western hegemony and 
cultural imperialism, the impact of such events is such that it gave Muslims hope 
for further successes and a better future. Many people must have thought that if 
Islam succeeded in toppling a tyrannical rule in Iran, why not in other Muslim 
countries? If oil embargo, always according the same argument, could have its 
impact, though carried out only temporarily, then one could hardly imagine the 
empowering benefit of the vast resources, of which oil is just one ingredient, that 
are at the disposal of the Islamic countries. Such a line of thinking, it is assumed, 
appeared to have led many people to feel that the long cherished dream of being 
treated with respect and on an equal footing at the international level and of rising 
as a strong, respected Umma is not after all out of reach, contrary to claims 
maintained for so long by sceptics and defeatists in the name of realism. These 
bright prospects are seen to have motivated many young Muslims to turn to 
religion.   
There are a number of remarks that could be brought against this theory. One 
obvious one is that those who claim that Islam acquired new vigor and intensity in 
Muslim societies in the 1970s and 1980s because of the events mentioned above 
seem to be unaware of the error their explanation incurs. They do not realize that 
Islamic movements had been in existence and active long before those events. 
The Muslim Brotherhood was founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 and in 
the early 1930s and 1940s was able to recruit, according to some accounts, over 
one million of supporters in Egypt alone in a population of less than 20 million.27 
The Islamic Liberation Party was set up in Palestine in 1953 and was and is still 
active in a number of countries. Another influential Islamic movement is the 
Jamaat-e-Islam which was founded in Lahore in August in 1941 by a prominent 
Islamic figure, Abu al-Ala al-Mawdudi, and has been operating since then in the 
Indian subcontinent. This is not to mention apolitical organizations like Tablighi 
Jamaat [Society for the Propagation of Islam], a large transnational association 
which was founded in India in 1927 by Muhammad Ilyas al-Kandahlawi.  
Such being the case, the “success theory” appears to be fundamentally flawed for 
the simple reason that it “places undue emphasis on factors that postdated the 
25 
actual emergence of the Islamic movements.”28 If one cannot deny that some 
events may have a positive psychological impact, it is hard to prove that it could be 
permanent and thereby be considered a decisive factor behind the Islamic 
resurgence. As Esposito has pointed out, it is “naïve to attribute the Islamic revival 
mainly to oil.”29 
Some theorists contend that the “clash theory” is more suitable to explain the 
Islamic revival adequately than anything else suggested so far. They claim that this 
theory puts the Islamic phenomenon in its true context and sees it “as a 
continuation of the clash between two great civilizations, Islam and the West.”30 
Bernard Lewis, a scholar of Middle Eastern history who maintained close 
relationship with the Bush administration, is a prominent advocate of this theory. In 
1990 he wrote an article about what he describes as “Muslim Rage” to convince 
the West of the nature and magnitude of the challenge it is facing. He stresses that 
it is “a mood and a movement far transcending the level of issues and policies and 
the governments that pursue them. This is no less than a clash of civilizations the 
perhaps irrational but surely historic reaction of an ancient rival against Judeo-
Christian heritage, our secular present and the worldwide expansion of both.”31  
According to such a view, then, the Islamic resurgence has nothing to do with 
issues, policies or the declared peaceful objectives of its various manifestations, 
but it rather represents the attempt of an old foe which is about to be “out of the 
bottle” to wage a “sacred war” against the “West, the matrix of the enemies of 
God.” As if to confirm further to the sceptics the validity of the clash of civilizations 
theory, Lewis states in another article that it is impossible to achieve “even 
prospect of peace” or to conceive of any “dialogue and compromise” with people 
motivated by “obscurantist ideas”.32 
This theory which seems to be beating the drum for conflict and confrontation is not 
appreciated, albeit for different reasons, by many scholars, Western and non-
Western alike. John Esposito, for example, in his book The Islamic Threat: Myth or 
Reality, notes that “emphasis upon the clash of civilizations reinforces the tendency 
to downplay or overlook specific political and socio-economic causes for Muslim 
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behaviour, to see Muslim actions as an irrational reaction rather than a response to 
specific policies and actions… The primacy of political interests, policies and 
issues is dismissed or eclipsed by the vision of an age-old rivalry.”33 Some critics 
have criticized this theory from other perspectives whereas others have gone even 
to suspect it of having contributed largely to the rise of Islamophobia or, to employ 
Halliday‟s term, “anti-Muslimism” in the West.34 
Contrary to the analyses which smack of a mood for confrontation, proponents of 
what may be termed as “the bubble theory” think that the Islamic resurgence has 
been exaggerated too much. They contend that in spite of some successful events 
here and there under the banner of Islam, there is no need to be scared or to make 
of the phenomenon more than it actually is. It merely represents the last attempt “of 
the adherents of a great religion which has yet to come to terms theologically and 
convincingly with today‟s world.”35 In 1985 Elie Kedourie wrote an article to stress 
that “Islamic fundamentalism – [is] an idea whose time has gone.”36 This view was 
also emphasized by another analyst who claim that “the political phenomenon we 
here identified as “Islamic fundamentalism” is a spent force now.”37 Olivier Roy, a 
leading French analyst of Islam, wrote a book in 1992 where he explains how “the 
failure of Islam” has occurred. He argues that the “fundamentalists”, weakened, 
lacking in innovation and suffering from perennial paradoxes, are not expected to 
achieve anything of significance and concludes that “the Islamic revolution is 
behind us.”38 Another French political scientist, Gilles Kepel, made a similar view 
when he wrote in a book published in 2000 that that the Islamic movement had 
entered a decade of decline since the early 1990s.39  Before Roy and Kepel, 
Bernard Lewis could assert in 1980 that “the Islamic resurgence has reached its 
peak and that from now [1980] onwards it will probably decline rather than 
ascend.”40 
Analyses which have come to the same conclusion are not scarce. The major 
problem with Islamic movements, according to some, lies in their archaic nature 
and thus they are “destined either to wither away in the face of liberalization, 
rationalization and democratization or to assume the mantle of nemesis to an 
otherwise democratic, right-based, peace loving consortium of nations and 
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cultures.”41 Some critics have even expressed their dismay that “phenomena such 
as Islamic fundamentalism have survived into the modern era at all,” and predicted 
that “such fundamentally archaic impulses are destined to extinguish themselves in 
a flash of predictable but nonsensical violence.”42 Similar arguments which assert 
that the “fundamentalist bubble” is bound to burst sooner rather than later are not 
infrequent, though they slightly disagree as to how this extinguishment is likely to 
take place. Whereas some think that it will fade out slowly until it sinks into oblivion, 
others, as pointed out above, are of the view that it will occur abruptly following 
some botched acts of terrorism which would spur the whole world to come together 
to extirpate the “scourge” once and for all. 
1.5 An alternative theoretical framework 
It is beyond the purview of this study to survey the vast literature and assess all the 
interpretations of the Islamic movement and see how far they have gone to capture 
the contemporary Islamic phenomenon. However, the samples presented here 
seem to be enough to bring us face to face with a crucial question: Is there not an 
alternative, if none of the above theories sound adequate to satisfactorily explain 
the Islamic resurgence? For some analysts, it is still premature to speak of a 
comprehensive theory that would help to comprehend the Islamic phenomenon in 
all its dimensions. Instead, as Dekmejian himself has pointed out, one can only 
speak of general propositions “as explanatory hypotheses”. The reason, in his 
view, is that the Islamic revival is still in a period of transition and thus “it is 
foolhardy to identify any precise causal factors.”43 
Imad Shahin, an Egyptian specialist in Islamic movements, also agrees and 
identifies several factors which, in his view, could account for the difficulty of 
devising a theory to forecast and explain the emergence and spread of active 
Islamic movements. Some of these may be summed up as follows: 1/ the Islamic 
emergence is still in flux and all the Islamic movements are currently in a 
transitional phase at the political as well at the ideological level; 2/ Islamic 
movements operate in different environments and under different conditions, which 
makes the generalization about them a difficult task; 3/ most studies on Islamic 
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movements focus on those that are active politically but ignore those associations 
which, though apolitical,  do have an impact that should not be undermined; 4/ a 
secular framework of analysis is sure to miss significant dimensions of the Islamic 
phenomenon such as the close relationship between Islam and politics.44 
Despite the plausibility of these arguments, attempts to cope with a very complex 
phenomenon have never been given up. Two examples, however, which point to 
the growing importance of a tendency in the study of Islamic movements, will be 
mentioned here. One is represented by John Voll, professor of history and author 
and co-author of important books and articles on Islam and the Middle East. In 
1982 he published a book titled, Islam: Continuity and Change in the Modern World 
where he discusses at length the contemporary Islamic experience and how it 
could be better understood. He speaks about the need to go beyond the analyses 
which see the Islamic resurgence as primarily motivated by socio-economic and 
political problems whereas Islam is being picked merely as an instrument to 
channel those issues. These analyses, as he points out, exclude “the possibility of 
a truly Islamic-inspired anti-imperialism or an Islamic-oriented desire for social 
transformation.”45 They also fail to appreciate the durability of the phenomenon.46 
As an alternative, Voll proposes an approach that takes into account three 
dimensions: 1/ the individuals and groups involved in the Islamic revival and the 
local conditions in which they evolved; 2/ the relationship of the Islamic movements 
to the basic dynamics of modern world history on the grounds that these 
movements do not emerge and operate in isolation of the rest of the world; and 3/ 
Islam itself in order to situate these movements in their Islamic as well as their 
modern context and thereby “avoiding the pitfalls of using only a modernization 
model as the basis for analysis.”47 This three-dimensional approach, as he calls it, 
is important to secure a better understanding and all the more so because it 
recognizes the dynamic vitality that the faith has assumed in the changing 
historical circumstances. Voll does not claim that his approach is ideal, but it is 
perceived as a possible framework for analysis. 
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A second example may be represented by Roxanne Euben. In her book, Enemy in 
the Mirror: Islamic Fundamentalism and the Limits of Modern Rationalism, she 
argues that the reason for the inability to achieve a good understanding of the 
Islamic activism has its origin in the theoretical discourse dominant in the West, “a 
theoretical discourse that no longer sees any place for metaphysics in political 
life.”48 The problem, then, is in the framework used for analysis and understanding 
and not because the Islamic phenomenon is impossible to comprehend. She goes 
even to suggest that “the more our stories about politics…are committed to a 
rationalist epistemology, the more difficult we may have in compassing the 
significance of practices guided by and defined in terms of belief in divine truths 
unknowable by purely human means.”49  
The problem does not stop there, that is, in the increasing difficulty to understand 
the significance of ideas, practices and behaviours informed by a different 
worldview, but also in the fact that the secular framework seeks to reinforce an 
idea the core of which is that “religio-political movements (among others) stand in 
relation to Western secular power and internal order as the chaos of the 
particularistic, irrational, and archaic stand in relation to the universalistic, rational, 
and modern.”50 It is no surprise, Euben concludes, that “political Islam” is now 
depicted in many accounts as a menace “to be contained or overcome.”51 It is the 
logical outcome of an approach anchored in a secular culture and applied to an 
experience which emanated and evolved in a different historical and cultural 
context. 
Euben criticizes the explanations which view Islamism as “a reflex reaction to 
certain political or socio-economic circumstances,”52 or that Islam is being picked 
up simply because it is considered a powerful vehicle for channeling “political and 
economic demands rather than being itself the impulse behind these demands,”53 
or, as some claim, it is the last option being left. Such arguments, in her view, if 
accepted, would entail that “moral beliefs are selected as are tools in a hardware 
store, chosen only for their efficiency, or because the store was out of all 
brands…[R]eligious convictions -as are all convictions worth the name- are far too 
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complex to be either reduced to an option in the marketplace of ideas or minimized 
as a “refuge that provides emotional peace and comfort.”54 
In order to overcome the weaknesses and the limits of such approaches and the 
flawed explanations they have generated, Euben proposes what she calls “a 
dialogic model of interpretation”. She explains that in adopting this model, she 
draws on “debates within and about hermeneutics, a tradition, in its modern 
formulation, has been influenced largely by the work of Martin Heidegger and 
Hans-Georg Gadamer but has been elaborated in a variety of disciplines by a 
variety of scholars.”55 This model, as she demonstrates in her book, involves an 
interpretative approach which aims to reach an in-depth understanding of the 
Islamic phenomenon.  
However, in order to achieve this goal, the dialogic model of interpretation requires 
taking into account certain conditions. To provide an adequate explanation, the 
interpreter has to present the Islamists‟ ideas, experiences and arguments using 
their own terms and categories rather than terms and categories outside their own 
worldview.56 One has to take their discourse seriously and move away from the 
tendency, maintained so far by rationalist discourse, to dismiss readily whatever 
the Islamists say or do as pathological or irrational. The interpreter is also invited to 
be aware of the factors that could distort his or her explanation. As Gadamer 
argues, “an interpreter sees all objects of interpretation from within the horizon of 
her own worldview, her own belief, norms and practices.”57 Thus in order to 
generate “a better understanding”, it is important to insure that “the process of 
explicating meanings and advocating causal explanations begins with terms and 
categories used by the participants themselves.”58 Euben uses here “participants” 
because the process of interpreting is viewed in this model as a dialogue between 
the interpreter and the person or group whose ideas are to be studied. 
Though the dialogic model of interpretation is committed to the actors‟ self-
understanding, it does not mean that there is no room for critique or assessment. 
Far from it; some distance is not only possible but necessary. What is important, 
however, as Gadamer puts it, “is to be aware of one‟s own bias,”59 and, as Euben 
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remarks, to the fact that “the Western rationalist discourse continues both to frame 
and create our notions not only of ourselves but also of the world around us.”60 
Euben does not claim that the model she suggests is perfect or “invulnerable to 
distortions” but she thinks that it is less susceptible to them if the interpreter is 
permanently attentive not only to the effects exerted by his or her own ontological 
and epistemological position but also “to the inequality of participants in dialogue in 
a post-colonial world and…to the inevitable implication of power, and lack of 
power, in interpretation.”61 
This author has opted for the use of the dialogic model of interpretation, adopted 
by Euben and other students of Islamic activism, as a theoretical framework for the 
study and analysis of the topic of this thesis. Compared to the rationalist 
perspectives, examples of which have been discussed above, this model seems to 
provide ample opportunity and a better chance of coming closer to grasp what the 
Islamists want, what they are up to and what their real motives and concerns are. 
Therefore, to use it with the aim to achieve a better understanding of the nature of 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan, how it operates within the Moroccan society, its strategies, its  
intellectual and political stances and, more importantly, those aspects which could 
explain its appeal is very useful. As Euben has pointed out, there are many 
justifications for its adoption, which may be summed up as follows: 
1/ It allows for an intellectual space to present the Islamists‟ ideas, practices and 
motives in their own terms and categories. 
2/ Since not all interpreters can succeed to render the Islamists‟ understandings 
and vision adequately, this model requires what Alfred Schutz calls the “postulate 
of adequacy”.62 This entails a standard of compatibility between the interpreter and 
the actors‟ self-understandings themselves. 
3/ It provides for a conception of distance that leaves sufficient room for critique 
and evaluation. In other words, to attend to the Islamists‟ understandings does not 
mean, as Gilles Kepel puts it, that one should become their advocate or fellow 
traveler.63 
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4/ It allows to take seriously the Islamists‟ societal project which, as Kepel again 
remarks, if it cannot be interpreted in terms of Western categories of thought, 
cannot be said that it stems from “a dethronement of reason or from manipulation 
by hidden forces.”64  
5/ It constitutes a genuine endeavour to overcome the conventional secular 
assumptions and the false dichotomies that abound in the literature on the study of 
Islam and the Muslim world, namely this duality between “Us”, the people of the 
North, civilized, modern and democratic and “Them”, the uncivilized, backward, 
and undemocratic people of the South. The dialogic model of interpretation 
promotes cross-cultural dialogue and sound communication with the “Other”. 
6/ It offers the opportunity to detect the features that could explain the particular 
draw of the Islamic phenomenon in general and  why some groups seem to be 
more appealing than others though they refer to the same Islamic sources, which is 
the main purpose of this thesis.   
7/ Last but not least, the dialogic model of interpretation allows for certain flexibility 
and does not exclude the possibility of benefiting from the insights of other 
perspectives, rationalist or otherwise. 
Such were some of the important justifications for the use of the dialogic model of 
interpretation in this thesis. However, to come to this decision is not all that is 
required for the achievement of a better understanding of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. The 
reliable sources, how to access them and, more importantly, how to handle them 
constitute another crucial factor, to which we shall now return. 
1.6 A method of approaching the sources  
A few months before the death of Sheikh Yassine, an international conference was 
held in Istanbul, Turkey, to shed light on “the theory of the Prophetic method”, a 
theory devised by Yassine for the renewal of Islam and the reform of the Muslim 
individual, society and government.65 Researchers and academics from various 
parts of the world attended to bring their input and share their views. One of the 
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recommendations issued by the conference is that various opportunities should be 
organized to explore further Yassine‟s ideas which, according to the participants, 
constitute an original contribution to the contemporary Islamic thought. The event 
and the ensuing recommendations corroborate further the argument that it is 
imperative for any researcher interested in knowing about the nature of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan and what it stands for to study in depth the works, or the major ones at least, 
of its leader Sheikh Yassine. 
The author of this thesis did not wait for the Istanbul conference to convene and 
issue the above recommendations to take the works of Yassine seriously. He 
settled on the idea from the start. The question, however, is how to handle 
thousands of pages, in prose and in poetry, in Arabic and French and hundreds of 
videos and audio recordings. The answer to this question, as this author has found 
out, is of great importance in order to build one‟s analysis on accurate information. 
It would be an error –which is quite common- to randomly pick up one of Yassine‟s 
books, have a look at the table of contents and think that it is enough to know 
about the writer‟s final position on some of the issues raised. It all depends; it may 
be so and it may be not, which necessitates further clarifications. 
Sheikh Yassine was not just an author or theoretician who once he devised his 
“theory”, brought it to the marketplace and forgot about it. He was also founder of a 
movement with the aim to link theory to practice and from the interaction with the 
existing reality he could see whether some ideas needed to be refined, modified or 
even dropped all together. As he told this researcher in an interview, a theory is 
never born complete, if it could ever be so. It begins as a broad idea and with the 
passage of time and after continuous elaboration, in-depth thinking, further 
experience and repeated adjustments, it takes shape. What is important is that one 
should be open to new ideas and not hesitate to change his if need be.66  
Be that as it may, there are a number of points that the researcher has to bear in 
mind for a sound and proper use of the movement‟s sources, written or otherwise. 
One relates to chronology, that is, the researcher should be more attentive to the 
date when the book (or any other document) was written and completed than when 
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it was published. This is important in order to follow the evolution of the writer‟s 
thought and to capture the final stance towards the issue to be investigated. To 
ignore this is sure to lead to inaccurate conclusions. For instance, Yassine was 
initially against pluralism in Islamic activism. He believed at the time that all the 
Islamic groups should be united under a single organization. This is what the 
researcher would find in the first edition of al-Minhaj an-Nabawi [The Prophetic 
Method]. However, realizing that it was not practical, Yassine changed his view 
and in the second edition of al-Minhaj, we read that pluralism in Islamic activism is 
not only permitted but unavoidable. In this case, then, using the right edition would 
be crucial to know the true position. The same could be said about other issues. To 
cite one more example, to refer to the writings of Yassine before 1977 requires 
some cautiousness: many of his ideas have evolved since then, particularly in the 
political sphere.  
A second point has to do with terminology. Yassine was keen on the use of Islamic 
terminology. It is not out of some cultural chauvinism that he insisted on certain 
terms but rather because he believed that concepts are not always neutral. They 
reflect the values and the culture that they spring from. For this reason we find that 
he preferred, for example, “kawma” [uprising] instead of “thawra” [revolution] 
because the cultural charge is not believed to be the same: the former, he argues, 
involves “legitimate force”; the latter “violence and bloodshed”. The same could be 
said about other terms such as shura [consultation], democracy, etc. Therefore, to 
be sure of the meaning of the concepts Yassine used, one should be attentive to 
the definitions that he himself provided or consult the Islamic sources on which he 
based his arguments. 
To make a distinction between the changeable and the unchangeable in the vision 
adopted by al-Adl wal-ihsan is the third point that a researcher should take into 
account. If established Islamic principles fall within the latter category and 
consequently are considered immutable, anything else is open to assessment and 
thus subject to improvement, modification or complete change. An aspect, though 
self evident, which has strangely escaped all those who have written on al-Adl wal-
Ihsan concerns its organization. They all based their argument on the chapter 
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dealing with this issue in al-Minhaj an-Nabawi [The Prophetic Method], a book 
which Yassine completed and published more than three decades ago. The format 
that was suggested then was meant to be a starting point and not to be stuck to 
like a God-given order. A movement like al-Adl wal-Ihsan, dynamic and 
continuously growing, cannot get stuck in a fixed format all the time. Whether it 
wants it or not, it would be compelled inevitably to revise its organizational 
structure constantly. For this reason to write about the organization of the 
movement one should refer to other sources and not to al-Minhaj an-Nabawi 
despite its importance. This is what this thesis has done and thus been able to 
provide for the first time not only how the movement has evolved over the last thirty 
years but also the most recent organizational format the movement has adopted. 
The question that arises here is: how can we know about what is still valid and 
what is not? Two sources seem crucial to overcome this problem. One is to seek 
interviews with key members of the movement, and it is up to the researcher to 
decide which type of interview best fits his or her purpose. The author of this thesis 
has opted for the unstructured form for various reasons. Tim May has cited two: 
“First it provides qualitative depth by allowing interviewees to talk about the subject 
within their own frames of reference. […] Second, it thereby provides a greater 
understanding of the subject‟s point of view.”67 To these two, it could be added that 
it allows for the flexibility to clarify questions that may not be well understood68 and 
the chance to come across some information that may be more important than 
what the researcher is seeking. It furthermore helps to find out about some 
sensitive issues that the interviewee may not want to talk about for one reason or 
another. This should not be surprising given the prevailing conditions in countries 
like Morocco. Many people are sometimes sceptical of the aims of certain 
researchers and suspect that some questions may have more to do with 
mokhabarat [intelligence services] than with proper academic research. Therefore, 
the question of trust is important. Unless one is trusted and is well connected, he 
may not know where to go to conduct reliable interviews and even if he does, he 
may not obtain the required information. As Spadly has rightly pointed out, “mutual 
trust allows free flow of information.”69  
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The other source that should also be helpful either to supply the missing 
information or to get updated about the changes that the movement may have 
undergone relates to documents. Each organization may have its published and 
unpublished documents, and al-Adl wal-Ihsan is no exception. In fact, according to 
reliable sources, it has a considerable amount of them, unpublished in most cases. 
As we are often reminded by experts in the field, this source should not be 
neglected, for it has the potential to be of great value for the researcher. Indeed, 
the benefits that this thesis has drawn from the use of documents are not to be 
undermined. Otherwise, there is no way to know, for instance, the real reasons that 
made the movement change its initial name Usrat al-Jamaa to al-Adl wal-Ihsan if 
accessibility to the sole document that exists in this respect was not possible. 
A variety of people, though not large in number but deemed representative and 
sufficient for the purpose of this thesis, have been interviewed, including 
academics, party politicians, leaders of other Islamic groups. I must admit that 
access was not hard given the fact that I have been acquainted with most of the 
interviewees for a long time and some, including the current president of Moroccan 
government, Abd al-Ilah Benkiran, since we were students at university. Some 
documents about certain political parties have also been used, thanks to some 
friends affiliated to these parties themselves. Furthermore, a wide range of 
secondary sources, as will be seen, have been consulted, though the bibliography 
only enlists those cited. 
Some sources such as reports by national and international NGOs, Websites, 
scholarly articles and international magazines have been employed where found 
befitting the purpose of this thesis. However, as will be noticed, this thesis has not 
made much use of the Moroccan media for a very simple reason that all the 
observers of the Moroccan affairs are well aware of: there is no free media, in the 
true sense, in Morocco, despite claims to the contrary.70 Even what is described as 
“independent press” is only independent within the very limited space allowed by 
the regime. Those who tried to stretch the boundaries just a little further were dealt 
with harshly. Ali Lamrabat, editor of two Moroccan weeklies, Demain [French and 
Arabic], Abu Bakr al-Jamii, founder and editor of the weekly magazine Le Journal 
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and Rachid Nini, former chronicler, editor and director of Almassae, are just three 
examples among others. The sad point is that in order for some to stay alive within 
a stifling space, as it turns out, they have found themselves serving consciously or 
unconsciously the ruling elite‟s political agenda. 
Two final remarks need to be made here concerning the research method followed 
in this thesis. One is about the ethics issue. Given that the organization being 
studied here is not on good terms with the Moroccan Makhzen71, the rules of ethics 
have been rigorously observed. Where the names of certain interviewees are 
mentioned, it is because of their consent; otherwise, anonymity is maintained. 
Documents as well as some information which may be used for the first time are all 
approved by the leadership of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. It follows that some issues that are 
considered sensitive, mostly for security reasons, are left out. 
The other point is that though the nature of the subject to be investigated situates it 
within the qualitative tradition and entails a great deal of interpretation, a serious 
effort has been made to come up with a piece that tries to reflect to the best 
judgment of this author what is perceived to be the true nature of an influential 
Islamic movement in Morocco and the reasons behind its appeal over the last three 
decades. The author of this thesis does not deny that he, like any other human 
being, has his own preferences, but it is not here that one should come to expose 
them. 
1.7 Outline of thesis 
This study is divided into nine chapters, including the introduction and the 
conclusion. The introductory chapter, as explained above, presents the research 
questions, the thesis argument, clarifications of some terms and issues related to 
the subject under investigation, discussion of the major approaches to the study of 
Islamic movements, the rationale for the theoretical framework adopted for this 
study and some methodological ideas concerning the sources to be used for this 
thesis. 
38 
Chapter 2 focuses on Yassine‟s personality and the events and experiences which 
have contributed to shape his thought and strategy for social and political reform in 
Morocco. It seeks to examine his early childhood, his education and career and his 
Sufi experience and see how all of these have combined and impacted the form of 
Islamism which makes him and his movement al-Adl wal-Ihsan distinct in important 
respects from other Islamic groups in Morocco as well as in other Arab countries. It 
also discusses certain theories which have tried to explain some significant events 
in the life of the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, namely his Sufi experience, his open 
letter to the king called Islam aw at-Tufan [Islam or the Deluge] and his decision to 
set up an Islamic organization.  
Chapter 3 covers a period of about three decades and seeks to see how Yassine 
and his group made their debut and got well established in a political space 
dominated by a single person, the ruling monarch, and where opposition forces 
were facing serious challenges.  The first section of this chapter explores the 
movement‟s endeavours to cope with this obstacle since its inception in 1981 until 
it took a new name, al-Adl wal-Ihsan, in 1987. The second section covers almost 
twelve years, until King Hassan II died, bringing into light the regime‟s new 
strategies which culminated in different forms of repression and the outcome of 
such a policy towards the movement. The third section deals with the period 
beginning in 1999, when the new king, Mohammad VI, ascended the throne until 
the present time. The section also discusses whether a change of the ruling team 
entailed a rupture with what is termed “the years of lead” or a continuity of the 
same old policies in different forms towards political opponents in general and al-
Adl wal-Ihsan in particular. The final section, however, seeks to examine the inside, 
so to speak, of the movement and see how it started and has developed in terms 
of organizational structure and how it has been able to maintain its coherence over 
the last three decades. 
Chapter 4 focuses on the key concepts we frequently come across in the writings 
of Sheikh Yassine which constitute the pillars of the movement‟s intellectual basis. 
Three selected concepts -ijtihad, fitna, ihsan- which have triggered no small 
amount of controversy will be discussed. Sheikh Yassine has employed them not 
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only to secure effective communication and clarity of message in dealing with 
modern concerns but also to call into question some conventional ideas which had 
dominated the Islamic thought for years and even for centuries.  
Chapter 5 sets out to highlight the attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan towards modernity, 
democracy and women‟s rights. The main argument threading the three sections of 
this chapter that Yassine seeks to make is to challenge the view which maintains 
that the parameters of the field of discussion of such issues should be dictated by 
the Enlightenment philosophy. Muslim societies, in his view, should have the right 
to define their discourse and apply the criteria of the worldview to which they 
adhere to consider topics like the ones examined here. The focus of the 
discussion, however, is not to compare in order to prove which worldview is better, 
but rather to highlight a stance defended by Yassine and his group, among others, 
which posits that the world, despite agreed common values, is basically plural and 
diverse and it is in the interest of all that it should continue thus and not try to make 
a “melting-pot” of what is by definition “unmeltable”. 
Using comparative approach, I discuss in chapters 6 and 7 three major strategies 
used to achieve social and political reform in Morocco. The first has sought to get 
rid of the monarchical rule to allow for change to occur. This is the revolutionary 
strategy which may be represented by what is called “Option Révolutionaire” [the 
Revolutionary Option] whose major theoretician is the famous leftist leader Mehdi 
Ben Barka. The second strategy which may be described as “reformist” advocates 
working from within the system to pressure for political change, and l‟Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) [Socialist Union of Popular Forces] is 
taken as an example. Both strategies, however, have so far failed to achieve their 
goals. Chapter 7 is devoted to what may be qualified as a third-way strategy 
advocated by al-Adl wal-Ihsan. Specific attention is made to the basic features of 
such a strategy, how it differs from the previous ones and its chances of success. 
Chapter 8 focuses on tarbiya [education], an issue which al-Adl wal-Ihsan regards 
as one of the two major fronts in the struggle for comprehensive social and political 
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reform. It demonstrates how tarbiya is understood and practised and why it is 
considered, in the movement‟s strategy, of great importance.  
The concluding chapter summarizes the conclusions drawn from this study, points 
to some speculations on the future of the movement now that its charismatic leader 
Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine has passed away and ends with some suggestions 
for further research.  
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Chapter 2 Sheikh Yassine and the Quest for Reform 
According to an old political principle, “regimes often have the opponents they 
deserve.”1 Does this apply to the case of the Moroccan regime and its arch 
opponent, prominent Islamic leader Abdessalam Yassine? For nearly four decades 
the late king, Hassan II ruled and reigned autocratically. He could not conceive of 
the possibility of sharing power with anyone, let alone seriously questioning his 
legitimacy. He faced scores of political, religious, civil and military dissidents and 
did not hesitate to ruthlessly crush whoever was deemed a potential threat to his 
rule. Stories of those who did not disappear for good or dissolved in acid like what 
is believed to have happened to Mehdi Ben Barka,2 a brilliant mathematician and 
opposition leftist leader of international renown, but had to spend long years in 
abject secret detention centres, like the notorious Tazmamart, are now available 
for anyone interested to have an idea about the atrocities committed since 
Morocco regained its independence in 1956.3 
If that is the rule of King Hassan‟s rule, does it not have any exception? The early 
1970s provides us with an answer that may confirm the idea that “tough rule” 
generates “tough opposition”.4 A brilliant intellectual and scholar, as is now often 
described by his admirers as well as by his harsh critics, unexpectedly stepped 
forward to say publicly and emphatically to the king the very word he did not 
tolerate: No. His famous letter, Islam or the Deluge, which he sent to Hassan II in 
1974, explains why it was high time to say so to the Commander of the Faithful. 
Since then a popular belief circulated to the effect that the king feared Sheikh 
Yassine. This was confirmed later by a number of diplomats and observers such as 
Hofman, a German diplomat and former ambassador to Morocco, in his review of 
Yassine‟s book, Winning the Modern World for Islam and also by Stephen Hughes 
who, after an interview with Yassine, seemed perplexed that though there was 
“nothing fearsome in his [Yassine‟s] demeanour, …King Hassan feared him.”5  
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What made a determined autocrat like Hassan II fear a single person who had 
neither the fame nor the support that other prominent Moroccan figures like Allal al-
Afassi or Ben Barka enjoyed?6 Certainly Yassine did have his share of the 
monarch‟s bounty in the form of imprisonment, a decade-long house arrest, 
constant harassment, but it is almost nothing compared to what the victims of 
Tazmamart, for example, suffered. What spared Yassine a similar fate? How did 
he manage to start an Islamic movement now widely believed to be the largest and 
best organized in Morocco under the eyes of a monarch whose major defect was 
that he was only too much authoritative?7 
This chapter focuses on the personality of the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and the 
events and experiences which have contributed to shape his thought and strategy 
for social and political reform in Morocco. It seeks to examine his early childhood, 
his education and career and his Sufi experience and see how all of these have 
combined and impacted the form of Islamism which makes him and his movement 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan different in important respects from other Islamic groups in 
Morocco as well as in other Arab countries. It is expected to contribute significantly 
to answer a number of what appears to be intriguing and perplexing questions as 
to the true nature of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and the particular appeal it has been able to 
maintain in Morocco over the last three decades, which is our major concern in this 
study. 
2.1 Birth, upbringing and career8  
On Monday morning, 4th Rabi‟ II, 1347 of the Muslim calendar, corresponding 20th 
September 1928, Abdessalam Yassine was born in Marrakech, a city known for its 
“Seven Saints” as well as a number of distinguished scholars and leaders and 
decisive events in Morocco‟s history. His father Muhammad ibn Salam ibn 
Abdellah ibn Ibrahim was a poor, Berber peasant who left his village Ait Zeltan in 
Haha in the Suss region and came to settle down in Marrakech at an early age. 
Yassine is part of an old family called “Ait Bihi” whose lineage goes back to Mulay 
Idriss I, one of the great grandsons of Prophet Muhammad and founder of the first 
Islamic rule in Morocco. 
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As a child Abdessalam Yassine entered a religious school (Maahad Dini) founded 
by Almukhtar As-Sussi, an eminent scholar whose writings cover a wide range of 
topics including literature, history, Arabic sciences, and the like. There young 
Yassine demonstrated that he was a gifted learner with a prodigious memory and a 
brilliant intellect. He committed the whole Quran in a very short time and acquired a 
high command of the Arabic language to the extent that he could write poetry 
before the age of twelve. The language of the Quran, he reports, has had a great 
impact on his personality and his writings.9 
Prior to his admission to Ibn Yussef Institute for Arabic and Islamic studies in 
Marrakech in 1943, Yassine was interviewed by two members of the admissions 
committee who were impressed by his high achievement level. Consequently, they 
decided that he skip the primary level entirely (which at the time usually took three 
years of study) and be admitted directly to secondary schooling level. He spent 
there four years during which he excelled among his classmates. However, he did 
not confine himself to what was taught at the Institute, which he sometimes found 
unsatisfactory and lacking in creativity, but he read whatever came to hand, 
besides starting on his own learning some foreign languages. In a recent interview 
with this author, he said: 
I had an insatiable thirst for learning and I did not focus on one special field of 
study. I read a lot on Western and world culture and civilization, and my reading 
involved a wide variety of subjects: history, literature, Arts, sociology, psychology, 
foreign languages, classic music… [and he could have added: besides learning 
how to play certain musical instruments, namely the violin]. In fact, by those days‟ 
standards, you could say that I spent a good deal of money on the acquisition of a 
collection of classical music recordings, and Beethoven‟s fifth symphony had its 
special appeal. (…) I can‟t believe what I was doing at the time. I wanted to do 
everything, … To give just one example, when I tried to learn the Russian 
language, I wanted to do it as fast as possible. So, once I learnt some basic 
things about that language, I picked up Tolstoy‟s War and Peace, a huge volume, 
as you know, and started to read it in Russian. [He smiled] (…)This… shows that 
unless you have the right methodology and proper supervision, your energy and 
enthusiasm might involve you in unrealistic objectives…10  
In 1947, after passing a competitive exam to recruit primary education teachers, 
Yassine entered the teacher training school in Rabat. This change in educational 
settings and circumstances which involved moving from Marrakech, the southern 
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capital of the Berber region, to Rabat, a modern administrative city, proved very 
beneficial to young Yassine‟s life experience. He would have the opportunity to 
meet other people from different Moroccan regions, particularly at the boarding 
school of Mulay Youssef where he stayed during his training course. During break 
times or when and where the opportunity arose, he and other students would meet 
together to share their concerns, exchange ideas or debate issues of special 
interest. In a word, the new environment, and especially the competitiveness which 
was encouraged among students, had a positive impact on his efforts to boost his 
abilities and broaden his knowledge. This does not mean that everything was fine. 
He never forgot some officials‟ discriminating treatment of his group of students 
compared to the lavish care and respect reserved to the “Francophone” group 
students. But this only made him even more determined to increase his knowledge 
of foreign languages. 
After graduation with highest distinction, Yassine was appointed in 1948 as an 
Arabic teacher at a primary school called at the time Madrassat al-A‟ayan (School 
of the Notables) in Eljadida, a small town on the Atlantic coast, about 60 miles 
south of Casablanca. As his father had died earlier that year and his mother had no 
other children, Yassine had to bring her to live with him in his new home in 
Eljadida. 
Still young and full of energy and ambition, young Yassine adapted quickly to his 
new circumstances; and despite the demands of his new teaching position, which 
he fulfilled well, nothing would deter him from pursuing his studies. In fact, he was 
able to successfully complete in a few years a high degree at the Institute for 
Higher Islamic Studies in Rabat. Shortly afterwards, he went back to Marrakech to 
work as a teacher of Arabic and translation, a position which he held for three 
years. In October 1955 he sat for a competitive exam for the recruitment of school 
inspectors and, upon his success, he was named to the post of Arabic School 
Inspector (of primary and later of secondary levels too). 
When Morocco achieved its independence in 1956, Mr Yassine was among the 
first generation of young educated Moroccans who were assigned to a position of 
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responsibility. However, all of the posts he was appointed to from 1956 until he left 
in 1968, the activities he supervised or in which he participated, the contributions 
he made were related to education and the Ministry of Education. They may be 
summed up as follows: 
1.  Primary and secondary school inspection in different regions of Morocco; 
2.  Regional educational and administrative positions (Casablanca in Oct. 1957; 
Marrakech in Jan. 1963); 
3.  Director of the Teacher Training School (Marrakech in May 1959); 
4.  Director of the School Inspector Training Centre (Rabat in Oct. 1965); 
5.  He authored and co-authored a number of school textbooks and published 
other studies on education in general and in particular on the acquisition and 
development of certain skills such as: How to Write a Pedagogical Essay; 
6.  He attended many educational training courses abroad, ranging from a few 
days to seven months: in France, USA, Lebanon, Tunis, Algeria, and other 
African countries. 
What should be noted here is that Yassine‟s road to professional success was not 
always paved with roses, nor was he ever satisfied with the working 
circumstances. He never concealed his opinions or his indignation at unfair 
practices so much so that in certain cases what he was being offered in the form of 
a promotion was much more a way to keep him away than anything else. Yassine 
was not totally unaware of these manoeuvres. No wonder that he, like many other 
educated Moroccans, was long worried that the country was not put on the right 
track after independence, and as a result corruption, clientelism, mismanagement 
and the like defects were spreading rapidly within the power structure. Yassine got 
more and more uneasy about such unfortunate developments whereas his integrity 
and rejection of corrupt practices seemed to have become increasingly 
embarrassing to government officials. In 1968 Yassine stopped going to work 
partly for health reasons and partly for what he found unbearable working 
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conditions. The authorities could not have agreed more to such an exit. He never 
showed up and they never called him back. 
2.2 A Turning point 
By 1965 Mr Yassine had achieved a position deemed socially very comfortable. 
Professionally, he had moved through the hierarchy of the public system until he 
became, as he described himself later in his famous letter to King Hassan, “one of 
the princes of the Moroccan administration.”11 Materially, he had acquired all the 
means viewed as signs of a successful career and a happy life. He had a nice 
Mercedes car which only a few people could afford at the time, a large “villa” (a 
mansion) and a decent income. Intellectually, he was a highly educated man and 
above all he regarded himself as a good Muslim. He fulfilled his prayers and other 
religious duties regularly and read the Quran from time to time in order not to forget 
it. Was there anything else that could be sought for? 
Yet Yassine was far from being satisfied and when he approached the age of forty, 
he was all of a sudden overwhelmed by a kind of anxiety over the meaning of life 
and death and of his existence, a deep feeling that there was something missing in 
him. Though he had never neglected his religious duties, he discovered that his 
Islam was flat and his prayers were devoid of spiritual warmth. It was, as he 
described it later, a kind of spiritual awakening that some people mistook for 
craziness.12 What he experienced, however, was too powerful to be discouraged 
by what others might say about him. 
Yassine talked about this critical moment of his life several times and tried hard to 
explain what had happened. Once he pointed out that even the word “crisis”, 
though he himself sometimes used it, was not adequate to describe what he went 
through. For him “it was a pure quest for God.”13 He regretted that though he had 
achieved many things and learnt through independent study and wide reading what 
made him in the eyes of his peers a cultivated man, he found out then that the 
most important thing had escaped him, that is, to know his Creator. This 
awareness was all the more intensified when he started reading books on Sufism 
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and got familiar with the testimony of many eminent and trustworthy scholars such 
as Abu Hamid al-Ghazali and what they had achieved in this respect. 
One of the basic things Yassine learnt from reading a wide range of Sufi books 
was that unless he was assisted and guided by a Sufi sheikh, his endeavours 
would lead him nowhere. The question, however, was: where could he find this 
man and how could he trust that he was the right guide? These were not futile 
questions and their legitimacy stems from the fact that many disparaging remarks 
were, and still are, attributed rightly or wrongly to Sufi Orders. How to overcome 
such an obstacle, Yassine did not know for sure; nonetheless, he was determined 
to continue his search. At one moment, he even considered going to Indonesia, but 
he soon learnt that he did not have to go that far and that the man he was looking 
for was nearby in a small village called Madagh near Oujda, in north-eastern 
Morocco. 
Talking about his encounter with his Sufi sheikh, Al-Haj al-Abbas, he writes: 
I met a sheikh named Al-Abbas, and I saw him for six years. He was not illiterate, 
but he only had a traditional rural education. On the other hand, I, I who was 
imbued at the time with my own self sufficiency –I was an important person at the 
Ministry of Education– I became his disciple, his humble disciple, and I 
understood what was Islam, what was God. Very humbly I recognized that this 
man gave me a great deal.14 
Yassine vividly recalled those days and what he had to go through not only before 
but also after he had met Al-Haj al-Abbas. During his search it took him a lot of 
time, patience and perseverance before he could say for sure he found the very 
man he had been looking for; and once it was known that he had joined a Sufi 
order, many people could not believe it. How could Yassine, with the talents, 
intellect and knowledge he had, have made such a choice, many wondered. 
Others thought and, in fact, did spread the news that Yassine had gone mad. What 
tended to mitigate, however, the pressure that was coming from all sides, from 
relatives, colleagues, friends, and even from close family members was the new 
spiritual experience itself which started to bear fruit shortly after his consent to be a 
disciple of al-Haj al-Abbas.15 
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To be fair it is not surprising that some people should disagree or even be 
dismayed that Yassine should have joined the Bouchechia Sufi Order, particularly 
at an age when he was thought to be a very mature person and was not expected 
to make a rash decision or a reckless choice. Sufism is one of the issues upon 
which Muslim scholars have widely disagreed for centuries. At the one extreme of 
the spectrum there are those who reject it altogether regarding it as a phenomenon 
alien to Islam; at the other we find those who considers it the only acceptable form 
of Islam; but between the complete rejection and the unconditional acceptance we 
met with eminent scholars -and Ibn Taymia is just one among many others- who 
have adopted a rather balanced point of view.16 We will turn to discuss this issue 
later on. 
Suffice it to say here that Yassine‟s encounter with Sheikh al-Abbas marked the 
beginning of a new phase of Yassine‟s life which lasted for six years and during 
which he had the chance, as he said, to read “the Quran and the prophetic Sunna 
with a new heart.”17 
Anyone who is familiar with Sufi culture knows well that obedience is one of the 
basic conditions to join the Sufi sphere, and in certain cases it is pushed to the 
extreme. Yassine, however, seemed to have lived his Sufi experience in a rather 
different way. He never lost critical thinking or refrained from speaking against what 
he considered not allowed by Islam. Thus, while he was still affiliated with the 
Bouchichiya Brotherhood, he used to speak against some practices which he 
thought do not conform with the Islamic principles to the extent that he was dubbed 
“Mr Yassine Sharia” by members of the Brotherhood, meaning that he insisted too 
much on respect for the Sharia precepts. 
Unfortunately, his remarks were not welcomed and his efforts to stop the 
deviations that were creeping into the Zawiya were not very successful, particularly 
because his Sufi master had become very old and the Brotherhood had grown 
considerably and continued to attract new members of different social classes. This 
was not always beneficial for the Zawiya, for it created more problems than it 
solved them. For Yassine, the Zawiya already ceased to be the modest place it 
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used to be. When he first joined it, he found a few plain people sitting on straw 
mats and their food was very simple. That simplicity was gone and the Zawiya, as 
he explained later, became “a site of consumption,” instead of “a refuge for the 
poor.” “I saw furniture introduced into the Zawiya and how it was invaded by 
gifts.”18 
In 1972 the man whom Yassine held dear to his heart and followed [i.e. al-Haj al-
Abbas] passed away. Yassine stayed on in the hope that the people of the 
Boutchichi Zawiya might be willing to accommodate certain changes and thus be 
led to play a more positive role in society. Unfortunately, things did not evolve as 
he had wished, and, once convinced that the Zawiya was not going to improve in 
any significant way, he decided to leave for good but quietly. 
Some people have offered a different explanation of his rupture with the Boutchichi 
Zawiya. They claim that the real cause of his departure is that he had aspired to 
become the leader of the Butchichya after the death of Sheikh al-Abbas, but when 
the leadership was passed to the latter‟s son al-Haj Hamza, he felt disappointed 
and left. This explanation, unfounded and of which there is no mention even in the 
writings of the Butchichya itself, has been picked up and reiterated by some 
authors.19 In so doing, they seem to be unaware of the contradiction such an 
explanation would entail. That is the last thing Yassine could have coveted. It is not 
in line with what Yassine searched for and for which he devoted his whole life. Why 
should he take the long, hard road to something which he could have achieved via 
many a short cut? “I had no personal ambition,” he said. “I had this ambition which 
goes beyond limits, which transcends life and death: I wanted to please God.”20 
Admittedly, an outsider may find this hard to digest. 
Indeed one author has come up with an idea which says that “the break with the 
brotherhood served later in the creation of the figure of the saint.”21 This claim, I 
argue, is no more valid than the previous one. It entails bringing together two 
contradictory and mutually exclusive aspects. To claim that Yassine, or anyone for 
that matter, is a Sufi and he seeks to be recognised as “a saint” or “a hero” among 
people is like saying Mr X is tall and short at the same time, or that he is at the 
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same time a Christian and a Muslim. Therefore, those who are convinced that 
Yassine is craving for “leadership” or being regarded as “a hero”, should at least 
stop speaking about his Sufi origin, practices and ideas in order to avoid self-
evident contradiction. 
In 1972 and 1973 Sheikh Yassine published two books: the first is called Al-Islam 
byna ad-Da‟wa wa ad-Dawla [Islam between the Call and the State] (480 pages); 
and the second, a quite voluminous one (950 pages) is entitled Al-Islam Ghadan 
[Islam Tomorrow]. In these two books he discusses a wide range of topics, 
stressing the dire need for reform in Morocco and, more importantly, the method or 
the way to achieve the required reform smoothly and peacefully. He also 
emphasized the need to educate the people considering them the decisive factor in 
any attempt to reform Muslim societies. In the mean time he warns against 
violence, which he rejects by temperament as well as by principle, as a means to 
achieve social and political reforms. 
There is no space here to go into the issues explored in these two voluminous 
works, but a few remarks may be in order. The first thing that may strike the reader 
is the kind of topics being investigated, and from this it is not hard to come to the 
conclusion that Yassine‟s rupture with the Zawiya traditions and restrictions is as 
good as complete. His field of interest has now enlarged to include the society as a 
whole instead of focusing on himself only and being confined within the boundaries 
of the Zawiya and its affairs. The second point a cautious reader cannot fail to note 
has to do with the way he expounds his ideas in these two books. We can already 
discern that he is trying to work out a comprehensive vision of the deep change he 
expects to take place in Morocco, though this vision is substantially reviewed in his 
later writings.22 A third point concerns a section of the wide and diversified 
audience he is targeting and the message he intends to bring home. But it could 
not be said that his project at this stage is revolutionary, for at the time, when he 
wrote those books, he still hoped the reform might come from the top. It never did 
and Yassine had to think of something else. 
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2.3 A bold initiative  
When Yassine noticed that the regime had not taken note of his suggestions and 
no steps had been taken to prevent the situation in the country from getting worse, 
he thought of an initiative to convey his message clearly and secure the conditions 
for his voice to be heard. This was considered to be very important, if not 
unavoidable, in order for him to say for sure whether there was any political will to 
undertake the required reforms or not. He talked to some close friends about his 
intention to write an open letter to King Hassan II. Only two, Muhammad al-Alawi 
and Ahmad al-Mallakh, agreed to the idea whereas others tried to deter him, 
claiming that the prevailing circumstances were not suitable and the monarch 
would not tolerate such an initiative, all the more so as he had just been the target 
of two attempted coups. Yassine had a different view and went on with his project, 
a letter of more than 110 pages which he completed and published in 1974. 
What is astonishing about this letter, which is highly admired by many, dismissed 
by some as “suicidal”, and described by others, in a rather typically English tone, 
as “not very diplomatic”,23 is not only its language which “clearly reflects Yassine‟s 
elegant style and confident command of the language”24 but also its content which 
would take no small amount of courage and confidence in order to compose and 
address to a king like Hassan II.  
My letter is unlike any other you have received so far. It renders an answer 
obligatory, and even your silence will be an eloquent response. Perhaps you will 
read it as potentates read letters from common people, but you will have to 
respond to it [in one way or another]… 
No matter what your answer might be, …you will not be able to forbid the word of 
truth and justice which I proclaim. (...) You should know that God, the Glorious, 
cannot be vanquished, and that He may task the weakest of his servants with a 
great mission…and [may I add that] I am that humble, weak servant.25 
Trying to revive an Islamic tradition, that is, the duty of Muslim scholars to give 
Annassiha (advice) to rulers when they get involved in acts of oppression or allow 
unjust practices, Yassine raises in his letter a number of sensitive issues such as 
the concept of bay‟ah (oath of allegiance) and how it has been manipulated by the 
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king and cloaked in rituals and ceremonies which, to say the least, are humiliating 
to human dignity: 
Has it ever occurred to you that every man has his dignity, and he whom you 
obliged to prostrate himself before you, in front of everyone and on television 
curses you in his heart because of your contempt for human dignity? You must be 
mad if you think that those who are at your service adore you, and prostate 
themselves out respect for your person and the kingdom.26 
He also denounces the king‟s extravagant life-style and his squandering of the 
country‟s resources whereas the majority of Moroccans are floundering about in 
poverty. He warns him against the dangers that beset the country and invites him 
to take genuine steps and implement the reforms that Morocco is in dire need of. 
He stresses that he should follow the example of great leaders such as Umar ibn 
Abd al-Aziz (682 – 720)27   in the Islamic history and prove his sincerity through 
deeds and not words. In brief, it could be said that the king‟s true character, not the 
image he carved for himself and inflated and embellished all the more by a phalanx 
of flatters around him, is being exposed to the public and commented on in the 
clearest way possible. 
The other major issue dealt with in Yassine‟s letter and to which he devotes a 
whole chapter concerns the scholarly community.28 This raises the question as to 
the rationale behind targeting an institution which in effect had no power. Why 
should it be implicated when it was the king, as it was well known, who ruled and 
made all the decisions? To answer this question, a bit of cultural and historical 
backdrop should prove helpful. 
If we examine Islamic history, it should be crystal clear that specialists in the matter 
of religion, commonly called Ulama, have always been of great importance to 
Muslim societies. Though they have never developed into a clerical institution 
similar to the one defined by Christianity in the Middle Ages, their importance have 
never been questioned. The reason, as Hudson has put it, is that “Islam in the Arab 
world …permeates the daily life of the individuals with its ritualistic obligations…it 
affects personal status [and] it plays a political role.”29 Thus it is only natural that 
the role of Islamic scholars, given their specialisation in the field, should continue to 
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wield special significance. Their consultation is sought and their views, albeit not 
always put into effect, are requested not only on personal matters but also on 
social, commercial, financial and political affairs. 
In Morocco, until the early decades of the twentieth century, the Ulama had 
maintained a significant share of influence which sometimes outweighed that of the 
monarch himself, as manifested by their active role in the deposition of Sultan 
Mulay Abdel Aziz in 1908.30 Though such cases are not frequent, they 
nevertheless attest to the potential power and respect the Ulama could command. 
When Hassan II ascended the throne in 1961, he was fully aware of the 
challenging power the Ulama could pose, and since he knew only too well that his 
despotic tendencies and policies would most likely provoke the anger and the 
protest of Moroccan scholars, or at least some of them, he adopted a number of 
strategies in order to keep them under tight control. This is not where to investigate 
those strategies in detail,31 but suffice it to say here that their end results were 
detrimental, probably more than the king had expected. Not only did the Ulama 
become submissive to an alarming degree and refrain from speaking against un-
Islamic practices, but they also willingly functioned as a tool serving the interests of 
the monarchy and legitimising its policies.  
Given the historical importance of the Ulama in Moroccan society, as explained 
briefly above, and the significant role they could play to put the country on the right 
track after a decades-long history of despotic rule, it is no wonder that Yassine 
should address them in his letter, though the bulk of criticism is levelled at the king. 
He regrets that they give up their noble duty and accept to be pawns in the hands 
of what he considered a corrupt ruler. Instead of speaking against moral, social 
and political degeneration and supporting the welfare of the community, they 
applaud the official discourse and endorse the regime‟s unpopular and unjust 
practices. If many young Moroccans turn to Marxist-Leninist ideologies,32 he 
argues, it is because of the court scholars‟ –“worms of the books”, as described in 
an old saying– as well as the despotic ruler‟s tampering with Islam. Both are to 
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blame, he contends. He calls on them to repent and join forces in order to save the 
country.  
When the king learnt about Yassine‟s letter, it came as no surprise that he was 
infuriated and so were the scholars of the state. What further exacerbated the king, 
however, was not only its content and the manner in which he was addressed but 
also the fact that it was made public. Yassine meant it. He wanted to make sure 
that the people were aware of the true story if anything unpleasant happened to 
him. Thus when he wrote his letter, he sent about two thousand copies by post to 
prominent people in the Moroccan society such as lawyers, Ulama (Islamic 
scholars), teachers, doctors,…whose details were taken from the phone book. 
Only a week later did he send two copies to Hassan II through the Governor of 
Marrakech. 
The king‟s response to the letter was quick and harsh, though publicly he tried to 
ignore it in order to defuse its effects. He sent Yassine to a psychiatric hospital 
where he was detained for three and a half years without trial. His two companions 
Muhammad al-Alawi and Ahmad al-Malakh, who aided him in printing and 
distributing the letter, were interned in a secret detention centre in Casablanca for 
fifteen months. Harsh as it may be, some people find this punishment rather soft 
compared to what normally happens to anyone who dares take a similar initiative. 
As Munson points out, “Most Moroccans aware of Yassine‟s epistle of 1974 cannot 
believe that Hassan II did not have him killed.”33 
Why did he take such a serious risk then? A number of explanations have been put 
forward. According to one, Yassine‟s letter should be put into its historical, social 
and political context in order to better understand the real motive of its author and 
the conditions which made the implementation of such an idea possible. In the 
early 1970s the military had tried at least twice to overthrow the monarchy but 
failed. The left had also made several attempts but without success. Meanwhile the 
Islamic resurgence had been gaining ground everywhere in the Arab and Islamic 
world, providing what was deemed a powerful tool to rebel against the ruling 
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establishment. Yassine seemed to have read the situation correctly and exploited it 
skilfully for his initiative.34 
Another explanation which is close to the one just referred to considers the 
initiative from another perspective. It maintains that with the collapse of the 
scholarly community in Morocco which began under the French colonial rule and 
continued during the reign of Hassan II, a space was created for the reinvention of 
the Moroccan tradition of Nasiha [advice to the ruler]. Yassine, as implied by this 
theory of “empty space”, only seized the opportunity to fill the void and managed, in 
the view of others, to turn himself into the figure of a hero and martyr.35 
A slightly different explanation from the second speaks about what it calls “the 
concentrated challenge”. The argument here is that since the breakdown of the 
scholarly establishment “enabled religio-political authority to be concentrated in the 
figure of the king, then the same developments enabled a similarly concentrated 
challenge to the throne after independence.”36 Accordingly, Yassine and his 
famous letter to the King Hassan II may well represent this “concentrated 
challenge”. 
The problem with these three explanations is that they do not tell us in any 
convincing manner why Yassine was the only person who had spotted such a 
“valuable moment” and exploited it for his project. Were there not other religious 
Moroccans among a population of about 20 million at the time who were at least as 
clever as Yassine? If the moment was “suitable for challenging the king”, as 
claimed, why did not other Moroccan Islamists rush for the opportunity or at least 
follow suit? Though it cannot be denied that there were some attempts, albeit 
limited, it cannot be denied either that they were dealt with immediately and easily. 
There are a plethora of questions to challenge the suggested explanations above, 
and if we could agree with some of the descriptive aspects of their argument, it 
would be hard, given the available facts, to accept the substance of their 
conclusions. 
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A fourth explanation attempts the field of mythology to account for the letter which 
made the case of its author a cause celebre. It postulates that Yassine‟s initiative 
to write directly to the king in the special manner he did, seemed to be the only 
option available at the time in order for Yassine to appropriate the image of “the 
saintly scholar willing to stand up defiantly against the corrupt sultan.”37 The 
purport of the argument is that Yassine was desperately in need to build up the 
required personal charisma for his political success, and to achieve this end he 
resorted to an old myth, that is, “the myth of the righteous man of God”. What may 
corroborate this theory, it is argued, is that much of Yassine‟s popular support is 
derived from this image. 
For those who are not familiar with the Islamic religion, culture and civilization and 
Arabic language, this explanation might pass unnoticed or at least be considered 
as one possibility among others. However, if it is examined from an Islamic 
perspective, it simply cannot be accepted. The core of the matter is that the debate 
triggered by Yassine‟s initiative is not predicated on a common platform. It rather 
involves two spheres which are basically distinct, though common points cannot be 
ruled out. Each has its own logic which differs significantly from the other. Unless 
we take this into account, discussion of issues of the sort we are considering may 
continue as long as we want and theories may proliferate, but this would not serve 
in any meaningful way sound scholarship and mutual understanding. I need not 
add that to understand does not necessarily mean to agree; and to disagree does 
not automatically entail grabbing at whatever comes to imagination; and to meet 
the academic standards does mean attacking indiscriminately, using whatever 
comes to hand. 
That said, let us consider briefly the simple, but not trivial, reasons behind 
Yassine‟s initiative which remains, whether we agree or not, no small feat. Drawing 
on Yassine‟s writings and interviews, a number of reasons could be identified. 
First, he meant to remind the Ulama of their traditional role as the guardians of the 
Sharia and their duty to enjoin good and forbid evil. That is why a complete chapter 
in his letter was devoted to them. The intended message is that if the Ulama do not 
speak against the evil of corruption which is widespread at all levels, as King 
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Hassan himself admitted in a broadcast on 20th August 197038, against the grinding 
poverty from which many people are suffering, against humiliation to which the 
Moroccan people are being subjected when they go hospital to see a doctor or 
when they to go to any government building to ask for an administrative service, 
however small it may be,…if they do not speak against these evils, then when are 
they expected to react? 
A second reason for writing the open letter to the monarch was that Yassine 
sought to revive a traditional Islamic practice called an-nassiha (frank advice, 
counsel) which the Ulama were supposed to offer rulers to ensure they conform to 
the basic principles of Islam which stress, among other things, a just form of 
government and fair distribution of wealth. According to Islamic teachings when an-
nassiha involves an unjust ruler, it is considered the best type of jihad, and if as a 
consequence the person undertaking such an initiative is killed, he is regarded the 
best of martyrs.39 It is a practice through which the Ulama could exercise their 
traditional role vis-à-vis the ruling power and reduce the chance of outright 
authoritarianism which is the root cause of the plight affecting Muslim societies to 
this day. 
A third reason is that Yassine thought that the shock effect of the letter might lead 
the king to reconsider his ways and undertake the required reforms. Yassine was 
not totally unrealistic, for he had in mind examples of some Muslim rulers who, 
despite inheriting power, proved capable of radical change. Umar ibn Abdelaziz, 
the Ummayad Caliph, is a case in point. 
A fourth reason is that Yassine seemed to prefer the top-down approach to reform 
because he thought it would secure the cooperation and involvement of all in the 
process and thus save Morocco time, energy, resources and, above all, the 
prospect of being dragged into internal conflicts which were in nobody‟s interest. 
Despite the appealing advantages of such an approach, King Hassan seemed 
determined to maintain the status quo, and Sheikh Yassine decided to take 
another course of action. 
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2.4 A change of strategy 
When Sheikh Yassine regained his freedom in March 1978, he tried to deliver 
some religious talks in a local mosque not far from his house, but the authorities 
soon intervened and stopped him. He denounced what he considered an attempt 
to silence him or to prevent him from having contact with people. Since then, his 
house was going to be a point of attraction for many people not only from 
Marrakech, the city where he was still living, but also from all over Morocco. 
To be sure, knowing that his house was closely monitored, not many people could 
show up at the beginning, but with the passage of time their number increased, 
though the purposes of their visit were not necessarily the same. While some 
visitors came just of curiosity to meet the man who had the courage to stand up 
against King Hassan II, others wanted to find out about his views regarding certain 
issues and what should be done to overcome the problems facing the Islamic 
groupings at the time, particularly their fragmentation and apparent ineffectiveness. 
It may be worth noting here that while Sheikh Yassine was still in detention, a 
serious incident happened which had a very negative impact on the Islamic 
landscape. In 1975 Omar Benjelloun, a member of the political bureau of the 
Socialist Union of the Popular Forces (USFP), was assaulted and killed in front of 
his house in Casablanca. The Moroccan regime claimed that the Islamic Youth 
Association, founded by Abdelkarim Motii, former inspector of primary education, 
was implicated in the assassination. Motii, however, denied this accusation 
claiming that it was a plot staged by the Moroccan authorities to get rid of him as 
well as of the leftist activist Omar Benjelloun.40 
Whatever the situation might be, the consequences of that tragic incident were 
detrimental to Islamic revivalism in Morocco. Sheikh Yassine contemplated the 
whole scene and thought that perhaps the best thing to do was to get in touch with 
the various Islamic associations and see if they could join forces and merge into a 
single organization, for the prevailing fragmentation and the resulting weakness 
only played in the hands of the regime. 
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The project seemed appealing and, in order to campaign for it, Sheikh Yassine 
started in 1979 an Islamic journal which he called “Aljamaa” [the group], which is 
very revealing. It was meant to be the prelude for a direct contact with Islamic 
groups, scholars, mosque preachers and whoever might be interested in the 
project. Despite its modest appearance, and despite being obstructed and even 
frequently confiscated by the authorities, the journal did reach many readers, albeit 
usually from hand to hand.  
Meanwhile Yassine and/ or other people who supported his idea undertook several 
trips to different Moroccan cities, met leaders or prominent members of other 
Islamic groups as well as some independent Islamic figures and tried to persuade 
them to overcome the prevailing factionalism and work together to save the 
country. Unfortunately, the response was not very encouraging, to say the least. 
Sheikh Yassine was reluctant to add, as he would put it, a new element to an 
already fragmented scene,41 but left with not other option, he finally agreed to 
establish an association which officially saw the light of day in September 1981. 
However, to start an association was not all that mattered to launch an organized 
Islamic action. What was more important was the guiding principles and the line of 
thinking to be adopted and where to be positioned regarding certain issues upon 
which Moroccan Islamists seemed to disagree a great deal at the time. In fact, the 
problem of factionalism dominating the Islamic landscape then was largely due to 
differences of opinion on some of those issues. Hence, convinced that knowledge 
should precede action, as the saying has it, and that clarity was the best policy, 
Yassine thought it was the moment to begin publishing what he called al-Minhaj 
an-Nabawi (The Prophetic Method), a book of which the first part appeared indeed 
in al-Jamaa Journal, No.8, in 1981. We will discuss later some of its features, but 
here I will try to sum up some of the guiding principles raised in al-Minhaj an-
Nabawi and see how they helped to clarify in advance the identity, so to speak, 
and the image of the newly-born group. 
First, Yassine stresses in the clearest way possible that violence is to be rejected 
categorically whatever the circumstances, and as if to reassure the sceptics, he 
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reiterates on various occasions that it is a question of principle based on Prophetic 
recommendations as is clear from the following: “God is gentle and likes 
gentleness and he rewards for gentleness what he does not reward for harshness 
or anything else.”42 The topic is tackled later in other Yassine‟s works and 
speeches. 
Second, he also rejects underground activism and speaks about his intention to 
seek legal recognition and be allowed to express openly his ideas and opinions. He 
explains that to go underground would only serve the ruling authorities which may 
at any moment fabricate anything against their opponents and crack down on them 
without any fear of a backlash from the public opinion and human rights 
organizations. It is worth noting that this idea which is now widely accepted was not 
so evident at the time. Some Islamists claimed that the new comer, i.e Yassine, 
had no experience and was not aware of the consequences of what he was doing 
and saying. In some extreme cases he was accused of working for the Palace and 
Zionism to uncover Islamists and render them an easy target for the regime. 
Third, Yassine speaks about the necessity to be independent organizationally and 
financially. He points out to the detrimental consequences of being manipulated by 
any foreign or domestic force. Thus he and his group have never accepted or 
received any financial aid from the rich Gulf region, for example, or any other 
foreign country. They believed that their stances are, and should always remain, in 
line with their ideals and according to the best of their judgement. This is 
considered one of the strengths of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, that is, its capacity to maintain 
its autonomy. The Moroccan authorities have been constantly on the watch, yet, 
they have never established any organizational or financial link between the 
movement and any foreign power.  
Forth, he emphasises that neither he nor any one for that matter has a monopoly 
on understanding Islam or an exclusive representation of Muslims. He criticises 
those who claim that their group is the only Islamic one and the rest are wrong and 
should be dismantled or adhere to theirs. It is a kind of narrow-mindedness for 
which there is no justification. It is true that there are some aspects so explicit that 
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no two Muslims can disagree upon, but there are other issues which are open to 
interpretation. Such being the case, no interpretation could be claimed to be more 
valid than others. Only time and practice can tell in such cases which is more 
accurate than which. 
Fifth, despite some unpleasant practices, argues Yassine, Moroccan society 
cannot be claimed to be completely disconnected from Islam. The Moroccan 
people are highly respectful of, and still attached to their religion in general, though 
the degree of understanding and commitment may differ from one person to 
another. The point here is meant to refute the idea of ascribing jahiliya to Muslim 
societies. This concept, which will be discussed in chapter 4 of this thesis, was a 
recurrent theme in some Islamists‟ writings. The endeavours of Sheikh Yassine to 
keep away young Moroccans from such an extreme interpretation are now well 
known.  
Sixth, he makes it clear that he is for gradual change, flexibility and dialogue as a 
way of settling differences or searching for a common platform to undertake the 
reforms the country is badly in need of. A long history, he argues, of 
mismanagement, authoritarianism, and corruption cannot be settled overnight, but 
it is crucial that there should be a clear agenda, an adequate approach and a 
sound beginning. 
Seventh, he emphasises moral and spiritual education as well as scholarly training, 
effective organization and civic and political engagement. He believes that to focus 
on one aspect of Islam at the expense of others would not help to revive Islam or 
create the conditions conducive for the liberation of an Umma which has been 
under the yoke of authoritarianism for centuries. He knows that there are those 
who would misunderstand his insistence on spiritual education as proof of the 
continuing influence of, and yearning for his former Sufi experience, but Yassine 
would not be deterred by what he regards unfounded claims. The movement he 
has in mind should be broad in its scope and even politics, notwithstanding its 
importance, should only be part of its mission, but not all that matters.43 
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In sum, with the publication of al-Minhaj an-Nabawi (the Prophetic Method) and the 
dissemination of its signposts some of which have been referred to above, it could 
be said that the conditions for starting an organised action had been completed. 
The next step, as it will be shown in the next chapter, was to move from theory to 
practice, that is, to translate a project which until then was only committed to paper 
on the ground. 
2.5 Conclusion 
The trajectory of Yassine‟s own life since his early childhood till the moment he 
became politically engaged provides us with a number of clues as to the nature of 
his project, how it started and developed and the factors that contributed to 
shaping his choices over the years. Though his early education was traditional, he 
could not be identified with the common image of the Moroccan Alim (scholar) 
confined to his traditional concerns and tamed and subjected to unprecedented 
state control. Taking advantage of his talents, Yassine learnt to speak and write in 
different languages, got familiar with European culture and history and assimilated 
issues and theories of special interest in various fields of knowledge. This, in 
addition to his Islamic studies, had its bearing on his perception of Muslim society 
and what he would suggest for its rejuvenation and progress. 
His career pathway, besides allowing him to travel a lot and see the world, gave 
him the opportunity to explore an area of interest considered vital for development 
and progress, i.e. the education sector. It enabled him to acquire valuable 
expertise from which he benefited a great deal to devise the educational 
programme he set for the members of his movement. 
His Sufi experience constitutes another highly significant factor in developing his 
theory for social and political reform as well as for the revival of Islam in Morocco 
and elsewhere, in Arab and Muslim countries. The logic of the theory and approach 
he adopted brought him face to face with an authoritarian monarch. It was a test 
and the success he achieved has made many people trust his ideas, namely about 
how to build up and improve the personality of the Muslim so that he and she could 
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positively and peacefully get engaged, whatever the sacrifices and the 
circumstances, in reforming their society, fearing none but God.  
The next chapter will focus on al-Adl wal-Ihsan and see, not how it developed as 
an idea in the mind of its leader for over a decade, but how it emerged, put into 
action and managed to secure a sure place in the Moroccan society. We will see 
how it started and took shape in a stifling political environment and how it has 
coped with its internal and external concerns. 
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Chapter 3 Emergence and Development of al-Adl wal-Ihsan [Justice and 
Spirituality] 
A popular joke in Morocco says that once King Hassan‟s son, Prince Mohammad, 
was attending school for a geography lesson when his teacher asked him to name 
a few countries on a blank map of the world. He identified a few correctly, but when 
the teacher pointed to Morocco, the prince answered: “That‟s dad‟s farm!”1 
This joke of which even some Western observers have made note gives an idea 
about how the conception of power is perceived by the Moroccan ruling monarchy. 
Yassine set out in 1981 to challenge that conception, not merely through writing as 
he had done before, but practically, on the ground, creating thus “an 
unprecedented equation” that the king might not resolve as easily as expected. 
What seemed particularly intriguing about the new-comers, i.e. Yassine and his 
group, was that though their number was very modest – about twenty persons in 
total– they were outspoken in their criticism of the monarch‟s policies, raising 
issues deemed until then taboo and talking “naively” and clearly about their 
intentions and aspirations some of which the prevailing political climate could 
hardly accommodate. 
To be sure a curious struggle between two opposing wills was abound to occur. 
One was represented by the king who was determined to keep everything and 
everybody under a tight grip as he had done since he took office in 1961 and the 
other was represented by Yassine who was determined to challenge openly what 
he viewed as an illegitimate system of rule and to call for a new Islamic political 
order where monarchical authoritarianism had no place. The former claimed to 
have a fatwa attributed to the Maliki school of thought authorising him to liquidate 
one third of the population if found on the wrong side in order to preserve the 
remaining two thirds;2 the latter was motivated by the example of the best of 
martyrs and by what he described as “this ambition which goes beyond limits...to 
please God.”3 The former had at his disposal all the secret intelligence and the 
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coercive means which had indeed enabled him to inflict upon opponents and 
dissidents cruel and unheard-of forms of punishment; the latter was armed with a 
strong conviction that the weakest of creatures might be tasked with the noblest 
mission, and this, he thought, applied to his case.4 What would the latter do in an 
attempt to secure the conditions to advance his project and what would the former 
employ to thwart such endeavours?  
This chapter will cover a period of about three decades and we will see how 
Yassine and his group made their debut and got established in a political space 
dominated by a single person, faithful as always to the idea of “his private farm” 
and where opposition forces, whether from the army, the political or the Islamic 
spheres, were either neutralised, coopted or silenced and domesticated.  In the 
first section of this chapter we will explore the movement‟s endeavours to cope 
with this challenge since its inception in 1981 until it took a new name, al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, in 1987. The second section will cover almost twelve years, until King 
Hassan II passed away, bringing into light the regime‟s new strategies which 
culminated in different forms of repression and the impact of such a policy on the 
movement. The third section will deal with the period beginning in 1999, when the 
new king, Mohammad VI, ascended the throne until the present time. We will 
examine whether a change of the ruling team entailed a rupture with what is 
termed “les années de plomb” [the years of lead] or a continuity of the same old 
policies in different forms towards political opponents in general and al-Adl wal-
Ihsan in particular. The final section, however, seeks to examine the inside, so to 
speak, of the movement and see how it started and developed in terms of 
organizational structure over the last three decades. Thus, a further step will have 
been taken to understand al-Adl wal-Ihsan and its project. 
3.1 An outspoken voice under a modest banner 
When Sheikh Yassine founded his association in September 1981, he seemed to 
have taken the right step at the right time. Many analysts would not fail to notice 
from a brief survey of the political history of Morocco that the 1980s were marked 
by a certain void due to a number of factors. King Hassan, who had been on the 
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throne since 1961, fought ferociously and used scores of strategies in order to 
bring all “the troublemakers” into the fold.5 After two attempted coups in 1971 and 
1972 respectively, he managed eventually to neutralise the army and lure them to 
consider a better alternative to be safe and successful in life. “Make money, but 
don‟t do politics,” he once said in a speech addressed to his officers.6 The 
message, as it was understood, was that everything, even if unethical, could be 
tolerated in the pursuit of money as long as politics was shunned or, in other 
words, the position of the monarch was not targeted. 
The left also had made several attempts to get rid of the monarchy or at least to 
reduce its prerogatives extensively, but after their repeated failure and in 
consequence of the violent blows they had received, they finally accepted to 
operate from within the system and abide by the rules of the game which the king 
had carefully crafted in order to always be the victor and inculcate in the minds and 
souls of his subjects the notion of the king‟s “private farm”. Other personalities, 
despite their acknowledged past political and intellectual activism, changed 
direction completely, one after the other, and vied to put their talents and skills at 
the service of his Majesty. No wonder that political apathy set in and continued to 
spread rapidly.7 
As for the Ulama, they had long been transformed into pawns in the monarch‟s 
hands, using them when and where it best served his interests. Despite a 
sustained policy fostering moral degeneration and social injustice, the Ulama made 
no comment. The Commander of the Faithful told them not to interfere in politics 
adding that “it should not be their concern if the price of any commodity went up.”8 
And they obeyed. Islamic groupings in the late 1970s and early 1980s were in no 
better situation. They were weak, disorganised, fragmented and with no clear 
strategy; the first serious organised action undertaken by Abdelkarim Moti was 
nipped in the bud, after the controversial assassination of the leftist activist Omar 
Benjelloun.  
The major challenge, however, that seemed to disturb this “superb political 
quietism” came from the poverty-stricken strata of society which were getting wider 
67 
and wider. Serious riots had already broken in Casablanca, the largest city in 
Morocco, in1965 and the same thing happened again in the same city in 1981 and 
in numerous places in 1984. Though they were crushed quickly, leaving in their 
wake thousands of victims, the social and economic problems of Morocco were 
nowhere near to be eased for various reasons. A costly armed conflict with the 
Polisario Front in Western Sahara, four successive years of severe drought, an 
alarming rise in foreign debt and the introduction of a structural adjustment 
programme [SAP] as recommended by the IMF and the World Bank to rectify the 
country‟s failing finances in addition to a long period of mismanagement, wrong 
policies and widespread corruption… all of which combined to make the lives of the 
majority of people more vulnerable and thereby exacerbate social tension.9 To be 
sure, the need for serious reform could hardly be overstressed. The problem is that 
those who were expected to pressure for it were less and less visible, and this 
made the search for a viable alternative an utmost necessity. Could the emergence 
of an Islamic movement be a suitable response? 
Yassine believed so, and this is why he wished he could have set up, in 
cooperation with other Islamic groups, a single, large organization in order for the 
Islamists to be in a better position to press for the social and political change the 
Moroccan people were longing for. That did not happen, as explained in the 
second chapter, and Yassine had to start from scratch.10 However, he did not give 
up all hope and in order to emphasize that his original intention was still alive and 
serious, he chose for his newly formed group a modest name: Usrat al-jamaa [i.e. 
literally “a family” within a larger group]. He also wanted to make it clear, right from 
the beginning, that this group did not claim to have a monopoly on the 
representation of Islam, or that their interpretations were the only ones that 
mattered.11  
According to the Moroccan law any group of individuals can set up a legally 
recognized association. They have just to complete some simple legal formalities. 
Well, this is in theory, but the practice is something else, and the case of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan is one example, among many others, that shows the wide discrepancy 
between the official discourse and what takes place on the ground. When the 
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board members sought to officially declare the association of al-Jamaa on 15th 
October 1982, the Moroccan authorities refused to recognize it. Another attempt 
was made on 26th April 1983 under a new name, Jamayat al-jamaa al-khayriya, but 
again in vain.12 
However, the founding members would not stay cross-handed and “wait for 
Godot”. They moved on using the scant resources available to them at the time in 
order to get their voice and views heard and, why not, heeded. They used their 
own homes as their meeting places and relied on their own pockets to pay for their 
expenses and to fund their small activities. Nobody, not even the founders 
themselves, believed that the movement would expand so rapidly in such a short 
time.  
The Moroccan authorities were not indifferent to, or unaware of what was going on. 
They kept a close watch on the association‟s external activities and in some cases 
impeded or even banned them. For instance, when the al-Jamaa organized the 
first spring camp in 1982 in a place near al-Bir al-Jadid, about 30 miles south of 
Casablanca, the authorities intervened and stopped it. The same thing happened 
again when a second camp was organized in the summer of 1982. It is an official 
policy which started then and has never changed to this day. What they rarely tried 
to obstruct, however, was the meetings which took place inside the members‟ 
houses. Perhaps the Moroccan government at the time thought that the al-Jamaa 
was still very small and as such did not yet constitute any serious threat to the 
regime.  
In November 1983, the al-Jamaa took a further step and issued a new publication 
entitled as-Subh [the Dawn] with the aim of making it a daily newspaper later on; 
but after its second issue was published in the same month, it was confiscated and 
the paper was banned definitely. Another publication with the title of al-Khitab [the 
Discourse] was launched in January 1984, a move which meant among other 
things that Yassine and his group would not give up and they would continue to 
struggle for their legitimate rights. The reaction of the authorities was so quick and 
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stopped al-Khitab after its first issue, possibly to prove that they, too, were not to 
be defeated easily. 
On 27th December 1983, about two years after al-Jamaa‟s inception, Mr Yassine 
was arrested on the pretext of what was published in the as-Subh newspaper. The 
real reason, however, for the arrest was Yassine‟s commentary on “Message of the 
Century” which King Hassan had addressed the previous month to the presidents 
and kings of the Arab and Islamic world on the eve of the fifteenth century of the 
Islamic calendar.13 In a long article entitled “Words and Deeds” and published in al-
Jamaa Journal, Sheikh Yassine criticised strongly the king‟s Message, highlighting 
the discrepancy between official words and deeds and how the actual practices 
were in stark contrast to the declared policies.14 
When Yassine‟s article appeared, the Moroccan authorities did not react 
immediately most probably to defuse its effects, but the publication of as-Subh 
newspaper seemed to provide them with an opportunity to kill more than one bird 
with one stone. Firstly, they would deprive the association from an outlet through 
which it could convey its ideas and reach out to a wider audience; secondly, they 
would seek to discipline a troublemaker who, despite his late three and a half year 
internment, was not deterred from crossing the red lines set by the regime; and 
thirdly, an early crackdown on a nascent, Islamic opposition movement was 
expected to nip it in the bud, especially when an important figure like Sheikh 
Yassine was removed from the scene. 
Things, however, did not evolve as the authorities had planned but ironically 
enough proved beneficial for the al-Jamaa movement in many ways. One 
significant gain was achieved at the political and the human rights level. Yassine‟s 
trial, widely believed to be politically motivated, was covered by many national and 
international media outlets and human rights reports. Though some articles on 
Yassine‟s ideas and his group may not, at least in the eyes of the al-Jamaa 
members, be very friendly or neutral, most of them acknowledged that a strong 
opposition force to the regime of King Hassan was in the making. Thus, the 
political weight of al-Jamaa was enhanced significantly. 
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A second one was that Yassine‟s trial and imprisonment provided the movement 
with an opportunity to increase its base. Many people had never heard of Yassine 
and his group until he was incarcerated and his story received wide media 
coverage. Once convinced that he was a victim of injustice, many Moroccans 
naturally got angered and sought to express their sympathy in one way or another. 
Whereas some translated their support into financial aid or volunteered some 
services, others went further and got fully engaged into the movement. Ironically, 
Yassine‟s imprisonment which was expected to scare away people from al-Jamaa 
only increased sympathizers and supporters and raised the interest of journalists, 
researchers and the like. 
A third benefit concerned the development of al-Jamaa itself. There is no doubt 
that the sudden disappearance of the founding leader of any social, political or 
religious organization, particularly in the first formative years, can have its negative 
impact, even with the existence of a clear ideological basis.  The association of Al-
Jamaa cannot claim to be an exception. When Sheikh Yassine was jailed in 
December 1983, most members at the time were very young and they were not on 
the same level in terms of their understanding of the whole vision and the strategy 
of al-Jamaa. A number of questions were raised and some members were not 
satisfied with the answers that were provided. To be sure, it was a real test for the 
movement‟s leadership while Yassine was behind the bars. It required a great deal 
of effort to solve some thorny problems and cope with certain misconceptions to 
such an extent that some members of the leading council considered that it was 
only after Yassine‟s imprisonment that the real birth of the movement took place.15 
Whatever doubts persisted in the minds of some members were definitely dispelled 
when Sheikh Yassine regained his freedom and approved of all the decisions 
taken by the leading council during his detention.   
The Moroccan authorities might have realized that they had made the wrong 
decision when they ordered Yassine‟s imprisonment in December 1983; yet, like all 
autocratic regimes, they never lost hope of crushing an opposition force which 
seemed different from the ones they had dealt with so far. Therefore, they adopted 
other strategies, if not to eradicate the movement altogether, at least to reduce its 
71 
influence to a minimum. For many months after Yassine‟s release on 31st 
December 1985, members and visitors who came to Sheikh Yassine‟s house were 
subject to all sorts of harassment. Some were rudely treated; others were 
threatened and warned not to come again; still others‟ identity cards were kept in 
order to be called later and interrogated by the police once they were back home. 
As far as al-Jamaa was concerned, it would not be intimidated by such practices; 
on the contrary, these only boosted its cohesion as well as its morale and 
determination to continue to struggle for its legitimate rights. What was even more 
encouraging, according to some accounts, was that a growing number of people of 
all ages, albeit the majority of them were young, felt emboldened and were 
increasingly interested in the movement. 
By the end of 1987, it could be said that the movement, hitherto called Usrat al-
Jamaa, had successfully passed through the first period of its establishment and 
had managed not only to overcome the major obstacles created by the Makhzen 
authorities to impede its emergence in the first place and its subsequent natural 
growth but also to secure a firm place in the social and political firmament of 
Morocco. However, the name by which it was called did not seem congruent with 
these developments and all the more so as the hope of a unified Islamic 
organization was nowhere near to be materialised. Such being the case, the 
leadership decided it was time to take up a new name able to better reflect the 
social, political and Islamic outlook of the movement. 
3.2 Getting established under a new name  
“What‟s in a name? That which we call a rose by any other name would smell as 
sweet.”16 Yet, not many seem to subscribe to this Shakespearean idea. People 
from various faiths and cultures have always tried to choose what they consider 
good names for whatever they hold dear, whether their babies, businesses, 
residences, pets, associations or anything of the sort. When the leadership of Usrat 
al-Jamaa wanted to adopt a new name, they considered a few suggestions before 
they decided on “al-Adl wal-Ihsan” (Justice and Spirituality). The reasons behind 
this choice are explained in a letter which Sheikh Yassine addressed to the 
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members of the movement on 2nd Dhi al-Hijja 1407 corresponding 28 July 1987. 
Here are some excerpts: 
When the first issue of al-Jamaa Journal saw the light of day, readers found in it a 
sincere call for the unity of the Islamist groups in Morocco. We tried for years, 
before and after that, to come together, cooperate and join efforts to overcome 
the prevailing factionalism. And when we put forward The Prophetic Method, at 
the centre of our thinking there was “the national community” and how it should be 
established and organized was our contribution to the aspired unity. 
When what we expected did not materialize, we proceeded to found an Islamic 
association, hoping that it would only add a brick to the edifice of Islamic unity. 
The name which we then gave to our newly formed group “Usrat al-Jamaa” 
translated our intention to affiliate to the expected “national community”; it 
regarded us as part of a whole and furthermore the name in and by itself implied a 
high degree of self-denial, for it merely pointed to a small group of people around 
a modest journal called al-Jamaa.17  
Then he explains how “the issues of al-adl (justice) and ihsan are both 
emphatically stressed in the Quran: “God enjoins justice and Ihsan”. 18 He also 
maintains that these two concepts can comfortably accommodate the programme 
and the major objectives of the movement. If al-adl stands for the necessity to work 
for a just political system in Morocco, al-Ihsan stands for another dimension which 
is equally important, that is, the individual‟s moral and spiritual perfection. Thus, al-
Ihsan in Yassine‟s vision cannot be separated from al-Adl and to stress further their 
importance, he writes: 
We will be torn apart if we are faced with a serious obstacle and we do not have 
Ihsan. Our endeavours will fail if the issue of justice does not figure in our 
programme. Indeed the issue of justice should be given pride of place in our 
agenda.19 
Several activities were organized to explain to members and sympathizers the 
reasons for picking up a new name, though all took place in the members‟ dwelling 
houses. As for the Moroccan authorities, they cared much less about what the 
movement chose to be called than about its plans and what it sought to achieve. 
Consequently, they tried to block all ways to prevent it from communicating with a 
wider audience. Its senior members, despite their acknowledged scholarly 
qualifications, were denied the right to give lectures or talks in the mosques or in 
any other public places. It is no wonder that one of the priorities of the movement 
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at that time was how to break the blockade imposed by what was considered a 
despotic policy.20 
Thus a number of publications and audio cassettes and video tapes were produced 
and distributed widely between December 1985 and December 1989, the year 
when Sheikh Yassine was put under house arrest and members of Majlis al-Irshad  
[the Guidance Council]21 were arrested and jailed for the following two years. 
Sheikh Yassine alone published five books during that period: Islam and the 
Challenge of Marxism-Leninism (June 1987), Outstanding Men (January 1989), 
Islam and Secular Nationalism (October 1989), Notes on Fikh and History (though 
it was not distributed until 1990). In addition to these books, from 1st November 
1989 until 27th December 1989 Sheikh Yassine delivered a series of nine talks in 
his house to members of the movement in which he gave his analysis and his 
views on Islamic history, highlighting the repercussions of some catastrophic 
events, namely the overthrow of the Islamic caliphate [about 30 years after the 
death of the Prophet] and the establishment in its stead of despotic hereditary rule 
from which the Islamic Umma has been suffering to this date. These speeches 
bearing the title “Talks on al-adl wal-ihsan” were recorded and distributed widely. 
Another equally important series of talks given by Dr Mohamed Bachiri entitled 
“Promoting political awareness” and which, by 21st December 1989, had reached 
twenty-one, was also recorded and distributed all over the country. The use of 
these audio and video tapes proved very effective. They were easy to circulate, not 
very expensive and the chances to be heard and heeded were quite high. In fact, a 
great number of people learnt about al-Adl wal-Ihsan and sympathized with its 
stances or joined its ranks because of these tapes. 
Angered by the movement‟s apparent success to foil plans devised to hinder its 
growth and development, the authorities employed a plethora of new measures 
and tactics in the hope of improving their overall strategy to tighten their control 
over al-Adl wal-Ihsan and minimize its chances of becoming a real challenge to the 
regime. The first of these measures is that they put Sheikh Yassine under house 
arrest which lasted for ten years, from 30th December 1989 to the 16th May 2000. 
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During this period Sheikh Yassine was not allowed to meet anybody, not even his 
relatives, and the only way for him to keep in touch with the leadership of the 
movement was through letters which were leaked now and again from his house. 
Then, in an attempt to completely isolate the movement from its leadership and 
create the conditions for its fragmentation, they also put members of the Guidance 
Council in prison for two years. It is a policy which the Moroccan regime had 
pursued successfully in dealing with many of its political opponents, namely the 
leftist groups. The long years of imprisonment, the lamentable conditions in 
detention centres, and the usual squabbles that are likely to break out among 
people living under the same roof, and the like factors could have their 
psychological effects on the prisoners whose disagreement upon certain issues 
could develop into an irremediable crisis. At least in the Moroccan case, it should 
not be surprising that the underlying factor that caused some parties to splinter 
could be traced back to the days when the leading members were incarcerated. 
Soon afterwards, that is, on Wednesday 10th January1990, al-Adl wal-Ihsan was 
banned without a court order; and to enforce this new arbitrary restriction, the 
Moroccan security forces arrested hundreds of members and brought them to the 
police stations to sign off on a ban on the movement as well as pledges not to 
organize or partake in any of its activities, threatening them with dire 
consequences if they did not comply. Since then an odd situation was created and 
has continued to this day: according to the laws in place, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has been 
set up properly and is thus legal, and there are dozens of court orders to this effect; 
yet, the security forces refuse to recognize this reality and insist that the movement 
is prohibited and therefore is not allowed to undertake any activity, whatever its 
nature.22  
Furthermore, in order to give a clear warning not only to the members and 
sympathizers but also to those who were thinking of joining the movement, a wave 
of arrests of selected members was carried out simultaneously in various towns 
and cities and during which many victims were ill-treated or tortured before they 
were set free or had to sign self-indicting statements under duress before 
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appearing in the court room to stand show trials. The sentences ranged between a 
few months to twenty years of imprisonment, and the obvious message was, of 
course, to show that the Moroccan regime was determined to deal Yassine‟s group 
a fatal blow. 
As it is expected, these repressive measures were backed by an organized smear 
campaign against the movement and its leader in which a peculiar mix (salafists, 
leftists, Islamists, secularists…) participated vigorously. Thus many articles, CDs, 
and even books were published portraying Yassine as an ignorant Sufi, 
obscurantist, reactionary, utopist, lone dissenter, troublemaker, extremist, 
etc…whose main objective was to seize power and establish an archaic system of 
rule or what he called an “Islamic caliphate”. To use a wide range of contradictory 
abusive phrases, terms and epithets in order to speak or write about the same and 
very person is clear evidence that the strange interest in Yassine was not sparked 
by any academic motives but rather by a determined intention to distort the image 
of a political opponent proved hard to tame or co-opt.23 
Such were some of the measures taken to restrain the growth and influence of al-
Adl wal-Ihsan. The question is: did such a policy work? Answers may differ but in 
the view of this author a number of indicators show that though it did create 
problems for the movement, its success was rather limited. One of these indicators 
was that the attempt to isolate the movement socially and politically did not yield 
the expected results. A great number of lawyers and human rights and political 
activists who, despite differences in ideology and political stances, supported the 
movement while its leadership and many of its members were being tried. This 
should come as no surprise because we were in the early 1990s, that is, before the 
opposition parties entered the government. It may be argued then that those who 
showed support for the movement had an axe to grind and were motivated more 
by their desire to embarrass the regime than by anything else. Be that as it may, 
what should be underlined here is that the expected isolation did not occur, though 
many variables might have come into play to explain that failure. 
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Another indicator was that the case of al-Adl wal-Ihasn became for many 
successive months a recurrent subject in human rights and media reports inside 
and outside the country. It was referred to as an example, among many others, 
that confirmed the Moroccan regime‟s repeated violations of human rights and its 
scant regard for the rule of law. Undoubtedly, this is not what the authorities 
expected. What they did expect was that they would deal a fatal blow to al-Adl wal-
Ihsan and that nobody would even take note, let alone denouncing the regime‟s 
oppressive practices towards “a common enemy”. 
A third indicator was that the crackdown on the movement only enhanced its 
cohesion, strengthened its organizational structure and increased the members‟ 
trust and confidence in their leadership. This may be explained in part by group 
dynamics theory which maintains that groups “tend to become cohesive when they 
are in intense competition with other groups or face serious external threat to their 
survival.”24  
The last, but not least, indicator was that during that period al-Adl wal-Ihsan started 
another form of contestation to stress that it could not be silenced or ignored. Thus 
it took to the streets on various occasions and organized many demonstrations on 
its own or in cooperation with other political and trade union forces. A few 
examples of special significance deserve mention here : 
1/ On 8th May 1990 al-Adl wal-Ihasan staged a sit-in in front of the parliament in 
support of the Guidance Council members who were standing trial before the Court 
of Appeal in Rabat. The significance of this event is that while a “political trial” was 
being conducted and hundreds of members who showed up to express their 
support peacefully were ill-treated or arrested, King Hassan II set up on this very 
day a Consultative Council for Human rights. Nothing could have belied the 
declared intention and highlighted the glaring contradiction between words and 
deeds than what happened there and then. 
2/ On Friday 3rd August 1990, a sit-in coinciding with the “National day for Human 
Rights” took place in Ben Said mosque [not far from Yassine‟s house] in Sale to 
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protest the heavy sentences inflicted upon the Guidance Council members. 
Meanwhile, neighbouring Algeria was seething as the Islamic Salvation Front won 
55 percent of the vote in local elections in June 1990. The Moroccan regime 
seemed to have taken the wrong move, putting the leaders of al-Adl wal-Ihsan in 
prison and possibly to divert people‟s attention, the Minister of Awkaf and Islamic 
Affairs organized a conference on “Islamic Revival” in September 1990 and invited 
speakers from many Arab and Islamic countries. It was meant to be held annually 
but failing to achieve its aspired propagandistic goals, it was dropped after three 
attempts. 
3/ On 1st May 1991, it was the first time trade unions in Morocco came out together 
in street demonstrations, and the participation of al-Adl wal-Ihsan was so 
noticeable that it was claimed to have taken advantage of the 1st May celebration 
to display its strength. Actually something of the sort could not be denied, 
especially if we bear in mind the repression and harassment to which the 
movement was being subjected and the absence of any medium through which it 
could voice its grievances.  
4/ On 19th August 1991, another big demonstration was organized in Casablanca, 
the biggest city in Morocco, to protest the arrest and the trial of a group of students 
from the Faculty of Medicine. These students belonged to the movement‟s Student 
Section and were arrested not because of their activities at the Faculty but rather to 
exert pressure on al-Adl wal-Ihsan leaders who were in jail in Sale to make 
fundamental concessions to be set free, the most prominent of which was to make 
a pledge of allegiance to the monarch and recognize him as Commander of the 
Faithful. The movement leaders rejected this categorically and, as a result, were 
left to complete their sentences. Many political prisoners, however, were amnestied 
at that time including Abraham Serfaty, a leading Moroccan Jewish dissident, 
whereas al-Adl members were excepted. Such a discriminating move, though hard, 
boosted the popularity of al-Adl further as a credible opposition force.  
To be sure, these demonstrations, marches and sit-ins did provide al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
with an opportunity to exhibit its actual size, strength, organization and self-
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discipline. Never did it get involved in an act of violence though on many an 
occasion the security forces intervened brutally, causing severe injuries to many 
members and in some cases permanent disabilities. To maintain self-control and 
shun violence whatever the provocation and in the mean time continue to speak 
loudly against the corrupt practices of an autocratic regime earned al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
the respect and admiration of many Moroccan people. No wonder that within two 
years, that is, from January 1990 to January 1992, the movement saw the greatest 
increase in its base since its inception in September 1981.25 
This growth, however, had its side-effects. One of these was how to accommodate 
the hundreds of new members and provide them with adequate training. It was a 
question for which there seemed to be no easy solution. Imagine, by way of 
example, a teacher, instead of being in charge of 10 pupils, found himself 
responsible for three hundred! What made the situation even more complicated 
was that the movement was not permitted to set up its own official headquarters, 
nor was it allowed to have access to public places. The only option left for the 
movement‟s members was to use their own houses where the number and 
frequency of meetings were rather limited. And even in this case, nothing was 
guaranteed. Now and again the security forces would intervene to break up some 
of those meetings; sometimes they would arrest all the attendees, take them to the 
police station for interrogation and release them later at night or the following day, 
or they would select some and send them to the court to be tried for holding illegal 
meetings and belonging to an illegal organization. Strangely enough, the Courts 
always dismissed those charges on the grounds that the movement of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan had been set up according to the existing laws and therefore could not be 
regarded as illegal. 
To cope with the fallout of the sudden increase in the movement‟s following, a 
slogan which reads “Towards Balanced Expansion and Comprehensive Training” 
was raised immediately after the release of the Guidance Council members from 
prison in January 1992. Among the steps taken to put it into effect was the decision 
to slow down the process of membership and increase the number of workshops 
and training sessions for Nakib al-Usara [a person in charge of a group of 10-12 
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members] and Nakib Shuaba [who is in charge of a group ranging from 40 to 80 
members]. It was also decided that each member should not be assigned various 
tasks. Other educational, organizational and management rules and techniques 
were also taken to adapt to the new circumstances. 
Another equally important development occurred in 1997: a committee was set up 
to think about an institution to be charged with political matters, a political wing or 
something of the sort for al-Adl wal-Ihsan. In Marrakech, in the summer of 1998, 
the Shura Assembly approved formally the establishment of the political section of 
the movement. Since then endeavours to improve the performance of the various 
institutions and organs of the movement and ensure they could function smoothly 
have never stopped. It is not always easy as it sounds, especially if we take into 
account the prevailing oppressive political environment. 
On the 23rd July 1999 King Hassan, who had been in poor health for six years or 
so, died. If some people mourned him and shed tears, others hoped that the 
misery and the misfortunes wrought by nearly four decades of authoritarian rule 
could finally be laid to rest. During the last twelve years of his reign, repression 
against al-Adl wal-Ihsan had intensified, but it had failed to achieve its major 
expected results. Hassan died, but the movement of al-Adl wal-Ihsan survived. In 
the following section we will see how it has coped with “the new era” since it found 
out early enough that the demise of King Hassan did not entail the demise of his 
system of rule. 
3.3 A “soft” letter to a new king and its consequences 
When King Mohamed VI ascended the throne, he gave the impression he was 
going to break away from the old policies as well as the atrocities of his father‟s 
rule and usher in a new era. His slogans and promises were widely believed and 
applauded. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan had a different view but, due to the high pitched 
optimism of that moment, it did not wish to talk about it then lest it be 
misunderstood. It did not want to be seen as seeking to take advantage of the 
delicate transition phase to further its own political agenda. 
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After about six months, however, during which many people insisted now and 
again that Al-Adl wal-Ihsan should clarify its position on the monarchy and its 
proclaimed new objectives, Sheikh Yassine addressed a letter in French of about 
30 pages to the young king entitled Mémoire, à qui de droit [Memorandum: To 
Whom it May Concern]. In this letter, which was distributed on 28th January 2000, 
Sheikh Yassine cautions against the high expectations pinned on what was hailed 
as “a new era” and calls for concrete measures in order for the new promises to be 
trusted. It starts as follows: 
The Young monarch, Mohamed VI, is clearly admired by young Moroccan people, 
who seemed to regard him as a friend, a symbol of liberation and a promise of a 
better future. During the first weeks of his reign, and wherever his inaugural 
campaign took him, the young king is greeted with genuine, youthful enthusiasm. 
(…) 
The generously dispensed promises have generated intense excitement. 
However, beware of disillusionment if the youth, enchanted for a while and lulled 
by wild promises, sober up as the bleak prospects ahead remind them of their 
unenviable lot.26 
This letter, though small in size, soft in tone if compared with Islam or the Deluge, 
caused great uproar. It was attacked from all directions by left, right, Islamist and 
secular political parties besides official Arabophone and Francophone media 
outlets. The official Ulama went even further and described Yassine‟s letter as an 
act of political and religious dissent, which meant that its author should be 
penalized for being “at odds with the national consensus.”27 Other curious 
commentators were probing to find out about the real reasons for writing such a 
controversial letter. According to one explanation which, albeit strange, did 
circulate widely, the aim of the author was to provoke the Moroccan regime to 
maintain the house arrest because this would help him continue to promote the 
“victim image” of himself and his movement and thereby gain more supporters.  
Admittedly, Yassine‟s letter seemed to have upset the new ruling team who were 
trying to present what they called the “new era” with less tension and much fanfare. 
To explain further, it should be noted that the house arrest, imposed on Sheikh 
Yassine for over ten years, had long become meaningless and no longer served 
any purpose. The political parties whose credibility had hit the bottom felt 
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increasingly embarrassed to talk about the Moroccan democracy, the rule of law 
and the like slogans while an old man was illegally placed under house arrest. This 
had played into the hands of al-Adl wal-Ihsan which was steadily regarded as the 
major opposition force in the country. Thus, when the new king came to power, he 
and his advisors sought to get rid of this thorny issue, but in a way that it served 
their own interests. On the one hand they would use it as a good signal of their 
intention to break away with the practices of the past; on the other they would deal 
with an embarrassing case which, apart from al-Adl wal-Ihsan, served the interests 
of none. 
What may support this explanation is that in the summer of 1999, a few months 
after Mohamed VI took office, the then royal palace spokesman, Hassan Awrid, 
met three leaders of al-Adl wal-Ihsan in what was believed to be his father‟s house. 
He told them he was charged by the king himself to resolve the question of house 
arrest imposed on Sheikh Yassine for the last ten years. The leaders of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan explained to the king‟s envoy that the problem with the Moroccan regime 
could not be reduced to the house arrest of Sheikh Yassine. This is just part of the 
problem. To deal with the problem in its entirety, at least three points should be 
addressed: the first is that twelve student members who had been unjustly 
sentenced 20 years of imprisonment should be set free, and so should other 
Islamists who were in jail for no good reason; the second is the movement of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan should be allowed to operate freely like other political parties and 
organizations in Morocco; and the third point is that the house arrest on Yassine 
should be lifted immediately. Awrid, according to reliable sources, was not 
insensitive to the movement‟s demands, but he explained that he was not in a 
position to discuss what he called the whole “package” but only Sheikh Yassine‟s 
case.28 
This initiative simply failed; nonetheless, the Makhzen regime had to find a way to 
rid itself of what had truly become a burning issue. Acting on secret instructions 
from state officials, the question of Yassine‟s house arrest was raised in parliament 
on 10th May 2000. Ahmed Midaoui, who was then Minister of the Interior, denied 
that Yassine was under house arrest and that he, like other citizens, was free to go 
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wherever he liked. Sheikh Yassine took advantage of this declaration and issued a 
statement on 15th May 2000 to inform the public opinion of his intention to go out 
on 19th of the same month to attend the Friday prayer, which he did for the first 
time after more than 10 years. 
However, the failure to settle the question of house arrest the way the Makhzen 
had originally planned and the failure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan to hail the new incumbent 
monarch in one way or another in addition to the publication of Memorandum: To 
Whom it May Concern on 28th January 2000, all these factors combined seemed to 
uncover early enough what the new ruling team had in store for the Moroccan 
people in general and al-Adl wal-Ihsan in particular. Let‟s consider some 
components of the “new era” policy towards the movement of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
which started to take effect since then.  
Under the reign of the late king, Hassan II, summer camping was the sole type of 
external activity which had somehow more or less been tolerated and to which al-
Adl wal-Ihsan had brought a number of distinctive features. For instance in August 
1998 and in July and August 1999, al-Adl wal-Ihsan organized six big summer 
camps in different places in Morocco. The success of these camps hardly needs to 
be proved. Suffice it to say that the number of campers reached in some cases 
over 70,000 and that especially in the summer of 1999 they made the headlines of 
many national and international media outlets. With the ascension of the new king 
to the throne, the Moroccan authorities, as if they had been unaware of a serious 
loophole in their two decade-long blockade on the movement, responded firmly: no 
camping for the members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. Then they went on to take some 
precautionary measures to show, or so it seemed, that they would get their orders 
implemented and not tolerate any defiance: one camp in the region of Nador city 
was simply set to fire; another was ransacked and all the camping equipment was 
confiscated whereas the organizers of other camps would never have even the 
chance of setting foot on the sites they had used in the previous summers.29 
Al-Adl wal-Ihsan denounced vehemently these measures which contravened the 
laws and violated the most elementary rights of human beings. It did not want, and 
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has never sought, to engage in an open struggle with the security forces, but it 
thought of an idea which proved embarrassing to the new ruling team, Mohamed 
VI and his ilk, and a real litmus test of the slogans raised with the so called “new 
era” such as “the new concept of power”, “the rule of law”, “democracy”, “respect 
for internationally recognized human rights”, and so forth. The idea was quite 
simple: instead of organizing separate camps, why not go to the beaches where 
everybody went and mingle with the general public? 
The consequences of this simple idea were beyond all expectations. As if caught 
by surprise, the Moroccan authorities resorted to force, the option they favoured 
most and could readily think of, and that is how “the war of the beaches”, as it was 
referred to in the media, started. There is no need to go into detail, but it is not hard 
to imagine what the general atmosphere was like in the summer of 2000. The 
government with its resources and different apparatuses all mobilised to fight for “a 
sacred cause”: preventing, at all costs, men, women, boys, girls and children, too, -
whose parents belonged to al-Adl wal-Ihsan- from going to the beach! As for the 
Interior Minister, he, all of a sudden, turned “Grand Mufti” and issued his notorious 
fatwa (an edict) that forbade prayers on the beaches because they incited 
sectarianism among Moroccan people who are all Muslims! Wittingly or unwittingly 
Honourable Minister made himself the laughing stock of the Islamic world with his 
idiotic “fatwa”!30 
This may sound strange or even unbelievable or too much exaggerated, but 
absurdities of the kind are not rare in the kingdom of Morocco. In the 1980s, for 
example, Moroccan people still remember too well when a kind of witch-hunt was 
launched against “beards” and “scarves”. Many bearded gentlemen were taken to 
the police stations and /or to the Mukata‟a to provide an answer to a sole question: 
“Why do you grow a beard?” And however sensible and convincing your response 
might be , they would not let you go until either you shaved it yourself (a blunt 
razor, possibly used by other victims, would be provided for free) or a policeman or 
“Marda”31 would take care of you. No victim would ever recommend the latter 
option!  
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As for girls who started to wear hijab at the time, they were not allowed in school 
unless they removed their headscarves. One headmaster used to chase defiant 
girls in the schoolyard and rid them of their scarves, and from this practice he was 
thought to have collected lots of them, enough to start a small business! It would 
take volumes to tell stories of the kind. But these examples should be sufficient to 
give an idea about the system of rule in place, its priorities and its concerns on the 
eve of the 21st century. 
In addition to summer camping, the Moroccan universities, long seen as a 
stronghold of the youth of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, were the next important target 
envisioned in the “new era” policy. Student Unions, dominated by students 
affiliated or close to the al-Adl movement, benefited a great deal from a certain 
degree of freedom allowed within the universities to increase their follower base 
and enhance their influence. After the publication of the Memorandum, this was not 
to be tolerated any more. Thus, on 1st September 2000, a wide campaign of arrests 
was launched against the activities organized by Student Unions in different 
universities. The campaign started with Abi Chuaib ad-Doukkali University in 
Eljadida (about 125 miles south of the capital Rabat). Many students were 
arrested, or expelled from university or brought to trial after being tortured in police 
stations. Once again the Moroccan authorities proved their unquestionable ability 
to create new, unnecessary problems, as if Morocco had not already had enough 
and in a field where the conditions fostering wrath and indignation abound: 
overcrowded classrooms, content loaded curricula, lack of resources… and above 
all the gloomy prospects awaiting the graduates. 
A third target in the new ruling team‟s agenda was to prohibit the movement from 
publishing, distributing or displaying  publicly any printed materials, whether books, 
newspapers or leaflets or anything of the sort. Thus, Yassine‟s books were not 
permitted to be displayed in the Casablanca International Book Fair held in 
November 2000. Thousands of copies of Al-Futuwa and Al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
newspapers were confiscated before they were placed under a total ban without 
any official explanation or legal excuse. Two independent magazines which dared 
to re-publish the Memorandum were also confiscated to send a clear warning to 
85 
those who ventured dealing with al-Adl wal-Ihsan, let alone supporting it. One 
printing house company which published Yassine‟s recent book entitled Justice: 
Islamists and Power was attacked, in a rather burglar-like manner, at night and all 
its equipment was either demolished or taken away, and so were 800 copies of the 
Justice book. What “burglars” who, according to eyewitnesses, were accompanied 
by several cars, would do with these books is still not known. One thing for sure is 
that those who engineered this “burglary” of an independent printing company most 
probably believed that despite the change of time and circumstances and the 
emergence of new communication technologies, it was still possible to impede 
opposition voices from being heard and different ideas from spreading. Nothing 
would make people even more eager to know about those “ideas” than to try to 
suppress them. This is exactly what happened. The number of copies of Justice –
and other books as well– which were in one way or another printed and distributed 
from hand to hand far exceeded the number originally planned.32 
A Fourth target concerns street demonstrations. After the publication of The 
Memorandum all forms of protest, though peaceful and whether they concern 
national or international issues, were not authorized if the initiative came from al-
Adl wal-Ihsan; and in case they were organized, they would be crushed harshly. 
The first opportunity for this decision to be put into effect occurred on 10th 
December 2000, when the movement staged peaceful sit-ins in eight Moroccan 
cities to celebrate International Human Rights Day and protest the continuous 
human rights violation in Morocco. The atrocities inflicted upon protestors on that 
day were well documented and some of the bloody scenes were shown on world 
TV channels and drew the attention of many print media journalists and human 
rights reporters. 
Compared to the above-mentioned measures, two, however, seemed to be the 
most serious blunders in the new Makhzenian strategy. The first occurred when 
many members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan were prevented from going to al-Haj (to 
pilgrimage in Mecca), including Yassine‟s wife, son, son-in-law and members of the 
Guidance Council. This decision, besides being arbitrary, was considered by many 
observers a gross error the government of late Hassan II, to be fair, would not 
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commit. It is clear evidence that the new ruling team were rather disconnected from 
their people and did not weigh the consequences of such rash decisions in a 
Muslim society.33 
The other serious blunder was to target an-Nassiha meetings which were 
organized once or twice a month and devoted to special acts of worship such as 
reciting the Quran, night prayers, religious talks and so forth. Under the new 
orders, the security services would rush to the places where those meetings were 
being held and take everybody to the police stations. After hours of questioning, 
they would usually set them free late at night or the next morning. In some cases, a 
selected group would be tried for holding illegal meetings. This operation repeated 
again and again drew the attention of various media outlets, which led many 
people to inquire about these meetings and try to find out about their nature and 
aims. I need not stress the bewilderment of those who, out of curiosity, made the 
search. “What‟s the harm of such gatherings?” they wondered. “Did a group of 
peaceful people meeting to pray represent a threat to the country?” Why don‟t the 
police track down criminals whose number has grown alarmingly so much so that 
many citizens, especially women, are attacked in broad daylight?” To be fair, many 
policemen, too, admitted that they knew that what they were doing was just absurd, 
and in an apologetic voice they would add that they were just implementing the 
orders they received. As for the members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, nothing would deter 
them from holding those meetings, knowing that the Moroccan regime was paying 
dearly of its reputation for targeting them. Many people learnt and ultimately joined 
the movement because of those incidents. And for those who wonder how al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan has expanded so quickly, here is probably one of the clues. 
In summary, if the rule of Mohammad VI differs in any way from his father‟s, it is 
not in essence but only in “style” as he himself pointed out in an interview given to 
the French magazine Paris-Match.34 The way in which the country is governed and 
political opposition is treated is much the same as before. Yet, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has 
managed to resist repression, maintain its coherence and increase its base. In 
certain cases, it even succeeded to put the Moroccan regime in an embarrassing 
situation in the eyes of the general public inside and outside the country. 
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Furthermore, as it will be shown in the next section, the politics of oppression 
towards al-Adl wal-Ihsan has not deterred it from improving its internal structure 
continuously to adapt to the changing circumstances. As for the monarch, he 
seems determined to carry on not just “like father, like son,” but rather to show that 
“son can outsmart father.” Some time may be needed before we can know for sure 
about the outcome of such a policy in a country like Morocco already facing many 
challenges.  
3.4 Organizational structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan [Justice and Spirituality] 
The organizational structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan [Justice and Spirituality] is not well-
understood and in some studies it is poorly presented if not deliberately distorted. It 
is true that there are some observers who consider al-Adl wal-Ihsan the best 
organized Islamic group in Morocco, but others have a different view: they regard it 
as nothing more than a slight variation of a Sufi order or, at best an improved form 
of confrerie with Sheikh Yassine at the centre, involved in all issues and making all 
the decisions whereas the followers merely execute the orders of their master!35 
This section challenges these claims and seeks first to find out about the reasons 
behind these misconceptions and then to show, by a brief examination of the 
movement‟s internal structure, whether a single person, as it is claimed, could 
possibly manage a large organization like al-Adl wal-Ihsan. 
There may be different reasons for what is considered in the view of the movement 
unwarranted misconceptions and unreliable accounts. Some base their perception 
on unfounded information concerning the emergence of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. They 
claim that when Abdessalam Yassine disagreed with his master al-Alhaj al-Abas 
about the question of succession, Yassine left Zawiya al-Butchichiya to set up his 
own Sufi order. Consequently, the structure of his group could not differ from the 
traditional format adopted by Sufi orders in general, without excluding some minor 
changes to adapt to the new circumstances.36 
Others base their analyses on Al-Minhaj An-Nabawi [the Prophetic Method], a book 
which is actually of great importance to al-Adl wal-Ihsan. They focus particularly on 
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Chapter IV because it provides an outline of the Islamic movement to be set up. 
They never try, or so it seems, to find out whether a chart outlined in a book 
compiled more than three decades ago is still relevant or whether it has been partly 
or wholly revised.37  
If some researchers, however, have focused on Al-Minhaj An-Nabawi [the 
Prophetic Method], assuming that the movement could not reconsider what is 
proposed by its leader, or simply because they do not know of a reliable source to 
be better informed how al-Adl wal-Ihsan is organized, others unfortunately seem 
less interested in reflecting facts as they are. In a recent study by Mohsine Ahmadi 
published in 2006, we are presented with a structure that has nothing to do with al-
Adl wal-Ihsan as we know it today.38 What is more is that he uses it to draw a 
number of conclusions. Commenting on what he describes as a section for martial 
arts, he deduces that the “Ihsanistes”, as he calls them [i.e members of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan], have preference for violent sports because of their confirmed inclination 
towards organized violence!39 This is just one small example among many others. 
According to reliable sources the aforementioned section does not and has never 
existed. And if Mr Ahmadi, the author of the said study, carried out a survey to find 
out about the type of sport the “Ihsanistes”, to use his term, practise or prefer, he 
most probably would be surprised to discover that the majority prefer, like many 
Moroccans, football, whether they practice it or not. And if he could infer from this 
anything, however gross it might be, it does not matter much as long as facts are 
right. 
3.4.1 How did al-Adl wal-Ihsan start and develop structurally? 
Before we proceed to answer such a question, a bit of history about an important 
factor that preceded the emergence of the movement should prove helpful here. 
Unlike other Islamic groups, in Morocco at least, al-Adl wal-Ihsan differs from them 
in that when it was set up in September 1981, a theoretical framework for 
undertaking organized Islamic action had already been in place. Yassine, 
convinced that knowledge precedes action, as the old Islamic saying goes, had 
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invested a lot of effort for many years to work out what he terms Al-Minhaj An-
Nabawi [The Prophetic Method] which he first published in Al-Jamaa Journal and 
soon after in a book form. In his view, unless there is a clear vision from the 
beginning as where to start, which way to go, and how to get to the intended 
destination, the chances of getting confused and failing to make any significant 
progress are quite high.40 
The intention here is not to discuss the content of Al-Minhaj An-Nabawi but rather 
to point out to a widespread misconception. It is true that the Prophetic Method is 
for al-Adl its basic theoretical blueprint, but that does not mean it is above criticism 
or that members should literally stick to whatever it proposes. As a matter of fact, a 
number of ideas have been revised and some suggestions have been completely 
reconsidered. A conspicuous example is Chapter IV in Al-Minhaj An-Nabawi and 
particularly the sections dealing with the structure of the movement which have 
been thoroughly revised. The reason is that when this chapter was first composed 
in the late 70s, it was not meant to be “a sacred formula” that should be adhered to 
by all means and under all circumstances, but rather a proposal to start an Islamic 
organization that had not yet seen the light of day. Indeed there are a number of 
examples that highlight the difference between what does actually exist now and 
what was originally devised, and the political section is one example among many 
others. The leaders of al-Adl themselves have confirmed this fact in many 
speeches and interviews.41 Hence, it comes as no surprise the gross error incurred 
by those who, by chance or design, have chosen to base their analyses on purely 
irrelevant data! 
Now let us get down to facts but,  with a word of caution, I should add that it is 
beyond the scope of this study to trace all the structural changes al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
has experienced since its inception until today or go into much detail the disclosure 
of which may not be approved by the movement leadership. Therefore, I would 
focus on just four major phases and try to present the general configuration, so to 
speak, of the movement in each period.42 I do not claim that the way I have 
proceeded to divide these phases is ideal, but according to the documents I have 
consulted and the data I have collected, I think that what I suggest here seems 
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very plausible. Some researchers may want to do it differently, whereas others 
may object to the idea itself on the grounds that the division of what may be 
intertwined and overlapping phases can only be arbitrary and may not reflect the 
reality. This is not the place to discuss such an issue, but, as far as I am 
concerned, I am of the view that, as a heuristic device, the practice could 
significantly help us to understand the subject under study. 
Phase One: From 1981 to 1986 
During this period the structure of the movement was very simple for obvious 
reasons. The major concern then was to be and to meet basically the educational 
needs of the members, taking into account the scant resources available at the 
time and the very limited number of adherents. There were no local, regional or 
national committees or offices except for the leading council of the association 
which was then composed of eight members including Sheikh Yassine. Four broad 
geographic areas were sketched out and each of which was assigned to a member 
of the leading council. 
This period actually lasted four years and four months during which the Moroccan 
regime took harsh measures against the nascent movement, hoping to nip it in the 
bud, as explained before. Many members were arrested and imprisoned, including 
Sheikh Yassine who was jailed for two years. It is not surprising then that the 
structural development of the movement was slowed down. Given the prevailing 
circumstances, the main challenge was how to cope with the regime‟s repressive 
measures and continue to grow, albeit slowly, in size and influence. 
Phase Two: 1986 – 1991 
When Sheikh Abdessalam Yassine was set free in December 1985 and so were 
other members of the movement, an important step was taken two months later 
which proved very beneficial to al-Adl wal-Ihsan, especially with regard to its 
integrating skills as well as its performance. An Executive Council was set up on 
20th February 1986, composed at the beginning of four committees: one for 
organization, the second for communications, the third for students and the fourth 
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for artistic activities (songs, sports, drama and the like). The heads of these 
committees formed another one which functioned as the coordinating committee. 
The following figure [Fig. 3. 1] shows what the overall structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, 
including the Executive Council, looked like at that time: 
 
Fig. 3. 1 Organizational Structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan until 1991 (Source: The Movement‟s 
internal documents). 
Phase Three: 1991 – 1998 
The Executive Council had been expanding continuously in line with the 
movement‟s strategy to try to provide an opportunity for all its members to get 
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involved, improve their contribution and develop their leadership skills. Meanwhile, 
those committees were assessed regularly so that if any of them no longer served 
any objectives of the movement or appeared to be inefficient, then it would be 
examined for elimination or renewal and reconstruction. Thus certain committees 
were added to the existing ones, others were removed or revamped with new 
elements. Towards the end of 1998 the number of committees had reached nine: 
one for education, the second for children, the third for Islamic sciences, the fourth 
for Da‟wah [for raising Islamic awareness among the public and increasing 
membership], the fifth committee for social work services, the sixth for school 
pupils, the seventh for communications, the eighth for students, and the ninth is 
arts and sports committee [Fig.3. 2]. 
All of these committees have as part of their structure provincial committees linked 
to them, but others went further to have regional or even local committees affiliated 
to them as the following figure shows: 
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In 1991, another organizational measure was taken, considering the country as 
four large provinces: northern, southern, eastern and the midland province. In 1993 
a minor modification was introduced and as a result the number of provinces, as 
they are termed in the bylaws of the movement, became five. In the summer of 
1996 the number rose to nine. 
During the same period a Consultative Assembly was set up, but due to the 
prevailing circumstances, it only debated matters of special importance. Between 
1996 and 1998, a committee was set up to lay out a blueprint for the movement‟s 
political section. Another initiative was also taken to give women members the 
opportunity to improve and secure their organizational independence vis-à-vis the 
men section of the movement. We will see in the next phase how these initiatives 
have been translated into practice. 
Phase Four: 1998 – 2011 
In 1998 the political section of al-Adl wal-Ihsan was officially set up, but it took 
some time before it took its overall shape. Meanwhile, the Executive Council was 
dissolved, and some of its committees were kept and incorporated into the political 
section or into the movement‟s body of committees and specialized groups. In this 
period the women‟s section also became structurally more independent. After the 
establishment of the political section other task groups and units [Fig. 3. 3] also 
saw the light of day such as the Lawyers League,  Human Rights Committee,  
Council of Scholars, Leadership Training Committee, the Writers League, Support 
Committee (for Arab and Muslim peoples). 
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There is no doubt that these developments demonstrate a genuine interest in 
continuous improvement and provide clear evidence of the positive dynamics a 
young Islamic movement displays. However, not all changes were at all times 
beneficial. One of the drawbacks of the movement‟s structure as it evolved towards 
the last decade, for example, is that the committees and sub-committees, sections 
and sub-sections and other specialized groups had increased to such an extent 
that it might not be easy for anyone, let alone the outsider, to grasp the 
relationships between the different bodies within the movement and how they 
operated coherently. Hence, a high-level planning committee was set up to 
consider this issue and in 2012 it proposed what is claimed to be a more integrated 
format as the following figure hopefully shows: 
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Fig. 3. 4  A simplified chart of the structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan since 2012 (Same Source). 
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3.4.2 Remarks 
Such were in brief the different stages the movement has gone through to this 
date. However, for the sake of further clarification, a few remarks need to be made 
here. One of these is that the organizational structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, as we 
have seen, was very simple at the beginning but developed over the years 
according to the movement‟s needs and priorities, taking into consideration the 
changing circumstances which have invariably been far from friendly or 
encouraging. 
A second remark is that, given the prevailing oppressive policies of the Moroccan 
regime towards the opposition groups in general and al-Adl wal-Ihsan in particular, 
the structure of the movement could adequately be qualified as “militant”. If it had 
developed in a free, truly democratic environment, the picture would most probably 
have been different. Knowing that it is being targeted, the movement has been 
compelled to be constantly alert, expecting at any moment to be attacked. This 
might have served it to keep its members motivated, but in the meantime it has 
caused a certain degree of instability. For over three decades, it has never been 
allowed the required conditions to function normally. It has no official headquarters, 
no permanent central, provincial or regional premises with the necessary 
equipment and where it could hold its regular meetings or other activities, and it 
has been denied the right to use public facilities. No wonder that some activities 
may be postponed or even cancelled either for security reasons or because no 
convenient venue could be found. In a word, the movement‟s structure reflects to 
some extent the prevailing stifling political mood in the country.  
A third remark is that the structure of al-Adl wal-Ihsan has never been regarded as 
ideal and the senior members of the movement are aware of its weaknesses but 
they cannot help it. Some problems seem to persist despite the efforts made to 
overcome them. One of the reasons is that in some cases the movement finds 
itself compelled to undertake, not what appears best or preferable, but rather what 
is possible.43 
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A fourth one which is worthy of notice is that regardless of whatever shortcomings 
may be identified in the movement‟s structure, it has nonetheless developed to be 
virtually a huge network capable not only of maintaining the coherence of an ever-
expanding organization, but also of “spotting strange elements” early enough, 
before they could climb the hierarchical ladder and occupy any key post in the 
decision-making bodies of the movement. Stories of unwelcome activists trying to 
infiltrate the group are not rare, and the latest one is the case of a lawyer alleged to 
have been found red-handed and expelled from the movement after 
acknowledging he had been working for the Moroccan secret services. The police, 
angered at their failure to achieve a long cherished dream, retorted by kidnapping 
seven senior members of the movement in Fez on 28th June 2010 and took them 
to a secret detention where they were brutally tortured before they were sent to 
court. The scandal was widely reported by national and international media, 
resulting in the strong condemnation of world human rights organizations of the 
atrocities committed by the Moroccan authorities and the support of many 
European lawyers who attended the seven members‟ trial in the city of Fez.44 
The final remark is that, given that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is the largest Islamic movement 
in Morocco, as it is commonly known, with its broad and expanding organization 
network, it follows that it may be hard to believe that it could be managed or 
controlled by a single person, however talented he might be. When Tozy, Bahaji 
and others claim, for example, that Yassine “nominates the heads of the cells,” 
they do not tell us in any convincing way how it could be done in practice.45 How 
could Yasine appoint thousands of persons even if he wanted?! Furthermore, it is a 
small issue in which not even a provincial leader is expected to interfere. Errors of 
the sort about al-Ald wal-Ihsan are unfortunately widespread. If a certain degree of 
scepticism is understandable and comment is free, to distort facts is no good, is it?  
3.5 Conclusion 
To conclude, it could be said without fear of exaggerating that al-Adl wal-Ihsan was 
born and developed in a political environment which, to say the least, was far from 
friendly or democratic in any significant way. Since its inception in September 
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1981, it has invariably been subject to a policy of harassment and repression. 
There were moments when it eased but only to allow some time, or so it seemed, 
for the preparation of a new bundle of coercive measures or to let off, for a while, 
the steam to prevent “the Moroccan pot” from exploding. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
members have suffered periods of detention in police stations and custody ranging 
from a few hours to 20 years of imprisonment and fines amounting, if added 
together, to thousands and thousands of US dollars. Many have been kicked out of 
their jobs whereas others have been obstructed at every turn to conduct their own 
businesses properly until they have gone bankrupt. Some houses have been 
sealed off on the pretext of being meeting places for the movement members. 
During the arrest campaigns nobody has been spared, not even children and 
babies with their mothers, and the accusation has always been the same: holding 
illegal meetings and/or belonging to an illegal organization. Summer camps and 
picnic events are not allowed and even some marriage and death ceremonies and 
the like social gatherings are impeded. Some members have been denied the right 
of having a passport for over 20 years. More than 300 associations which are 
suspected to be close to al-Adl wal-Ihsan have been suspended. 
Despite this long period of continuous repressive measures of which only some 
examples have been cited, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has remained all the way through 
determined to cling to its non-violent approach. To some observers the movement 
has so far conducted the struggle well and intelligently. It has exploited every 
opportunity to make its voice heard, and has exhibited a lot of creativity to foil the 
Makhzen‟s strategies or turn them to its advantage. In certain cases it has made 
the regime look really ludicrous at the national as well as at the international level. 
Other commentators have gone further to point out that the movement had done a 
great service to a “thankless regime”, for it had been a bulwark against the spread 
of extremism in Morocco. One journalist speaking on Aljazeera Channel once 
claimed that al-Adl wal-Ihsan had displayed too much moderation to the extent it 
had become like “a large fridge” for many young Moroccans.46   
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Whatever the weaknesses of the movement and the mistakes it could have made, 
three aspects of its political and organizational strength cannot be denied. The first 
is that it has never faltered or hesitated to describe, in stunning clarity and 
frankness, the Moroccan regime as it is. Indeed, it has set the bar up so high that 
no other political activist living in Morocco, secular or Islamist, from the right or the 
left, has ever tried to clear. The most audacious demand ever made is to ask for a 
parliamentary monarchy. 
The second one is that al-Adl wal-Ihsan started in 1981 in Morocco and right from 
the beginning it clearly articulated its demands for a new political system, assuming 
its full responsibility. It does not have a single political asylum seeker outside the 
country. It has suffered for being outspoken in its opposition to what it considers a 
despotic regime, knowing that the road to freedom, dignity, justice and true 
democracy is rarely, if ever strewn with roses. 
The third is that notwithstanding what al-Adl wal-Ihsan has had to go through for 
nearly three decades, it has managed not only to maintain its coherence and adapt 
to the changing circumstances but also to constantly renew and improve its 
organizational mechanisms to the extent of being recognised the best organised 
social and political movement in Morocco. As we have tried to show in the section 
on the internal structure of the movement, it has never stuck to the same 
organizational format for long. It always seeks to improve its tools and means to 
avoid any possible organizational inertia on the one hand, and on the other to be in 
a better position to cope with its needs and overcome the various challenges it 
faces. If it cannot be claimed that all its initiatives have been successful, it cannot 
be claimed either that what has been achieved is insignificant.   
That said, can we conclude that the politics of repression pursued by the Moroccan 
authorities has fallen far short of its intended goals? Answers may differ, but in the 
view of this author although the Moroccan regime has created many difficulties for 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan; it has failed to eradicate it, or to split it into smaller groups or to 
stop it from expanding. Indeed, the movement‟s influence has even crossed the 
Mediterranean and the Atlantic, to Europe, USA and Canada. However, if al-Adl 
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wal-Ihsan does constitute a challenge to the regime, it still has not managed to 
harness enough support to topple it or pave the way for the emergence of a new 
political order in Morocco. This means that the struggle is likely to continue for 
some time. For how long and in whose favour will the balance be tilted ultimately? 
Perhaps the next ten or fifteen years will give us a clue. 
In this study, however, our concern is not to make speculations as to who will 
ultimately prevail, but rather to better understand a Moroccan Islamic experience 
which, despite enjoying a steady rise to prominence, seems to be poorly 
understood and often misrepresented. In the next chapter we will explore another 
aspect relating this time to its intellectual foundation but, given the limited space, 
we will only focus on selected key concepts, hoping they will provide us with much 
insight into the nature and vision of a contemporary, Moroccan Islamist movement 
that has not yet had the opportunity to tell its full story.   
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Chapter 4 Key Concepts in the Thought of al-Adl wal-Ihsan  
To achieve a good understanding of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and thereby base our 
analysis on facts, whatever the interpretations we may adopt, we need, among 
other things to be acquainted with the key concepts which we frequently come 
across in the writings of the movement in general and those of its leader and 
founder in particular. Terms like ihsan, ijtihad, fitna, kawma and many others 
employed in the discourse of al-Adl wal-Ihsan are not its own invention, nor are 
they borrowed from foreign cultures. They are rather well-rooted in the Islamic 
culture, namely the Quran and the Sunnah of the Prophet of Islam, and the general 
Muslim public is quite familiar with them, though the level of understanding of the 
details and the points of agreement and disagreement involved may vary from one 
person to another.  
The choice of these concepts which is made exclusively from within the Islamic 
heritage seems to serve at least two basic purposes. One of them is to secure 
effective communication and clarity of message. Yassine is of the view that terms 
are seldom, if ever, neutral; and to avoid any possible confusion, he prefers to use 
the language and the words that Muslims understand better and with which they 
feel more at home, though there is nothing wrong in borrowing from other cultures 
if need be. The second important purpose is to indicate that the position of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan vis-à-vis a number of issues is not dictated by personal vested interests 
or any political expediency, but rather defined by principles drawn from the major 
sources of Islam. 
Though some Muslim thinkers may not agree with some interpretations adopted by 
the movement, they cannot question or doubt the sources on which they are based 
or claim that they are not justified by Islamic standards. Sheikh Yassine has seen 
to it that his stances are supported by authentic Islamic texts, by the views and 
practices of eminent scholars where necessary and also, and this is very important, 
by reason and human experiences, both past and present. Such being the case, 
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we could venture to say that a line of thinking within mainstream contemporary 
Islamic trend but distinctive in some respects has actually seen the light of day with 
the emergence of al-Adl wal-Ihsan.  
To shed light on aspects of the claimed line of thinking advocated by the 
movement, this chapter will discuss three selected concepts –ijtihad, fitna, ihsan– 
which have triggered no small amount of controversy. Sheikh Yassine has 
employed them not only to deal with modern concerns but also to call into question 
some conventional ideas which had dominated the Islamic thought for years and 
even for centuries. Each of the following three sections of this chapter will focus on 
a single concept and examine its meaning, rationale and its implications. Thus it 
will hopefully become clear why al-Adl wal-Ihsan displays features which, prima 
facie, seem to be incongruent, perplexing or even contradictory such as the 
position towards society, government and Sufism, to cite but a few examples, but if 
examined closely they would be found consistent and faithful to an original Islamic 
view and spirit which al-Adl wal-Ihsan has only pioneered or sought to revive. 
4.1 Ijtihad 
The current body of literature on the issue of ijtihad (independent reasoning) as a 
tool to tackle new issues from an acceptable Islamic point of view is certainly large, 
yet it is still growing. A lot has been written about its meaning, importance, scope, 
its fields and the required conditions for its practice.1 Many recent studies point out 
that ijtihad, despite its agreed, crucial importance, unfortunately lost its initial 
momentum for a long time as a result of the decline of the Islamic civilization, 
giving way to what is called in Islamic jurisprudence taqlid (blind imitation of early 
jurists). The consequences of such a deficiency have been detrimental to the 
Islamic Umma and account, in part at least, for much of the hardships it has 
experienced during its long history. 
Lexically, ijtihad means “the exertion of effort on a matter that requires it.”2 In the 
field of Islamic law and jurisprudence, it is defined as the total expenditure of effort 
made by those qualified “in order to understand the source and deduce the rules 
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or, in the absence of a clear textual guidance, formulate independent 
judgements…”3 Concerning its importance, it is now a truism that unless ijtihad is 
given due consideration and recovers its former pride of place in Islamic thought 
and jurisprudence, the Arab and Islamic world will continue to lag behind other 
advanced nations and all the talks about freedom, justice, development and 
progress will be no more than a sad exercise in daydreaming and wishful thinking. 
Granted, but what input has al-Adl wal-Ihsan brought to the discussion of an issue 
which despite being debated for several decades has lost nothing of its intellectual 
interest and academic relevance? There is not much space here to go into detail, 
but we will try to focus on a few selected aspects which have been either missing 
in the literature on the subject, or not stressed enough to underline their 
importance or because they are considered from a perspective different from the 
ones known in the field. 
There are a number of principles upon which Muslim scholars and thinkers do not 
seem to disagree, but their views may differ widely on when and how to put them 
to practice. Ijtihad is undoubtedly one of these. If it is generally agreed that it is of 
vital importance to the development and progress of the Islamic thought and 
Umma, there are a number of things that should be borne in mind in order for this 
tool to be employed effectively. Otherwise, it would merely maintain the status quo 
and increase disagreement and tension among Muslims.  
Sheikh Yassine has dealt with this issue in many of his books and speeches and 
has pointed out to two major impediments that should be overcome to secure the 
conditions for ijtihad to be undertaken and be fruitful. The first has to do with what 
he calls “the shackles of blind imitation” whose impact is still present even in the 
writings and discourse of some advocates of ijtihad.4 A conspicuous example 
concerns the authoritarian regimes which have been in power throughout most of 
Islamic history. Despite clear texts which dub them as coercive, despotic forms of 
government, some scholars still defend them and regard them as legitimate, 
though they may speak about the need for reform.5 The reason is that the views of 
some jurists and scholars still depend on rulings which, besides being debatable 
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any way, were made centuries ago and in circumstances different from the present 
ones. 
It is worth noting, however, that those rulings justifying authoritarianism do indeed 
exist and they are not rare in the Islamic heritage; hence the spell they have 
acquired with the passage of time to the point of being mistakenly confused with 
revealed texts is amazing. Here lies one of the major weaknesses of the Islamic 
jurisprudence despite its enormous wealth and impressive achievements in other 
areas. However, the fact that not much was produced in the political sphere is not 
due to any intellectual inability, but rather to pure political reasons. This started 
thirty years after the death of Prophet Muhammad when the Khilafa ar-Rachida 
(rightly-guided Caliphate) was overthrown and replaced by autocratic, hereditary 
rule. The fukaha (Muslim scholars) were gradually marginalized and, indeed, 
forcefully deterred from tackling political issues. Those who refused to comply were 
persecuted, jailed, tortured or even assassinated. This accounts largely for the 
gaps in what is called the jurisprudence of transactions and particularly in political 
theory. Yassine stresses the need to overcome what may described as 
epistemological and psychological obstacles and to reconsider many received 
ideas and attitudes that are not founded on reliable sources; and even if some 
stances were ever justified at their times and in their circumstances, that is no 
excuse to regard them as binding on Muslims at all times and in all places.6 
The second impediment is “to think under duress”, or, to put it simply, to practice 
ijtihad under pressure, physical, psychological or whatever. The fact of the matter 
is that the current circumstances at the national as well as the international level 
are not encouraging, to say the least. Authoritarianism continues to reign supreme 
in most, if not all Arab and Islamic countries and unfortunately with the 
complacency and even the overt protection of some Western powers. This 
accounts largely for the emergence of a kind of defeatism leading to political 
apathy, frustration, despair and the like phenomena which are widespread in 
Muslim societies, and even among some educated people. 
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Now if the committee or institution charged with the task of making ijtihad is 
negatively impacted by the prevailing mood, its project is likely to stop short of 
providing what is needed to restore to the Umma its dignity including its right of 
being ruled by a government of its own choice. Instead, it may be apologetic or 
submissive on the grounds that one should be realistic and take into account the 
prevalent harsh realities or the like excuses which, if examined closely, are far from 
convincing. For this reason, Yassine maintains that those who tackle the issues of 
ijtihad should be independent-minded, responsible scholars and thinkers and not 
be subject to any constraints whatsoever.7 
This does not mean that Sheikh Yassine rules out realism or taking into 
consideration the existing conditions. On the contrary, he stresses in a number of 
books the need to be well-informed about the conditions of society before 
proposing any solutions to its problems. He even cites some ideas concerning 
certain sectors such as the banking system which, according to him, if put to 
practice immediately, would cause disaster.8 The point he intends to make, 
however, is that some excuses when pushed too far, as it has often been the case, 
are likely to serve the will and interests of the forces seeking to maintain the status 
quo. 
4.1.1 Types of ijtihad : 
Different perspectives have been used to discuss ijtihad and its types.9 As for 
Sheikh Yassine, he considers the issue from a perspective according to which two 
types of ijtihad should be of prime importance. The first type should be carried out 
before the establishment of an Islamic state and is basically concerned with what 
could be described as the strategic issues (al-kuliyat).10 It seeks to investigate and 
devise a theoretical and practical framework to reform society and government 
from an Islamic point of view. How to educate people, how to organize them and 
raise their awareness so that they assume their responsibilities and get actively 
involved in working for the required reform should be the major concerns of this 
type of ijtihad. 
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According to Yassine, this type of ijtihad is faced with two major challenges. One is 
intellectual and has to do with a widespread perception in many social milieus, 
whose understanding of Islam is far from being satisfactory.11 The question then is 
how to secure an adequate understanding of Islam as a way of life, concerned not 
only with prayers, fasting, zakah (alms) and hajj (pilgrimage) but also with justice, 
development and prosperity. How to free common people from superstitions and 
old received misconceptions and teach them that Islam is a revolt against injustice, 
corruption, humiliation, exploitation and impoverishment of people? How to 
convince them that the achievement of their freedom and dignity is dependent 
upon their involvement instead of engaging in wishful thinking and idly waiting for it 
to be served on a silver platter? 
The other challenge that arises once the question of comprehension and conviction 
is settled is that of organization. Given that individual attempts and disorganized 
initiatives will not lead far especially if we bear in mind the nature and scope of the 
reform that is sought for, the question then is how to organise Islamic action in 
such an effective way that it could materialize the aspired goals? “How to make,” 
wonders Yassine, “of the existing good disposition among common Muslims a 
powerful tool to rid of the wrong and set up the right?”12 Here, says Yassine, lies 
the great difficulty.13 A lot of creativity and imagination is needed in order to devise 
a viable plan of action combining what he considers three fundamental pillars: “the 
sacred revealed texts, the wisdom of reason and the faith of the heart.” The 
required ijtihad, as he argues, is “to combine these three pillars… to create an 
action plan that is achievable.”14 
The second type of ijtihad is to be tackled after the establishment of an Islamic 
political order. It is concerned with adapting the social, economical and especially 
the political system to Islamic principles and criteria.15 In other words if the former 
type deals with the strategic objectives that would create a conducive environment 
for the establishment of a viable and agreed Islamic system of government, the 
latter should complement the first, coping with the details, filling up the gaps, 
sorting out the different components and the like tasks to achieve coherence. It is 
no easy matter given the ruin incurred by a long history of despotism. 
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4.1.2 Conditions and approach 
Not everybody is qualified to conduct ijtihad, and the classical approach to cope 
with increasingly complex issues of modern times would not be of much help 
either. Therefore, there are a number of conditions that should be met, and some 
of these are highlighted in the following paragraph: 
Intertwined and contradictory interests in a complex world undergoing many 
crises of which we will not make head or tail if we do not liberate ourselves from 
the shackles of taqlid (blind imitation) and base [our independent reasoning] on 
the higher sources of ijtihad: the Quran and the Sunnah (sayings, actions and 
approvals of the Prophet), quiyas (analogical reasoning) performed by intelligent 
pious specialists, and the ijma‟a (the consensus) of scholars who have liberated 
themselves from the yoke of despotic rule.16  
In this passage Sheikh Yassine articulates some of the conditions which he thinks 
should be fulfilled by those conducting ijtihad. The first is to avoid imitating blindly 
earlier scholars without considerations of the changing circumstances of society 
and the increasing complexity of the modern world; the second is the importance of 
moral and spiritual uprightness, and this quality has rarely, if ever, received the 
attention it deserves in the writings of contemporary Muslim thinkers ; the third is 
that ijtihad should not be undertaken under constraints of any kind; the fourth is the 
importance of balanced knowledge of the required sciences, including but not to 
limited to Sharia; the fifth is the importance and the presence of what might be 
described as “the intellectual engagé”. To explain further this condition, he says: 
No single person is qualified enough for the ijtihad tasks. Nor does the duty of 
scholars of ijtihad stop at merely deducing rulings and giving them their legal 
status. The scholars of ijtihad must belong to the movement advocating the 
message (of Islam), and come up from within it. They must live it, breathe its 
spirit, shoulder its burden and strongly object to the flaws, present or expected, 
that can creep into it. If scholars of ijtihad are merely people who look into books, 
write documents, consider texts, put questions in abstract and toe the line, and if 
they are just eloquent mouths expressing thoughts but their hearts are not fully in 
them, they will be a disaster. Indeed, they will contribute to the demise of 
religion.17  
Such were certain distinctive conditions to undertake ijtihad; however, the first 
sentence in the passage quoted above seems to be somewhat problematic. If “No 
single person is qualified enough for the ijtihad tasks,” then what is the point of 
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talking about those qualifications, or rather how could the situation be addressed? 
This actually leads us to the question of approach which Sheikh Yassine also 
considers of crucial importance in order for Ijtihad to yield the expected results. 
To be fair, Yassine is not alone to stress that “No single person is qualified enough 
for the ijtihad tasks.” Other contemporary scholars and thinkers have emphasized 
the same point and it is no wonder.18 Given the increasing and challenging issues 
facing Muslim societies nowadays and the unprecedented advances in the various 
fields of knowledge which have become relevant to the ijtihad making, it is 
practically impossible to have the required expertise in all fields and tackle the job 
alone. To overcome this problem, Yassine suggests that it should be conducted 
collectively. Past is the time when it was carried out by individual jurists or 
scholars. That is no longer possible, nor is it viable as an approach not only 
because of its shortcomings among which the promotion of disagreement about 
petty matters, but also because of its inability to fulfill the needs of modern-day 
society. Hence, it is indispensable that it should be organized and conducted by an 
institution at the disposal of which all the necessary means and resources should 
be available to carry out its mission.19 
Furthermore, ijtihad should not only be collective but also consultative. Due to the 
nature of the issues to be debated, views are bound to differ. In this case, opined 
Yassine, it would be better to try to achieve, through dialogue, unanimity as far as 
possible; otherwise, the majority decides.20 This position is justified by verses from 
the Quran which enjoin shura (consultation) and a number of sayings of Prophet 
Muhammad in one of which it is reported that: 
I [„Ali bin Abi Talib] said to the Prophet, “O, Prophet, [what if] there is a case 
among us, while neither revelation comes, nor the Sunnah exists.” The Prophet 
replied, “[you should] have meetings with the scholars – or in another version: the 
pious servants – and consult with them. Do not make a decision only by a single 
opinion [Italics mine].21 
A third feature of the approach to be adopted is that it should be comprehensive 
because, as Yassine explains: 
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To look [at the issue] from a narrow perspective, the perspective of a judge, or a 
jurist concerned with individual cases or an intellectual keen on abstract thinking, 
will not enable us to bring about the comprehensive and methodological ijtihad 
that covers the great expanse of the end-goals of Islamic law.22 
A fourth feature is that it should be balanced, neither too rigid nor too loose. In the 
former case, at best it will only “bring about a traditional structure that preserves 
the inherited pattern;”23 in the latter, it may lead to the demise of Islam altogether. 
And this is no exaggeration. In his book, Notes on Islamic Jurisprudence and 
History, Sheikh Yassine quotes a modern Arab writer as saying that the meaning of 
“God” varies, depending on the situation of each person. “To the hungry person, 
God means bread; to the enslaved, he means freedom; to the oppressed, justice; 
to the emotionally deprived, love.”24  
The fifth feature is that the end-goals of Sharia should be presented as demands 
for something that is virtually lacking or has been tampered with, and not as 
something that is living and thriving and only needs to be protected. This is a truly 
novel idea, regardless of whether we agree or disagree with it. To the best 
knowledge of this author, no other Muslim scholar or thinker has ever considered 
the end-goals of the Sharia from this perspective since they were first elaborated 
by Imam Shatibi, a great scholar and jurisconsult (Faqih) who lived in Granada, 
Spain, in the fourteenth century (died in 1388). 
To sum up, the major concern underlying the conception of ijtihad as it is 
understood by al-Adl wal-Ihsan and its leader and theoretician, Abdessalam 
Yassine is not merely to stress the importance of an Islamic principle. That is a 
point that is also and already emphasized by other contemporary Muslim scholars 
and intellectuals. But the major concern is how to secure quality, lucidity, and 
effectiveness. How to use this principle which is of great importance in Islamic 
jurisprudence and teachings to devise a viable blueprint for the rise of Islamic 
countries after centuries of injustice, humiliation and hardships under authoritarian 
hereditary regimes? How to use this powerful tool to sharpen people‟s awareness 
of their plight and set them on the road to freedom and dignity? How can ijtihad 
serve to generate ideas, insightful, rational but not devoid of warmth and passion? 
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In other words, how can it secure knowledge, lucidity, self-motivation and 
strengthen people‟s determination to take positive action? 
All the ideas discussed above concerning the concept of ijtihad such as the 
decisive importance of moral and spiritual dimension, the need for a free 
environment and for a collective as well as consultative approach and an organized 
institution, the necessity to consider the end-goals of Sharia in a way different from 
the classical one, and the active involvement of proponents of ijtihad and other 
details which, for a lack of space, could not be covered here, all seem to present a 
view of ijtihad that is different, at least in some respects, from other contemporary 
views on the same issue.  
4.2 Fitna 
The word “fitna” is another concept of great importance in the thought of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan. Though it is used widely among Muslims and occurs frequently in religious 
as well as literary and historical Islamic sources, it seems that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is 
the first and the only Islamic movement to have picked it up and underlined its 
importance and relevance to overcome some thorny theoretical and practical 
issues concerning reform efforts in Arab and Islamic countries. What does fitna 
mean and why is it claimed to be more appropriate to apply to contemporary 
Muslim societies than for example, jahiliyya, another concept adopted by other 
Muslim thinkers, namely al-Mawdudi and Sayyed Quotb? What are its implications 
for the view and strategy pursued by al-Ald wal-Ihsan to reform society and 
government from an Islamic point of view? 
According to Lisan al-Arab, one of the most extensive Arabic dictionaries by Ibn 
Mandhur, the term fitna conveys many shades of meanings with a common thread 
referring to trial, ordeal, test, and tribulation. Its origin, says Ibn Mandhur, is derived 
from the action of putting gold and silver through fire to find out whether they are of 
good or bad quality or to burn off their impurities. Hence, the individual may be put 
through hardship to test his or her character. In the Quran the term and its 
variations, mentioned at least sixty times, refer to the trials, temptations, and the 
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suffering that man may go through here in this world and in the after-life. In the 
hadith [the sayings of Prophet Muhammad] the term is also used to describe a 
situation when it is hard to distinguish between right and wrong and truth and 
falsehood leading to social and political disorder or fragmentation. Hence, it is 
widely used in historic Islamic records to refer to divisions and internal conflicts 
which happened in the early years of Islamic history, starting with what is called the 
Great Fitna which took place after the assassination of the third caliph Uthman ibn 
Affan in 656 CE. 
In the collections of hadiths, we find whole sections devoted to al-fitan [pl. of fitna] 
and there are a number of reports about the trying events that the Islamic Umma 
has to confront in the course of its history: social and political rebellions, in-fighting, 
usurpation of power and the like. In some cases the Prophet warns against some 
specific events, indicating their time and perpetrators, but in other cases he does 
not specify and his recommendations are given in general terms. Nevertheless, in 
most cases he warns against taking part in social disorder and anarchy and 
adamantly prohibited bloodshed. 25 
What is worthy of notice here is that those recommendations have been interpreted 
as an obligation to obey rulers even if they are unjust for the sake of public interest. 
With the passage of time, each generation succumbed even more to the existing 
oppressive powers until “the religion of submissiveness”, to use Ibn Khaldun‟s 
terms, became the norm and ruled out any endeavours to seek reform and change. 
Islamic texts should be examined in their entirety and if some of them, argues 
Yassine, do in fact recommend patience, there are others which call for action, 
heralding a new future for the Islamic Umma after a long history of suffering under 
despotic rule. Why should we ignore these, implies Yassine, and only focus on 
those concerned with “special circumstances”? There is no evidence that the latter 
should constitute a principle to be observed at all times and in all places. Nor is 
there any indication that Muslims have only two options: either to engage in armed 
struggle causing thereby civil war and bloodshed or to keep quiet.26 Yet, the fear of 
the worst, that is, disorder and social anarchy, appears to have been pushed to its 
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extreme, and this has played into the hands of corrupt rulers who have been able 
to stay in power throughout most of the Islamic history. 27 
4.2.1 A crucial question: 
The question which Sheikh Yassine had to address well before he started his 
organized action in September 1981 is what description best fits the current 
situation of Muslim societies. This is indeed a crucial question whose answer would 
determine not only the attitude to take towards society and government but also 
the nature of strategies to be adopted to help bring about social and political reform 
in a country where absolutist hereditary monarchy has been in place for many 
centuries. 
Before Yassine, other Muslim intellectuals debated the same question and put 
forward views which triggered so much controversy in the Islamic world. Sheikh 
Abul A‟ala Mawdudi (1903 – 1979), a prominent thinker and writer of his time and 
founder of Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan, discussed in his works the current situation 
in the world in general and in Muslim countries in particular and brought forth his 
controversial concept of jahilliya.28 Sayyid Qutb (1906– 1966), another well-known 
Muslim intellectual in Egypt, took up the same idea and elaborated on it further in 
his writings, namely in his influential book, Milestones. 
Jahiliyya, translated in various terms such as “Ignorance of divine guidance”, “Days 
of Ignorance”, “the Age of Ignorance”, actually refers to the condition of the Arabs 
in the pre-Islamic era, that is, prior to the revelation of the Quran to Prophet 
Muhammad. In the last century, however, Mawdudi and later Sayyid Qutb 
extended the term and applied it to any human society regarded as displaying 
features similar to those which were prevalent in the pre-Islamic period of 
ignorance. Accordingly, present-day Muslim societies cannot be considered 
Islamic. Sayyid Qutb explained: 
We are today in a jahiliyya similar to that contemporaneous to Islam or worse. 
Everything around us is a jahiliyya: people‟s perceptions and beliefs, habits and 
legislations. Even much of what we think of as being Islamic culture, Islamic 
sources or Islamic philosophy and thought is in fact the making of this jahiliyya.29  
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The problem with such a view lies not only in the kind of ideas it has generated but 
also in the way it has been understood and translated on the grounds by certain 
groups, though they only represent a small minority compared to the mainstream 
Islamic trend. A number of violent and catastrophic events have indeed taken 
place. Condemned and rejected by Muslims all over the world, such mindless acts 
have neither helped to solve Muslim societies‟ problems nor increased their chance 
to realize their long cherished dreams of justice, freedom and progress. In fact, 
they have created more problems than they have solved and it is no wonder. 
Claims about the regimes‟ dirty involvement in such incidents may not be 
dismissed as mere rumours, especially now that many scandalous practices have 
been uncovered after the fall of the Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan dictators. 
Sheikh Yassine has been very adamant in his rejection of the view according to 
which Muslim societies are taken to be jahili and vehemently criticizes it in his 
earlier writings, starting with his first book, Al-Islam byna ad-Da'wa wa ad-Dawla 
[Islam between the Call and the State] which he published in 1971, about ten years 
before al-Adl wal-Ihsan movement saw the light of day. Then, he elaborates his 
ideas about the issue in his later works. In Tanweer al-Muminat, for example, he 
writes:  
Are we going to separate ourselves from the Umma‟s present and flee our Muslim 
societies, ascribing unbelief to them all and branding them of jahiliya as if our 
hearts are filled with the light of guidance and piety while others are all darkness, 
polytheism, bid‟ah30 and unbelief?31 
He goes on to discuss the concept of jahiliyya, using numerous rhetoric questions 
to expose its irrelevance and its dire consequences. Though the answers to such 
questions are evident, Yassine does not want to leave room for any doubt and 
responded with an emphatic “No”. Then he adds that he would rather use the term 
fitna to describe Muslim present conditions and societies.  It is more appropriate, 
he argues, not only because it is in line with the Sunni view which is extremely 
cautious when it comes to ascribing unbelief to any person but also because it 
allows for a balanced and well-informed position that is not tainted by ignorance or 
extremist ideologies.32 
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Yassine warns against some common simplistic ideas such as the one to the effect 
that the first period of Islam was divided into two separate, clear-cut blocs: one was 
of pure angels and the other of devils and unbelievers. Even those who embraced 
Islam, he argues, did not rid themselves all at once of all the traces of their former 
jahili lifestyles.33 
Commenting on the gradual change which occurred in the lives and behaviour of 
the first people who embraced Islam, Yassine stresses that though they were 
regarded Muslims once they uttered shahada [there is no god but God], it does not 
mean that they became perfect on the spot or that they could ever become so. He 
even wonders whether the first Islamic community was ever thoroughly free from 
all the remnants of Jahiliya.34 If such a thing could not be confirmed, Yassine 
seems to infer, then how can we expect the Muslim society of today and of 
tomorrow to be of angelic purity; otherwise, it should be dismissed as guilty of 
unbelief, jahiliya, bid‟ah, and flagrant error? 
In case some people may be surprised by these ideas, Sheikh Yassine cites two 
hadiths [sayings] of the Prophet to support his view. In the first it is reported that 
Abu Dhar, one of the Prophet‟s Companions, reviled a man and spoke ill of his 
mother. Then the Prophet said to him: “O! Abu Dhar, did you speak ill of his 
mother? You are a man who still possesses a trace of jahiliya.” In the second 
hadith the Prophet spoke of four traits of jahiliyya in his Umma that they would 
never relinquish… The lesson Yassine intends to underscore here is that human 
society can never be purified of all its weaknesses and shortcomings. This does 
not mean, however, that the Muslim should lose hope or feel frustrated. “On the 
contrary, he should be inspired by such hadiths to feel comfortable advocating “the 
easy way with a view to continuously striving for reform. „Verily never God changes 
the condition of a people until they [first] change that which is [not good] in their 
hearts.’”35   
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4.2.2 Implications of the fitna concept 
The question that arises now is: what are the implications of using “fitna” instead of 
“jahiliya” to describe contemporary Muslim societies? In the view of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan they are highly significant in all spheres, social, political, intellectual, 
religious, and psychological. Furthermore, the concept of “fitna” would help to 
understand the movement‟s behaviour and attitude towards a number of issues 
and the type of strategy it advocates to bring about social and political reform in 
Morocco. In a later chapter we will discuss this in detail, but for the moment only a 
few important points will be raised briefly here. 
Firstly, since the application of the fitna concept to Moroccan society excludes the 
idea of jahiliya, it follows that violence or the use of force as a means to achieve 
social and political change is rejected categorically. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan is clear about 
this since it was set up in September 1981. It stressed, from the beginning, in 
speeches as well as in published and unpublished documents what it called the 
three “NOs”, a tripartite motto the first component of which is “No to Violence”. 
Some have claimed that this is a mere tactical slogan to find a convenient place on 
the political scene, but al-Adl wal-Ihsan has been successful to demonstrate that it 
is a matter of principle to the extent that it has become a confirmed fact recognized 
at the national as well as the international level. Jeune Afrique, a well-known 
weekly newsmagazine published in Paris, had on the front page of one of its issues 
a headline featuring Al-Adl wal-Ihsan as a rampart against terrorism.36 This is not 
the only “certificate of good conduct” which al-Adl wal-Ihsan has received. Many 
Moroccan as well as foreign observers recognize the crucial role it has played to 
keep the Moroccan youth away from violence. 
Furthermore, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has been put to the test and has shown that, in this 
respect at least, it practises what it preaches. For more than three decades it has 
been subject to various repressive measures ranging from long-term imprisonment 
and abject torture in detention centres to other forms of ill-treatment causing in 
certain cases severe injuries. Yet, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has never been lured to get 
involved in violence. There are many videotapes showing the brutal intervention of 
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the police and some of these scenes have been aired on international TV 
channels. This is something that members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan are now very proud 
of, though senior members admit that at the beginning it was hard, particularly for 
the youth, to appreciate such an attitude.  
Besides writing extensively about the issue, Sheikh Yassine has made many 
speeches warning against violence, reiterating now and again a saying by the 
Prophet to the effect that “God is gentle and likes gentleness and rewards for 
gentleness what he does not reward for harshness.”37  It is a childish practice, he 
argues, to which they resort only those who do not have confidence in their project 
and consequently seek to impose their ideas on others by force. Addressing a 
meeting of women and men, he said: 
I have heard that some of you are frustrated and get angry because their young 
daughters don‟t want to wear hijab or their sons do not perform their prayers 
regularly or not at all. They get angry and they might be tempted to use force. I 
warn you. Do not resort to violence. There‟s never any good in violence.  Do not 
impose anything on your children. Remember that your child is a human being. It 
is not an iron rod that you can put into fire and then mould it the way you like. 
Unless they are convinced, you should not and you cannot impose anything on 
them. It should come from within.38 
Secondly, the concept of fitna has its bearing on the kind of strategy espoused by 
al-Adl wal-Ihssan to seek reform in Morocco. The members are fully aware that 
social and political change cannot be realized overnight, nor can it be imposed with 
the stroke of a pen or by a simple administrative order. Change is a process. It 
takes time and requires energy, innovation, determination and a lot of sweating. 
However, though the prevailing harsh circumstances represent fitna par 
excellence, one should not despair or feel frustrated as long as he or she is deeply 
involved in serious endeavours to bring about the aspired reform or at least to 
promote the suitable conditions for achieving it. 
Thirdly, the adoption of fitna concept is intended to stress the necessity to avoid 
thinking in black and white terms and oversimplifying what is in fact very complex. 
Social reality is not as simple as it might appear in the writings of those who 
wrongly applied the term jahiliyya to it. There are plenty of colours and nuances 
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and as a result society cannot be divided into two distinct groups: the good guys 
and the evil ones. Such a society does not and has never existed anywhere. 
Finally, the concept of fitna has allowed for a fresh reading of Islamic history which, 
in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, is more realistic and objective. There is no denying 
that there have been brilliant achievements of which Muslims can rightly be proud 
of. Yet, this should not blur our vision or blunt our senses to the extent of not 
seeing the other side of the coin. One of the greatest disasters which occurred in 
Muslim history yet, strangely enough, still denied by some Ulama, is that political 
authority was hijacked in the early years of Islamic history and that much of the 
suffering which Muslims have been going through to this date goes back to and 
emanates from that catastrophic event.39 According to al-Adl wal-Ihsan, to consider 
Muslim history through the fitna lens allows for a balanced perception which 
acknowledges the positive achievements but in the mean time highlights the 
source of all or most trouble in the Islamic world, that is, despotic hereditary rule. It 
also allows for a balanced view of individuals, whether rulers or ruled, scholars or 
laymen. 
In sum the concept of fitna is of special importance in the thought of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan. It helps to understand how al-Adl wal-Ihsan has tried to provide possible 
answers to thorny questions in the Islamic thought, namely the attitude towards 
society, government and history, and to shape a strategy which is deemed more 
suitable to overcome the present predicament in Morocco and seek a better future. 
4.3 Ihsan 
Of all the key concepts in the thought of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the term ihsan is placed 
at centre stage. The leader of the movement devoted a voluminous book of two 
volumes and much of al-Minhaj an-Nabawi book to the subject. As a matter of fact, 
there is not a single book or speech by Sheikh Yassine in which he does not allude 
to the notion of ihsan to stress its importance whatever the nature of the topic 
under discussion. When the movement decided to take on a new name in 1987, it 
chose one which brought the term ihsan into relief to signify that it is at least as 
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important as the other demands, namely justice. It is indeed this obvious emphasis 
on the spiritual and ethical dimension of Islam which makes the discourse of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan appear in the eyes of some observers and researchers “unusual”, 
“peculiar”, “distinctive”, “difficult to categorise” and other epithets to the same effect 
are also used, which indicates no small amount of bewilderment. This section 
seeks to shed light on this concept, its meaning, its importance and its implications 
for an Islamic opposition force engaged to press, from its own perspective, for 
social and political reform in Morocco.  
Arabic dictionaries tell us that ihsan means doing something in an excellent 
manner and also doing someone a favour. It derives from husn which is translated 
in English as “beauty”; its opposite is kubh and su` meaning “ugliness” and 
“repulsiveness”.  In the Quranic and the Sunna terminology, however, the word 
ihsan is employed to convey different layers of meaning of which three will be cited 
here. The first is that you should worship God as if you see him, for even if you do 
not see him, he sees you. The second is that you should do what is good and 
beautiful towards your parents, your spouse, children, relatives, friends, all people 
regardless of their colour, race and religion, the poor and the needy and also the 
ecosystem. The third is that you should perform whatever you are entrusted with in 
an excellent manner: a job, a task, a public office or any other activity.40 Hence, it is 
not surprising that there should be no English equivalent for the term ihsan. 
Various translations have been used: charity, beneficence, and spirituality, but 
none of these could be claimed to be accurate, though perhaps for the lack of a 
better alternative spirituality and ethics may be used. 
According to Yassine, the various meanings of ihsan coalesce to provide us with 
the basic characteristics in order for the Muslim to be a good, responsible citizen, 
able to make significant contribution to his and her society and promote the 
conditions for a better life in this world and a good preparation for the life to come 
in the hereafter. Those who worship God as is his due, observe the basic practices 
of Islam, perform what is beneficial to people and society and have good 
intentions, then they should be a blessing not only to their close community but all 
mankind. Commenting on a hadith in which the Prophet says, “Verily, God loves, 
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when one of you is doing something, that he or she does it in the most excellent 
manner,”41 Yassine points out that to serve society does not depend only on good 
intentions and the willingness to get engaged, but also on the acquisition of the 
required expertise, skills and the ability to perform one‟s task well.42 
The term ihsan appears to be broad in scope, fit to convey a range of deep, 
positive meanings and attitudes and, above all, well rooted in Islamic culture. This 
explains to a great extent why it has been chosen by Yassine to stress the 
importance of spirituality and ethics in the Islamic renewal. Some critics, however, 
regard Yassine‟s emphasis on ihsan as too much exaggerated, most probably, it is 
argued, as a consequence of his past Sufi experience. Others go further to claim 
that the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is just playing on words to circumvent 
controversy and that what he calls ihsan is but Sufism, pure and simple. This is 
though Yassine has reiterated in writing as well as in speech that he is not a Sufi, 
without denying he was.43 His detractors seem convinced that the old man has not 
changed in the least and that he is, as he has always been, a confirmed Sufi. 
Hence, a number of articles and even books have been published to attack what 
they describe the Sufi deviations of Yassine‟s thought.44  
Such developments have prompted Yassine to devote a voluminous book titled Al-
Ihsan where he explores the issue in detail, clarifying as best as he can what he 
thinks of Sufism and explaining why it is ihsan, and not Sufism, which is more 
appropriate in the present time to cater for the spiritual thirst of large sections of the 
Islamic Umma, including even many young advocates of an Islamic order. In an 
attempt to dispel any possible misgivings, Yassine makes it clear from the 
beginning that it is not his intention to call to Sufism. “I like neither the name,” he 
says, “nor the form because I cannot find them in the book of God or the Sunnah of 
the Prophet.”45 His intention, as he explains, is rather to discuss the issues related 
to Sufism quietly to help promote a better understanding of the subject and be able 
to distinguish between truth and falsehood and what is beneficial and acceptable 
and what is not. 
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As a basis for discussion, Yassine chooses one of the most famous hadiths and 
uses it as a model to expound his understanding of Islam in general and the 
concept of ihsan in particular. Given its crucial importance, part of the hadith will be 
quoted here: 
„Umar ibn al-Khattab said: One day when we were with God‟s messenger, a man 
with very white clothing and very black hair came up to us. No mark of travel was 
visible on him, and none of us recognized him. Sitting down before the Prophet, 
leaning his knees against his, and placing his hands on his thighs, he said, “Tell 
me, Muhammad, about Islam.”  
The Prophet replied, “Islam means that you should bear witness that there is no 
god but God and that Muhammad is God‟s messenger, that you should perform 
the ritual prayer, pay the alms tax, fast during Ramadan, and make the pilgrimage 
to the House of God if you are able to go there.”  
The man said, “You have spoken the truth.” We were surprised at his questioning 
him and then declaring that he had spoken the truth. He said, “Now tell me about 
Iman (faith).” The Prophet replied, “Faith means that you have faith in God, the 
angels, the Books, the messengers, and the Last Day, and that you have faith in 
the measuring out, both its good and its evil.” 
Remarking that he had spoken the truth, he then said, “Now tell me about Ihsan.” 
The Prophet replied, “Ihsan means that you should worship God as if you see 
him, for even if you do not see God, God sees you.” (…) 
Then the man went away, and the Prophet informed them it was Gabriel who came 
to teach them their religion.46 
What is interesting about this hadith, which Muslims everywhere and for over more 
than fourteen centuries must have had the chance to be familiar with if not to learn 
by heart in early childhood, is not only the clarity and importance of its content but 
also the circumstances in which it was revealed. In a contemporary study, Murato 
and William Chittick have rendered the event in such a vivid description in an 
attempt, as they say, to bring it closer “to a reader situated many centuries and 
miles away.”47 
They have pointed out to a number of strange facts which added a lot to the 
significance of the event. One of these is the sudden appearance of a strange 
man. He could not be a traveller because he showed no signs of travel; and he 
could not have come earlier because the people of Medina knew each other and 
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would have known about his arrival. Another strange fact is that the man seemed 
to be familiar with the Prophet. A third fact concerns the way in which the interview 
was conducted: each time Muhammad answered the man‟s question, the man 
said, “You have spoken the truth.” A fourth important fact relates to the Prophet‟s 
final comment when the man left: “That was Gabriel. He came to teach you your 
religion.” The authors conclude that “No one was supposed to forget about this 
visit…[and] if they ever wanted to know what was essential in Islam, all they had to 
do was to remember the strange events of that day.”48 
Sheikh Yassine has made similar remarks about the circumstances in which the 
Prophet‟s Companions came to know about this hadith to underline its special 
significance and concludes that: 
Islam is an ascent; it is not a stationary state. The first rung is that of the 
practicing Muslim, attentive to fulfilling the obligations the law prescribes for every 
Muslim. The second rung is that of Iman [faith], a higher degree, where worship 
and moral rectitude are on a par. The third degree, ihsan, is the springboard for 
the great spiritual journey and its infinite space.49 
This passage which tells in a nutshell how Yassine understands Islam should 
trigger no controversy, for it actually belongs to a mainstream perception among 
Islamic scholars. Yassine has only told the hadith of Gabriel in another way using 
some figures of speech to convey the idea of upward spiritual and moral motion. 
Other Muslim (and even non-Muslim) thinkers have used similar metaphors such 
the three-dimensional reality of Islam50 or the three-level edifice of faith51 and the 
like to express the same idea. Yassine himself points out that he would rather 
prefer “the image of a building that is being built slowly and surely…”52 The reason, 
as he explains, is that “the progress on Islam‟s path to moral and spiritual 
perfection is a construction, and the fulfilling of the obligations of its law are the 
bricks and cement, with prayer foremost.”53 
The message he intends to bring home here through the use of such figures of 
speech is that ihsan cannot possibly be achieved outside the framework of Sharia 
and that he, like mainstream scholars of Islam, disapproves of any method that 
ignores the established rules of Islam. “You cannot build on a void and with 
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nothing,” he affirms.54 However, he also disapproves of the practice of those who 
may be learned in the matters of Sharia, yet they present them in “in dry terms, 
emptied of their core substance,”55 and, above all, get involved in endless quarrels 
about trivia. Yassine refuses both extremes and warns his readers to be on their 
guard if they come across what he describes as “Sufis inebriated with their spiritual 
ecstasy.”56 “Take to heart their advice to love God,” he says, “and ignore the 
rest.”57 And if they encounter the type of learned men referred to above, he advised 
them likewise to heed “their words of knowledge” and avoid getting “enmeshed in 
pointless quarrels and sectarian rigidity.”58  
If ihsan is not possible outside the framework of Sharia, Yassine believes that it is 
not possible, save exceptional cases, without spiritual guidance either. “A spiritual 
guide is needed,” he explains, “for the highest degree, since the trip is long and the 
road is full of snares. A spiritual guide, tutor, is required until the plant of the 
spiritual being takes root and grows in strength.”59 Here lies one of the major points 
in Islamic thought which has been open to debate for centuries and it is not 
expected to close any time soon. 
Broadly speaking, two trends have developed. Adherent of Sufism, including 
eminent Sufi scholars and figures like Imam Al-Ghazali and Abdelkader al-Jilani 
and many others believe that spiritual guidance is not a mere recommendation; it is 
rather an unavoidable prerequisite for ihsan seekers. Others, however, 
represented by Wahabi inspired Salafists, maintain that the spiritual guide is not 
required at all and that it is within the reach of every individual to achieve moral 
and spiritual perfection without any assistance. Members of contemporary Islamic 
movements are divided on the issue, depending on the source from which they 
derive their inspiration. Detractors of Yassine often raise this point as evidence that 
Yassine‟s claimed rupture with Sufism has never taken place and he is just trying 
to eschew embarrassment. 
In his book, Ihsan, Yassine discusses the idea of spiritual guidance and a lot of 
other issues in detail, making use of a wide range of authentic Islamic texts and 
references to prominent Islamic scholars who are widely respected to this day. This 
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is not the place to review a book of more than one thousand pages, but a few 
points need to be made here. One is that by stressing the spiritual and ethical 
dimension of Islam, Yassine is not actually inventing anything new; he is just 
emphasizing something that is part and parcel of Islam as the hadith of Gabriel 
referred to above shows. If some people choose to ignore it, that is their business; 
but they cannot claim that those who want to give it the attention it deserves are 
talking heresy. The balanced view that Yassine advocates is that no aspect of 
Islam should be neglected or exaggerated at the expense of others. 
Yassine also asserts that when he states that the Sufis have indeed preserved the 
science of ihsan, he does not mean that all those who raise the banner of Sufism 
are to be trusted or are above criticism. He distinguishes, for instance, between the 
type of Sufism which is compliant with the Quran and the Sunnah and the 
philosophical type which he rejects categorically.60 He disapproves of anything that 
is not in line with the established precepts of Islam. 
Furthermore, Yassine shows that he is not alone to stress the relevance of spiritual 
guidance. Throughout the Islamic history, many eminent Muslim scholars 
embraced Sufism and some, such as Imam al-Ghazali and many others, talked or 
wrote detailed accounts of their personal experiences. They were unanimous in 
their agreement that spiritual supervision is necessary and that to rely on books 
would not help in this respect. Other scholars, though they did not adhere to 
Sufism, did not reject the idea and were generally respectful of Sharia-abiding 
Sufism.  
Some writers claim that Yassine‟s position towards Sufism is rather ambiguous: on 
the one hand, he defends it and on the other he says he does not support it. 
Yassine explains that there is no ambiguity in his stance. He only means to prove 
that those who regard Sufism as something alien to Islam are wrong and maintains 
that thanks to these people, a precious part of Islam has been preserved, but he 
cannot call to or encourage Sufism for the simple reason that the Sufis are 
completely disengaged from socio-political matters, which he finds unacceptable 
nowadays. In fact, it was the major cause which made him sever his relationship 
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with the Boutchichi Zawiya. He could not find an excuse for their continuous 
disengagement and quietism when the Islamic Umma is undergoing the worst of 
times. 
Finally, he remarks that those who are reluctant to consider this highly significant 
aspect of Islam, in theory as well as in practice, are virtually depriving themselves 
from a precious treasure whose benefits are beyond description. It is not just an 
idea that is supported by Islamic texts only; it is a reality that he himself has 
experienced. If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, as the English saying has 
it, he invites the sceptic to make a try for a few weeks or a few months, and then 
they could judge for themselves.  
That said, could it be concluded that Yassine has made a case for the moral and 
spiritual aspect of Islam? It may be too early to say for sure, but judging from what 
has been achieved, it seems that his attempts have not been wasted. Until about 
two decades or so, the Wahabi-inspired approach to Islam had been dominant not 
only among apolitical Salafist groups but also among politically engaged Islamist 
groups. Now, the Islamic landscape especially in Morocco has changed, not in the 
sense that the other groups dropped their approach and adopted Yassine‟s, but 
rather another alternative based on a well-founded and balanced view has been 
put forward and has succeeded in achieving visibility. Some people may still 
disagree with some of his interpretations, but they cannot question the authenticity 
of the Islamic sources on which he relies. Furthermore, the fact that al-Adl wal-
Ihsan has become in a relatively short time, the largest Islamic organization in 
Morocco is an indication that Yassine‟s approach has not been ignored. 
Yassine‟s stress on spirituality and ethics has another implication which Henry 
Lauziere has investigated in detail in an interesting piece which was published in 
May 2005. In this paper Lauziere examines post-Islamist theory by using the 
religious discourse of Abdessalam Yassine and concludes that this theory “is 
unable to account for the fact that spirituality has been central to Yassine‟s 
discourse since 1972, that is, well before the alleged failure of political Islam.”61 
This is absolutely true; and if some individuals or groups have toned down their 
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demands or moved to quietist Sufism or shunned political issues because of an 
alleged crisis, with Sheikh Yassine it is the other way round. He moved from 
Sufism and became one of the major opposition figures in his country. Yassine‟s 
concern for ihsan is not, then, a reaction to a supposed political failure, as Lauziere 
has rightly shown, nor is it a way of self-promotion or a means to further any 
political ends, as some studies seem to imply.62 It rather reflects his deep religious 
conviction, as Lauziere has pointed out,63  and has become part and parcel of the 
identity of al-Ald wal-Ihsan. 
4.4 Conclusion 
The three concepts we have discussed in this chapter –ijtihad, fitna, and ihsan– 
are expected to give an idea, albeit concise, about the intellectual and the religious 
base of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and thereby dispel some misconceptions and pave the 
way to understand the movement on its own terms. Each concept deals with an 
issue of special importance to the contemporary debate on how to reform society 
and government and restore vitality and dignity to the Islamic Umma. Though the 
terms and the related topics may not be new to some researchers, the way they 
are approached and the points raised present no small degree of novelty and 
originality. 
In his discussion of ijtihad (independent reasoning), Sheikh Yassine does not dwell 
much on some conventional questions such as whether “the door of ijtihad” should 
or should not be open, nor does he concern himself with the search for more 
supportive evidence to prove its self-evident importance. What he rather thinks 
worthy of study is where ijtihad as a tool to tackle modern concerns is most 
needed, how to ensure quality and effectiveness and what purposes should be 
given priority. In other words how to utilize this powerful tool to foster the conditions 
for the Islamic Umma to regain its political freedom after a long history of 
despotism and to rise after years of decline and subordination. 
Concerning the debate on how to perceive society from an Islamic point of view, 
Yassine uses the term fitna (trial) because he thinks it allows for a balanced view 
that excludes extremism as well as defeatism. Whereas some groups, wittingly or 
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unwittingly, seem to look at society from above, blaming it for the rampant social 
and moral ills and advocating any means even it involves violence to effect the 
required reform, al-Adl wal-Ihsan and its leader believe that this is neither 
permissible nor practical. It is not permissible because the use of violence, 
according to the Islamic teachings, is not allowed and can never be the right 
solution to Muslims‟ problems; and it is not practical because social change cannot 
be achieved overnight. It takes, among other things, time, perseverance, and 
active involvement. It should be noted that the intention here is not to seek 
reconciliation with a social reality that is undoubtedly far from rosy, but rather to 
invite the Muslim individual to understand but not condone and to get engaged but 
keep clear of some rash attitudes which create more problems than they solve. 
As for the concept of ihsan, it is, in the view of al-adl wal-Ihsan, the beading cord of 
the necklace, the cornerstone of the whole edifice. Consequently, spirituality and 
ethics should be given due consideration in all walks of life and whatever the 
nature of the project undertaken, social, political, intellectual or economic. Is this 
too far-fetched? For Yassine, it is not. It is the core message of Islam and he has 
invested a lot of time and energy to demonstrate that it is no small issue he is 
trying to highlight. It is rather a position that is authentically supported by the 
Islamic texts, endorsed by viable historical experiences and adopted by high-
calibre figures in Islamic history. 
The three concepts covered in this chapter actually form part of a comprehensive 
view that seeks to integrate revelation and reason, spirituality and social justice, 
practicality and flexibility, intellectual initiative and organized action, all in a manner 
that makes a convincing case for social and political reform in theory as well as in 
practice. In the next chapter we will see how the attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
towards some hot issues such as democracy, women‟s rights, and modernity is 
informed and determined by this line of thinking. Whether this approach is going to 
take root in contemporary Islamic thought remains to bee seen. What we can note 
for the moment, however, is that its supporters in Morocco are still growing, which 
indicates that Yassine‟s intellectual endeavours in this respect have not gone 
unnoticed.  
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Chapter 5 Attitude towards some Controversial Issues 
“During the 2010 mid-term election campaign [in USA], virtually every hard-
charging candidate on the far right took a moment to trash a Muslim, a mosque, or 
Islamic pieties,” wrote Stephan Salisbury in July 2011.1 A Muslim, according to an 
increasingly important group of politicians, is by definition anti-democrat, anti-
modern, misogynist and above all a threat wherever he or she happens to be. It 
might be argued that this is just cheap political propaganda and Islam-baiting, as 
we all know, has nowadays become a common strategy to win a few more votes. 
The practice, however, is not confined there; similar stances do also exist in the 
academic sphere, though it is not clear whether they, too, are taken by “the far 
right”. One academic, for example, has chosen the term “repudiation” to define the 
position of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and its leader Sheikh Yassine vis-à-vis the West and 
whatever originates from it. He even warns his readers not to be mistaken and 
regard Yassine as “a Western-style liberal democrat in sheikh‟s clothing.”2 The 
implication which is not hard to infer is that he is just “a traditional, Middle-Eastern 
illiberal autocrat in the customary sheikh‟s apparel”, and therefore we should not 
expect from him and his group an enlightened outlook on democracy, modernity or 
women‟s emancipation. 
This chapter seeks precisely to discuss this issue and clarify many points in order 
to come close to understand where al-Adl wal-Ihsan stands in this respect and how 
it perceives such issues and the arguments that underpin its position. The first 
section of this chapter will focus on democracy, the second on modernity and the 
third on the status of women. The reason why these three topics are selected lies 
not only in the great importance they still command or the vast literature on the 
subject in which a large number of people, scholars and laymen alike, have 
contributed, but also in the fact that they are often used as a yardstick to assess 
the extent to which social and political trends in general and Islamic groups in 
particular are engaged with the modern world in which we live and whether they 
130 
hinder or promote the emergence and development of modern society in their 
countries. In the case of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, an established Islamic force which 
cannot be ignored in any attempt to undertake serious reform in Morocco, to 
understand its attitude towards these three issues acquires a special significance. 
So, let us take each issue in turn and start with democracy.  
5.1 Al-Adl wal-Ihsan and democracy 
“Is democracy a good thing?” This question, outside a restricted academic circle, 
might be considered provocative and it might prompt what could be regarded as an 
equally provocative answer: “Is there a better alternative?” This attests to the 
present popularity of democracy and the respect it generally commands though, as 
one notable scholar remarks, it “is not yet universally practised, nor indeed 
uniformly accepted.”3 It is rightly considered the best way so far devised to get rid 
of dark absolutism from which many a country still suffers. Many world initiatives, 
albeit some of which are undoubtedly controversial, have been taken to promote 
democracy or to spread it where it is claimed to be most needed.  
Meanwhile, one of the themes which has been widely debated, especially over the 
last three decades, is whether the emergence of the Islamic movements in the 
Muslim world squares well with “the democratic age” in which we live or whether it 
is rather an unfortunate development, anathema to the global democratic climate. 
Simply put, do these movements constitute a major obstacle to the growth and 
development of democracy in Arab and Islamic countries or, on the contrary, a 
supportive force that should be recognized and respected? A word about this 
debate is of crucial importance before we proceed to examine the attitude of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan towards the issue of democracy. 
5.1.1 Two broad trends 
Roughly, we may speak of two broad trends of thought. One is deeply convinced 
that Islamists are not and can never be democratic for cultural, historical and 
religious reasons. The long history of authoritarianism in the Muslim World, it is 
argued, nearly fourteen centuries, the nature of the prevalent political culture and 
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the nature of Islam itself all constitute a major barrier to democracy. Elie Kedourie, 
one of the proponents of this school of thought, asserts that “The idea of 
representation, of elections, of popular suffrage, of political institutions being 
regulated by laws being guarded and upheld by an independent judiciary, the ideas 
of the secularity of the state […] all these are profoundly alien to the Muslim 
political culture.”4  
Therefore, the political movements which take Islam as their point of reference are 
not expected to endorse a democratic political system of rule. This argument is 
also stressed by Bernard Lewis, Samuel Huntington, Martin Kramer, Daniel Pipes 
and many others.5 One writer, possibly to demonstrate that there is no prejudice or 
Islamophobia involved in this perspective, claims that “In the light of modern 
democratic thought, Islam is no more, no less democratic than Christianity or 
Judaism. All three monotheistic religions, if proposed as constitutional foundations 
of the state, and if proposed as providing an ineluctable authority for the guidance 
of all significant human choice, are undemocratic or non-democratic.”6  
To deal with such a phenomenon, proponents of this trend have put forward some 
suggestions though it is not clear which is the most preferred among them. In a 
speech delivered in May 1990, Dan Quayle said, “We have been surprised this 
past century by the rise of Communism, the rise of Nazism and the Islamic 
fundamentalism.”7 The parallelism in such a statement, as Dale Eickelman 
remarks, is staggering.8 Indeed, to put what he calls “Islamic fundamentalism” and 
“Nazism” side by side can only be shocking to any scholar who is familiar with 
Islamic culture and civilization. Perhaps the claimed similarity between those 
phenomena might somewhat be mitigated if Mr Quayle had cited other “surprising 
events” like the two World Wars which both claimed more than 100 million deaths, 
making them among the deadliest conflicts in human history. These and other 
incidents which were equally serious all happened in the century Mr Quayle 
referred to in his speech. 
What is worthy of note, however, is the implication of Quayle‟s statement. It does 
not involve just casual “enlisting” of some socio-political phenomena though they 
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may differ in nature as well as in rationale, but it rather indicates the course of 
action to be pursued to “make the world safer”. Another leading figure of US 
foreign policy went further to explain the situation and state explicitly what should 
be done. In 1992 Amos Perlmutter wrote in the Washington Post that “Islam, 
fundamentalist or otherwise” is incompatible with “liberal, human rights-oriented, 
Western-style, representative democracy,” and therefore Islamic religious 
movements “should be stifled at birth [sic].”9 
As if Perlmutter‟s suggestion on how to effect this “stifling at birth” policy were not 
clear enough, another scholar elaborates on the idea further and raises two 
options. The first is “When the security forces arrest or kill [sic] large numbers of 
the Islamist leaders and membership –without giving them the opportunity to 
portray themselves as martyrs of unjust repression– this inevitably leads to a 
weakening of these organizations.”10 The second option is to allow them to 
participate in elections and if they win, they will quickly realise that it is always 
much easier to be in the opposition than to govern a country effectively. Then they 
may have to compromise on their principles to deal with many thorny issues, and 
this “could lead to the Islamists‟ demise.”11 
So it all depends on the intended policy. If it is to weaken the Islamic organizations, 
then the first strategy should be used, that is, to “arrest or kill large numbers of the 
Islamic leaders and membership without giving them [and this is important] the 
opportunity to portray themselves as martyrs of unjust repression;”12 but if the aim 
is “their eventual demise”,13 then the democratic strategy should be implemented 
provided that all the necessary precautions are taken so that the Islamists would 
not make “the election that brings them to power the last one held.”14  
That there should be some people who entertain such extreme ideas and rally for 
them secretly or overtly may not be surprising; extremists have always existed in 
all cultures and religions and in all times and places, but societies have always 
known how to protect themselves from whatever pathological tendency to violence, 
hatred and antagonism. What is really surprising is how such ideas can be 
couched in scholarly apparel and easily find their way to publication in academic 
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journals. If such articles may serve any purpose, one is certain: providing the 
appropriate materials which could trigger and feed extremism on the other side, of 
presumed Islamic hue. 
The second trend of thought, however, differs drastically from the first in that it 
maintains there is nothing in the Islamic culture, or any other culture for that matter, 
that inhibits the emergence of a responsible and accountable government. Many 
scholars refute what is called “the concept of Arab and Muslim exceptionalism” 
advocated by the culturalist and Orientalist perspective and regard it as unfounded 
if not heavily prejudiced. Amartya Sen, for example, argues that there is no real 
basis for the alleged claim that Islam is “fundamentally intolerant of and hostile to 
individual freedom.”15 He refers to many Muslim rulers from India as well as from 
Turkey, Cairo and Baghdad who “provide good examples of both the theory and 
practice of political and religious tolerance.”16 He even asserts that many of these 
rulers “were often more tolerant than their European contemporaries,”17 and cites 
the case of the great Jewish scholar Maimonides who “had to run away from an 
intolerant Europe (where he was born) and from its persecution of the Jews to the 
security of a tolerant and urbane Cairo and the patronage of Sultan Saladin.”18    
Sen does not deny that there can be some authoritarian writings within the Muslim 
as well as Asian traditions, but he affirms that the same thing is also true within 
Western classics, and the writings of Plato or Aquinas, let alone the substantive 
medieval literature which supported the inquisitions, are a case in point.19 Sen 
makes another observation which some people tend to overlook in their appraisal 
of democracy. The positive status, he remarks, which democracy enjoys nowadays 
is largely due to a consensus that only emerged with the Enlightenment and 
Industrial Revolution and was consolidated particularly in the last century. “To read 
this as a historical commitment of the West –over the millennia– to democracy and 
to contrast it with non-Western traditions would be a great mistake.”20 Democracy 
is not, therefore, a very old practice in the West, and its birth and development 
were not smooth and unobstructed either. The bloody conflicts and the long 
struggles which accompanied its rise and evolution are all too well known. This 
tendency, in Sen‟s view, of portraying democracy in the West as if it dated from 
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time immemorial and as if its progress had been easy flowing is a kind of 
oversimplification which unfortunately can be found not only in the writings of some 
government officials but also in the theories of well known scholars like Huntington 
and others.21  
We have so far focussed on the ideas of Amartya Sen, a respected, Nobel laureate 
scholar, but he is not the only one who represent this school of thought. Other 
scholars like John Voll, Esposito and many others in the West have also stressed 
the idea that neither Islam nor its culture is the major barrier to the establishment of 
a modern, political system of rule. Voll, for instance, argues that “Islam has within 
its historic and theological repertoire of symbols and concepts the resources to 
create democratic discourses and to provide the foundations for systems of Islamic 
democracy.”22 Robin Wright, an American expert on the Middle East and the 
Muslim World, also confirms that “Islam is not lacking in tenets and practices that 
are compatible with pluralism,”23 and cites “ijtihad” [independent reasoning], “ijmaa” 
[consensus], and “shura” [consultation] as examples.24  
Esposito raises a pertinent point to stress further the fallacy, in theory as well as 
practice, of the claim that Islam and the realities of the Muslim polities both 
constitute a major obstacle to democratic rule. He argues that if Islam is to be 
blamed just because some rulers have used it to try to legitimize their 
authoritarianism, then the same thing can be said about other religions. “Judaism 
and Christianity, the Hebrew Bible and the New Testament, have been used to 
legitimize monarchies and feudalism in the past and democracy and capitalism as 
well as socialism in the present.”25 In other words if some rascals have used Islam, 
or any other religion for that matter, to further their vested interests and continue to 
wield all levers of power, should we blame Islam or those “rascals” who, as we 
learn from history, would not hesitate to employ whatever they can think of, from 
religion, propaganda, tribalism, superstition to all sorts of “soft” and “hard” means 
to maintain the status quo?  What if in the name of democracy a Western power, 
for example, invaded another country causing heavy losses in life and property for 
no good reason; should we hold democracy responsible for the resulting 
catastrophes or the people who misused the concept to seek illegitimate ends?  
135 
Even Fareed Zakaria, a well known journalist and author, who cannot be accused 
of being sympathetic to Islamists, has recognized the weakness of the culturalist-
religious argument as an explanation of the absence of political accountability in 
the Muslim World. He argues that “Catholic Popes combined religious and political 
power for centuries in a way that no Muslim ruler has ever been able to achieve.”26 
He also points out that Islamic rulers were no more autocratic than other rulers in 
China, Japan, and Russia where they asserted themselves and were treated as if 
they were gods. Making reference to some sayings of the Prophet, he even 
contends that “Islam has anti-authoritarian streak that is evident in every Muslim 
land today.”27  
The question now is: if the claim that Muslim culture is not an impediment to the 
establishment of a democratic and accountable system of government, then what 
is the real obstacle? For Alfred C. Stepan, director of the Center for the Study of 
Democracy, Toleration and Religion, “the greatest obstacle to democracy is not 
posed by Islam but by military and intelligence organizations uncountable to 
democratic authority.”28 In his study of the current Islamic movements in North 
Africa, John Entelis argues that “the only movements…insistent on democratic 
change, government accountability, the rule of the law, transparency and civilian 
authority are non-violent Islamist political parties.”29 Contrary to the view held by 
writers belonging to the former school of thought, Entelis believes that Islamists do 
not constitute a threat to the democratic project. In fact, they are “best poised to 
promote substantive change.”30  Then he stresses this idea which is also shared by 
other scholars endorsing this line of thinking: “As long as groups do not use 
violence, do not violate the rights of other citizens, and stay within the rules of the 
democratic game, all groups [including Islamists] are granted the right to advance 
their interests, both in civil society and in political society. This is the minimal 
institutional statement of what democratic politics does and does not entail.”31  
5.1.2 Attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
Where does al-Adl wal-Ihsan stand in this debate? Does its attitude confirm the 
claims and the fears voiced by the former trend of thought or does it lend credence 
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to the views of the latter? Does it accept or reject democracy wholesale or does it 
stand for a vision of politics according to which democratic and Islamic principles 
can be brought together to work out a viable formula for a viable system of 
government able to win the trust and respect both inside and outside the Muslim 
World? 
If we examine the body of works produced by al-Adl wal-Ihsan in which the writings 
of its leader Sheikh Yassine takes, of course, centre stage, we will find that the 
issue of democracy is given due consideration. Some of Yassine‟s books have 
been devoted totally to the subject, and the writer‟s appreciation of ideas 
advocated by the second school of thought comes as no surprise, particularly 
because they offer the opportunity to get to the heart of the debate without 
necessarily starting from scratch. 
To address the question of democracy, Yassine raises two preliminary remarks. 
One concerns the closed manner in which the discussion is often framed by 
sceptics: “Are you for or against democracy?” To debate a complex concept like 
democracy, contends Yassine, in absolutist yes-or-no terms is not scholarly or 
appropriate, to say the least. It is usually intended to embarrass than to seek 
clarification, and sometimes whatever your answer, it makes no difference. 
Contrary to the rule which stipulates that every person is innocent until proved 
guilty, an Islamist, argues Yassine, is by definition guilty until he or she proves, if 
they can, innocent. If an Islamist says, “No, I don‟t want democracy; I want Islam,” 
then the case is closed and he is dismissed on the spot as a confirmed advocate of 
authoritarianism. If he says, “Yes, I am for democracy,” his answer would not be 
taken seriously and is likely to be ignored. However, if he refuses to be cornered 
and contends that the answer requires some explanation and that it would be 
simplistic to deal with such a concept in black-and-white terms, he is likely to be 
suspected of trying to dodge the question.32  
The other remark concerns the way in which democracy is presented by some 
people. They usually give the impression that it has “a single agreed meaning.”33 
The reality is that democracy, as generally recognized, is an “essentially contested 
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concept,”34 and can take various forms some of which may seem contradictory.35  
Accordingly, how can we expect the answer to be either yes or no when the issue 
in question is “inherently debatable and changeable”?36 It may be argued that 
“democracy is a term which, whatever its precise meaning, will always signify for 
many a cherished political principle or ideal.”37 Debatable though this might be, the 
question is whether the people in the Arab and Islamic World should blindly 
applaud whatever shape democracy comes to take. When, yesterday, it meant the 
exclusion of large sectors of society from the vote, Muslims should have been 
happy and if tomorrow it takes another form, they should not hesitate to express 
their satisfaction. 
Many scholars, aware nowadays of the “inherently debatable and changeable” 
nature of the term, have already started talking about “democracy with adjectives” 
as is reflected in terms like “liberal democracy”, “participatory democracy”, direct 
democracy”, “associative democracy”, etc. Such a development may render the 
debate even more complicated. Should Muslims, to stay on good terms with all 
forms, applaud all of them and claim that they all apply to their societies, or should 
they pick up one and brace themselves to quarrel with the rest?   
Now putting aside the closed format in which the discussion is sometimes cast and 
the disputes “which are perfectly genuine”38 concerning the meaning of democracy, 
we will proceed to adopt the approach pursued by some scholars who, in order to 
reduce the tension involved, speak of what they consider an acceptable minimal 
level of democracy. Robert Dahl whose definition is widely known among political 
scientists is taken here as a basis for discussion of the attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
towards democracy. Dahl cites seven elements which are in brief as follows: 1) 
elected officials, 2) free and fair elections, 3) inclusive suffrage, 4) the right to run 
for office, though age limits may be higher for holding office than for suffrage, 5) 
freedom of expression 6) the right to seek alternative sources of information which 
should exist and be protected by laws, and 7) the right to form relatively 
independent political parties and interest groups.39  
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According to Yassine “these are all noble objectives.”40 If democracy only means 
that, then there is no reason for any quarrel or objection. In fact, he does not hide 
his admiration of such features and institutions. Commenting on the multiparty 
system, he says that “there is a great wisdom behind [it],” adding that if “democracy 
had not devised it, we, Muslims, would have to evolve one […].”41 He recognizes, 
like many Muslim leaders and thinkers, the importance of learning, without any 
hesitation, from democracy how to organize elections and government, separation 
of powers, manage disagreement and diversity of opinions in a multiparty context 
and other techniques necessary for good governance. He argues that Muslims 
cannot possibly be against any of these objectives “for they are precisely what we 
as a community are raised for.”42 Yassine is well aware of the dire consequences 
of authoritarianism from which the Arab countries still suffer and, as a result, he 
does not hesitate to state in the clearest way possible that he wholeheartedly 
supports democracy when it delimits the authority of the rulers and provides for 
government accountability, genuine representation of the people, viable institutions 
and freedom of expression.43  
However, the problem emerges when some people are not satisfied with definitions 
like the one provided by Dahl and insist on other items such as the idea that 
democracy is not conceivable or possible without secularism. This entails that 
Islam and politics should be separated in the same way that the Church and state 
are separated in the Western context. This separation, it is argued, is 
“indispensable to good government and a free society.”44  
This way of viewing democracy is neither appreciated among mainstream Islamic 
movements, including al-Adl wal-Ihsan, nor is it actually required for “good 
government and a free society” in an Islamic context. First, there is no general 
consensus on such a view of democracy and there is no reason, it is argued, why 
we should accept it and exclude others. Furthermore, to insist on secular 
democracy is to assume that the “world is a monolithic bloc” and that what works in 
Western societies should work everywhere, which is not true. The Islamic World 
has its culture, religion and history and it would be a great mistake to import and try 
139 
to implant in it a ready-made system, born and developed in a completely different 
context, and expect it to take root and bear fruit.  
It appears that when some Western thinkers speak of religion, they have at the 
back of their mind the bitter experience Europe lived under the hegemony of the 
Church in the Middle Ages. No wonder that it is widely believed that the best 
solution is to relegate religion to the “private sphere”. It is then a position reflecting 
the influence of a certain historical experience. With the Islamic World the situation 
is different and such a measure would not be appropriate from an Islamic point of 
view. First, the bright moments in the Muslim history are those when Islam was 
closely observed and its principles were implemented; and second, it would mean 
for the Muslims a kind of schizophrenia: they may believe in God at home but 
outside they should ignore Him and His recommendations. And Islam does not 
condone this kind of double life. If this is permissible in one cultural setting, it does 
not mean that it should be the same in another or everywhere.45  
Such being the case, the core of the matter, in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, is to 
define the real issue. If it is to combat authoritarianism and dictatorship and provide 
for a system of rule that guarantees accountability, freedom of expression, the rule 
of law, regular fair and transparent elections and other useful institutions, then 
there is no problem. That objective and the means required to achieve it, argues 
Yassine, does not necessarily entail that Muslims should have to sever their 
relationship with their religion and “just as a mind formed in a secular school is 
amazed at Islam‟s mixing of the two spheres, we are [likewise] amazed at the 
oddness of separating private from public life and the mosque from parliament.”46 
However, if the issue is to “rubbish” religion and copy a model in which secularism 
is an essential constituent besides other ideological and philosophical 
underpinnings which are in stark contrast to Islamic principles and values, then that 
is a different story and a different agenda whose prospect of success in the Muslim 
lands is bleak if not nil, as the latest elections in Tunisia and Egypt after what is 
called the Arab Spring have shown. So it all depends on the real issue. 
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5.1.3 Fears and phobias 
Some argue that if the idea of the secularity of the state is not taken into account, it 
is likely that a system of government based on Islam will lead to a theocratic 
regime which will confiscate the people‟s rights and liberties and incur all sorts of 
absurdities reminiscent of what happened under the Church and feudal institutions 
in the Middle Ages. Others also point out to the current Arab rulers who exploit 
Islam, among other things, to stay in power and deprive the people from their rights 
to have any genuine say in the public affairs of their countries. 
Some fears may be legitimate possibly because there is no living model to refer to 
and the only experience which Muslims hold dear in their collective memory dates 
back to the first century of the Islamic calendar (i.e. 7th C.E.) However, they could 
easily be dispelled if an effort is made to understand that Islam is not a religion in 
the way the latter is understood in the West and that the Islamic World has not 
known an experience similar to the one the West had with the clergy in the Middle 
Ages. Hence, an extrapolation of the effects of Western historical events to Muslim 
societies is not appropriate for the simple reason that there is no clergy in Islam. 
This is why a government based on Islamic principles can never be theocracy, 
autocracy, plutocracy, or any other “formcracy” for that matter, that would deny the 
people the right to choose their leaders and their representatives and change them 
if deemed necessary. The Islamic texts themselves are crystal clear in this respect 
and it is not possible to interpret them in a way that legitimizes usurpation and 
tyranny. 
As for the conduct of the past and present despots in the Islamic countries, it 
should not be taken as a justification to chase Islam from the political sphere. If we 
were to pursue this logic, we would have to reject also democracy because some 
old democracies have been responsible for many disasters. Just a few decades 
ago, more than one million people were killed in Algeria by the French colonial 
authorities just because the Algerian people wanted their independence. The same 
tragedy, though under different cicumstances, happened again in 1990 when the 
Islamists emerged victorious in fair and transparent elections and were poised to 
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come to power. Thousands were killed and arrested and the whole process was 
suspended by Algeria‟s military junta with the complicity of some Western 
democratic powers.47  
Consider, furthermore, the present world order dominated by great powers most of 
which are very democratic. Yet, according to a United Nations report, “the richest 
20% of humanity consumes 86% of all goods and services and generates 75% of 
the world‟s pollution and waste while the poorest fifth consumes just 1.3%.”48 Is it 
not paradoxical to combat poverty and all the “giant evils”, to use Beveridge‟s 
words, at home and foster their conditions abroad through various means the least 
of which is to continue to support the corrupt potentates of all shapes in the Third 
World? If we want to cite the wrong policies and their disastrous consequences 
committed by governments whose democratic nature cannot be questioned, it 
would take volumes. Yet, do we have “to rubbish democracy” to use the words of 
Sen, altogether because of those inappropriate practices? If such reasoning cannot 
be endorsed, then Islamic values and principles cannot be jettisoned because of 
the conduct or rather misconduct of some rulers in the Muslim world. 
Some critics may yet have another objection. They claim that the commitment of 
Islamic movements to democracy is rather tactical and there is no guarantee that 
they will relinquish power if they have the opportunity to come to it through 
elections. Maddy-Weizman, for example, argues that the major problem with 
Yassine‟s approach to democracy is that it “suffers from a crucial flaw: it envisions 
a democratic process in which Islam is established in power, it cannot envision a 
continuation of that process that might remove Islam from power.”49  
It is not clear how Maddy-Weizman has come to that conclusion. Has he read all 
the forty books written by Yassine? Probably not. Even if he confined himself to the 
book he used, Islamiser la modernité, there is a statement in chapter 5 which, 
putting aside any ideological grudges, should not have escaped his attention. It 
reads: “Our assurances NEVER [emphasis added] to hang on power against the 
consent of the electorate will respond to the concerns of the political parties.”50  
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There are several reasons why al-Adl wal-Ihsan‟s declared intention that it would 
never stick to power “against the consent of the electorate” should not be 
dismissed as tactical. One is that al-Adl wal-Ihsan has a firm conviction that any 
system of government imposed from above cannot and will never succeed, and 
consequently nothing would lure al-Adl wal-Ihsan to adopt an approach that is 
doomed to fail. The second one is that given the nature of the modern state and 
the colossal tasks it faces, it is unlikely that any one party or organization, however 
popular it might be, has the capacity to always perform well and meet the people‟s 
expectations and can thus stay in power for ever. People are likely to seek change 
for one reason or another, and it is much better to have a system of rule that 
provides for smooth outgoing and smooth incoming and that guarantees the 
chance to return to power if the deficiencies are overcome and the mistakes are 
corrected than to stick to power until being kicked out by force. 
A third reason is that “the international community,” as one expert in economics 
and finance has pointed out, “is now unfriendly towards illegitimate governments 
[…]. Globalization is also acting as a check on despotic governments.”51 An 
economic embargo could cripple a government if in the name of Islam attempted to 
maintain power against the will of the people. 
A fourth equally important reason is that in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan the only 
way to keep up the present dynamism of the Islamic movements is to have a 
system of government where power is accessible to those who are competent and 
chosen by the people, where losing does not threaten the security of the losers and 
winning does not guarantee the privileges of the victors. That is why Yassine, as 
noted above, speaks of the dire necessity of the opposition and he devotes 
significant space in his writings to the discussion of this issue. The moment, he 
argues, the Islamic movement considers having a monopoly on power, that would 
undoubtedly be the beginning of the end. It is a lesson confirmed by historical 
experiences that no rational human being should ignore.52  
The last but not least reason is related to the vision of society which al-Adl wal-
Ihsan endorses and whose achievement in its view does not depend solely on 
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political action. Senior members of the movement are never tired of repeating that 
politics is only part of their project. As Yassine explains, “It is not an election or a 
turnover in power that we aspire to. [...] Our goal is the kind of deep change that 
only a direct and continuous action, with the help of God, is capable of initiating or 
directing.”53 And in order for this “direct and continuous action” to be set in motion 
and be sustained, it should not being contingent on being in power; it should 
basically take root in society. It is a long term project, acknowledges Yassine, but 
there seems no other alternative.  
To what extent can these reasons reassure the sceptics? One thing for sure is that 
ideological scepticism, like personal grudges, is hard to ease. Let us consider this 
example before closing this section. In the letter Yassine sent to King Mohammad 
VI, he writes that if the king were to take the required measures for reform, 
Morocco could move towards “genuine democracy […] the only way out  of the 
dark absolutism.”54 The idea is crystal clear; yet one sceptic warns his readers not 
to be so naïve as to believe that Yassine is “a Western-style liberal democrat in 
sheikh‟s clothing.”55 What is more serious in such a claim is the message it seeks 
to bring home. The aim is not merely to underline “difference” but rather “stark 
contrast”. In other words, since Yassine is not “a Western-style liberal democrat,” 
he is automatically identified with the opposite image: “a Middle-Eastern-style 
illiberal autocrat” whose “endorsement of some democratic principles is utilitarian 
and conditional.”56 The underlying message, therefore, is that nothing Yassine says 
should be taken seriously. It is interesting to note here the gross error that some 
academics may incur when scholarly accuracy is sacrificed at the expense of 
ideology and distrust is pushed to the extreme.  
To conclude, al-Adl wal-Ihsan understands democracy as a procedure, a set of 
mechanisms to manage power, cope with differences and organize society and as 
such there is no reason for objection. On the contrary, it considers that there is a 
great wisdom behind such techniques and procedures and consequently it 
sincerely, not tactically, endorses them. However, if some people insist that the 
procedures cannot possibly be disassociated from the philosophical beliefs and 
values which contradict the Islamic worldview, al-Adl wal-Ihsan would still take the 
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mechanisms and ignore the rest. In any case, al-Adl wal-Ihsan, seems to stand 
firm in its support of the idea that the final decision should be left to the people and 
their choice should be respected. It is the only way, in its view, to overcome the 
status quo, manage differences peacefully and avoid civil disorder.57 
5.2 Al-Adl wal-Ihsan and modernity 
Alasdair MacIntyre writes in one of his books the following: 
[…] When the sacred and the secular are divided, then religion becomes one more 
department of human life, one activity among others. […] Only religion which is a 
way of living in every sphere either deserves to or can hope to survive. […] If our 
religion is fundamentally irrelevant to our politics, then we are recognising the 
political as a realm outside the reign of God. To divide the sacred from the secular 
is to recognize God‟s action only within the narrowest limits. A religion which 
recognizes such a division […] is one on the point of dying.58 
This abridged passage could well be written by a Muslim scholar, for if we remove 
the name of its author, a Muslim may not readily recognize that it has been written 
by a Christian philosopher. In a nutshell, the passage points to a major point of 
contention in the debate on Islam and modernity. As an Islamist movement, al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan is also concerned with the subject and it should be interesting to find out 
where it stands in this debate. This is what this section will try to do as it seeks to 
address the following questions: 1/ What is modernity? 2/ How is it perceived by 
Yasssine and his group? 3/ And is there an “Islamic modernity”? Let us take each 
in turn.   
5.2.1 What is modernity? 
It is a question to which there is, unfortunately, no easy answer. Historians, 
sociologists, philosophers and experts from various fields of knowledge have 
addressed the issue, but they do not seem to agree on what the term means 
precisely. The problem is that the more publications one consults to be 
enlightened, the more unclear the term becomes.59 Writers disagree not only on he 
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basic meaning of modernity but also over dates and the significant factors that 
were decisive to its emergence and development. However, this is not to say that 
the question should be ignored or left undisturbed in its well-protected ambiguity, 
but merely to stress that the concept and what it stands for is far from being a 
settled issue. 
When the term “modern” came into usage, it simply meant “current”, “up-to-date”, 
“of recent origin” or something to this effect. Then it was used to situate the present 
in relation to the past and to convey a certain preference. At one moment, the past 
was held to be superior to the present; at another, it was the reverse. Various 
considerations were invoked to articulate one tendency or the other as it happened 
in the quarrel between les Anciens et les Modernes in 17th -century France. The 
use, however, that concerns us here and on which our discussion will focus is the 
one which usually refers to modernity as an epoch with distinctive features that 
distinguish it from an old traditional era. This is not to close the discussion; it only 
begins. 
One of the problems with the usage just referred to is that no one can tell for sure 
when modernity as such started. Some writers claim that it was in the Renaissance 
period, in the fifteenth and sixteenth century, that modernity emerged.60 Others 
would argue that the modern era did not actually occur until the eighteenth century 
on the grounds that it was a period during which the Enlightenment thought and 
other significant events such the Industrial Revolution and the French and the 
American Revolutions took place.61 Still others would go as far as to locate its 
emergence in the 12th century.62  
Considered from a rather different perspective, it is claimed that modernity has 
gone through three distinctive historical phases. The first extended from the 
beginning of the sixteenth to the end of the eighteenth century; the second started 
with the French Revolution and the subsequent uprisings in social, political and 
personal life; and the third was associated with what Berman refers to as “the 
global diffusion of the process of modernization and the development of a „world 
culture of modernism‟.”63  
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Contrary to the attempts which seek to fix a starting point for modernity, some 
writers would argue that the idea itself is neither relevant nor required. They 
believe that “the history of human society is a seamless continuum,”64 and thus to 
try to set a starting point for the modern era is practically impossible. “Nowhere,” so 
goes the argument, “did the members of any society awake one morning to find 
themselves “moderns” when they had been traditionalists the previous night.”65 
Consequently, it would be more realistic to speak of “a longish period of history 
during which there is a clear transition in the balance of social arrangements from 
the primacy of a configuration to the primacy of another.”66 It is, according to this 
view, “the predominant pattern that counts”67 and not anything else. In case it were 
really necessary, argues Walters, to specify a date, it would only be an 
approximation and the turn of the nineteenth century would sound more 
plausible.68  
If the attempt to fix a commencement or an ending date for modernity is highly 
contested, to find out what the term exactly means is no less problematic. In 
Spaces of Modernity, Miles Ogborn writes: 
Against the backdrop of the Enlightenment, modernity is associated with the 
release of the individual from the bonds of tradition, with the progressive 
differentiation of society, with the emergence of civil society, with the political 
equality, with innovation and change. All these accomplishments are associated 
with capitalism, industrialism, secularization, urbanization, and rationalization.69  
In a rather different analysis, it is argued that to define modernity, we need to make 
a distinction between its cultural and epistemological aspects on the one hand and 
its institutional aspects on the other. In the cultural and epistemological conception, 
modernity “is characterized by the emergence of the nation as an autonomous 
subject, the transition from an organic to a mechanistic world picture, and the 
embrace of human values and objective scientific inquiry.”70 In the institutional 
conception, however, modernity is regarded as “a mode of social life or 
organization […]. It is characterized by structures and processes such as 
industrialization, capitalism, rationalization and reflexivity.”71  
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It seems that the attempt to provide a clear, concise and uncontested definition, as 
is pointed above, is daunting if not impossible. This is probably why some writers 
have chosen another approach, that is, to speak about what they consider the 
basic features of modernity instead of struggling with an already great number of 
definitions which trigger more questions than they answer. However, they do not 
agree on the number of these characteristics. Stuart Hall, for example, identifies 
four: 
1/ The dominance of secular forms of political power and authority and 
conceptions of sovereignty and legitimacy, operating within defined territorial 
boundaries… 
2/ A monetarized exchange economy, based on the large-scale production and 
consumption of commodities for the market, extensive ownership of private 
property and the accumulation of capital on a systematic, long-term basis… 
3/ The decline of traditional social order, with its fixed social hierarchies and 
overlapping allegiances, and the appearance of a dynamic social and sexual 
division of labour… 
4/ The decline of the religious worldview typical of traditional societies and the rise 
of a secular and materialist culture, exhibiting those individualistic, rationalist, and 
instrumental impulses now so familiar to us.72 
Other accounts have identified more or less than twenty characteristics, and 
though they may converge on some aspects, they do diverge on others.73 This 
approach, therefore, does not seem to solve the problem either; it only confirms the 
idea that modernity is highly controversial not only with regard to its historical 
emergence but also in terms of significance. The concept, as many critics have 
demonstrated, covers a wide range of aspects and ideas, but what is surprising is 
that some of them may be in stark contrast to each other. Yet, the space is still 
expanding and the boundaries are continuously being stretched further, and this is 
bound to make its use and understanding even more complicated. The Nobel Prize 
winner Octavio Paz may not very far from the reality when he describes modernity 
as “a word in search of its meaning.”74 Until that daunting challenge is satisfactorily 
met, let us turn to the second question in this discussion. 
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5.2.2 Yassine’s critique of modernity  
In Islamiser la modernité, a book written in French in 1998 to discuss the subject in 
some detail, Yassine avoids, nonetheless, being trapped in the potentially endless 
debate over the various definitions of modernity and focus instead on the 
implications of some features which are commonly believed to be part and parcel 
of modernity. He makes it clear from the beginning that he does not deny the 
importance of the deep transformations which Western societies have undergone 
with the emergence of modernity and the indisputable benefits brought to people. 
His intention is not to argue about that, nor is it to wage war on modernity or the 
West, or incite hatred and antagonism among people. He intends to examine, 
calmly but frankly, some aspects of modernity and the threats they pose to 
humanity. He emphasizes that it is done out of love, hoping that it should be seen 
as “a hand of friendship for humankind, bearing the message of sense and justice 
for all human beings.”75  
He also speaks about the necessity of ample patience and tolerance in order for 
his views to be fully understood, “especially in a climate,” as he describes it, “where 
disinformation reigns along with rejection of the other.”76 His analysis is based on a 
worldview that some may or may not share, but the important thing is that it should 
not be confronted with minds well retrenched “behind ready-made convictions, 
resolved to hear or understand nothing.”77 To promote dialogue and mutual 
understanding requires, among other things, a willingness to hear what the other 
has to say and to do away with prejudice, doubt and suspicion; otherwise, 
communication becomes hard if not out of reach.78  
One of the significant criticisms levelled at modernity is what Yassine calls its 
underestimation, if not its contempt, of non-Western societies and of other cultures 
and civilizations. The reason is that modernity as “a socio-cultural and political 
manner of being,”79 has been quickly overtaken by the view that it represents the 
summit of human condition that all societies should aspire to, and those that 
display signs of reluctance or resistance are immediately dismissed as inferior, 
prey to superstition, backwardness and ignorance and it is the duty of the West to 
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liberate them and convert them to its own way of life. This feeling of superiority, 
corroborated all the more by the scientific and technological achievements, has 
provided, argues Yassine, the pretext “for the military and economic colonization of 
the World of the South,”80 and for turning it into a market as well as a depot of 
some harmful and polluting products.81  
Another aspect which Yassine considers more serious is the attitude towards 
religions in general. Here he refers to Critique de la modernité by the renowned 
French sociologist Alain Touraine to illustrate this point. According to Touraine: 
The most powerful Western conception of modernity, and the one which has had 
the most profound effects, asserted above all that rationalization required the 
destruction of so-called traditional social bonds, feelings, customs and beliefs, 
and the agent of modernization was neither a particular category or social class, 
but reason itself and the historical necessity that was paving the way for its 
triumph.82  
This is the most dangerous weapon of the lot, concurs Yasine, for it seeks to 
eradicate everything, without distinction, deemed ancient. And since all religions, 
including Islam, fall within the category of “ancient stuff” deemed traditional and 
consequently irrational, it is only natural that Islam should also be targeted by 
modernity. “To be modern […] means one must rebel against the sacred, against 
the divine.”83 And as Islam is based on divine revelation, it should be destroyed in 
order to clear the way for reason and the emancipation of human mind. Thus it 
becomes clear from this analysis that if Muslims want to secure a comfortable 
place in the modern world, they have to reconsider their attitude towards their 
religion and regard it henceforth “as something to be rejected […] like some 
unworthy and shameful archaism.”84  
Admittedly, the West may have its reasons to live “its modernity essentially as a 
revolution against its past […].”85 It may have been affected by a long history 
during which “a dark, regressive alliance”, as Voltaire would put it, between the 
Church and certain despotic rulers was formed, resulting in the persecution of 
many eminent scholars like Copernicus, Galileo, and Newton to cite but a few and 
the exploitation of common people in the name of religion. All these things are true 
and are well-documented in the recorded history of Europe. However, it does not 
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justify correcting an error by another. Otherwise, modernity itself would have to be 
rejected because of the many serious problems it has so far engendered. 
Organized slavery whereby “millions of Africans were shipped to the Western 
hemisphere in subhuman conditions to run the plantation economies for 
generations,”86 Stalinism, Hitlerism, the Holocaust, Hiroshima and Nagasaki 
disasters, colonization and predation of the resources of poor countries, support of 
corrupt rulers in the Third World and other forms of injustice and aggression have 
all occurred in the triumphant era of modernity. Does this justify a return to the 
Dark Ages?  
Claimed to be, among other things, “a carrier of historical destiny, a collective 
missionary with the duty to spread the gospel of reason,”87 modernity engaged in a 
wide and prolonged campaign, especially during and in the post-colonial period, “to 
pluck the faith from hearts or conviction from minds…by instilling and fomenting 
doubt in [the young], and by describing the revealed as fraud and lies.”88 This is, in 
Yassine‟s view, one of the most serious examples of aggression inflicted upon 
young people since Arab countries came under control of Western powers. Their 
consequences, argues Yassine, are more harmful than any economic or military 
invasion, for they seek to weaken the very basis of personality. This is how the 
culture of defeat takes root and the young find themselves, like a feather in the 
wind, unable to take their destiny in their own hands and decide on the course of 
action that befits their culture and secure their dignity.89  
Yassine also deplores the sacrifices made to satisfy a greedy, modern capitalist 
system. He refers to the negative consequences of the Industrial Revolution and 
how “the lives of millions of persons were turned upside down and plunged into 
anonymous suburban misery so that capitalism, whose sole allegiance was to 
profit, could prosper.”90 It is worth noting here that some of Yassine‟s criticisms of 
the capitalist system converge with those coming from the left, but his emanate 
from an Islamic perspective and not, as it is sometimes claimed, from an attempt to 
echo ideas which appeal especially to the poor and the downtrodden. For Yassine 
the excesses of capitalism are the logical consequences of a system that “worships 
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the god of profit” and not God, the Creator of the universe. Religion, if not ridiculed 
and ignored, is at best relegated to the private sphere. 
One must admit that Yassine‟s criticisms of modernity are sometimes very harsh, 
to say the least, but it would be wrong to assume that he and his group would go 
as far as to reject it altogether. As a matter of fact, neither Yassine nor any Muslim 
thinker of stature that this author is aware of calls for the total repudiation of 
modernity save a few isolated voices with no significant bearing on the dominant 
cultural and intellectual trend in Muslim societies. Islamist groups in general do 
appreciate modern positive achievements, but they do not subscribe to “the view 
that modernity is really one thing, towards which every society is inevitably moving, 
though at different rates of development.”91 They cannot understand why Western-
style modernity should be, as is often claimed, the only and unavoidable destiny of 
all societies. They do not know why non-Western societies should be denied the 
right and the freedom to think for themselves and to use their talents and abilities 
to pursue the course that best suits their circumstances and serves their legitimate 
aspirations. 
Furthermore, the assumption that “there is only one path of development […] and 
that this is a universal model which all societies must follow,”92 is, as some recent 
critics have demonstrated, fundamentally flawed. If we were to follow this logic, as 
Stuart has rightly pointed out, then we should expect other societies to take the 
very course travelled by Western societies, that is, “tribal society would inevitably 
lead to nation-states, feudalism to capitalism, rural society to industrialization and 
so on.”93 Stuart might also add that they should be allowed their share of 
misdemeanour in the form of at least one world war and a few decades of 
colonization of some poorer countries! Many analysts in the West itself have 
criticized this perspective which, according to Stuart, was very popular in the 
1950s, especially in the works of Walter Rostow.94 They are increasingly aware of 
the limitations of this line of thinking as they witness now and again “outcomes no 
one ever intended, which are contrary to, and often the direct opposite of, what 
seemed to be the dominant thrust of events.”95  
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The leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan does not, therefore, repudiate modernity wholesale, 
as some writers have claimed, or favour some kind of tabula rasa, starting from 
scratch. He is fully aware, like any sensible person, of its benefits and the positive 
changes it has brought to human life, but what worries him most is the dark side of 
which only a few aspects have been raised above. Furthermore, he is not the sole 
person who tries to demonstrate the considerable risks to which humanity is 
exposed from the forces of modernity that could get out of control at any moment. 
“One need hardly mention the almost delirious stockpiling of thousands of nuclear 
warheads which, at the slightest technical or human error, could automatically lead 
to collective extermination.”96  
Indeed, many thinkers in the West as well as elsewhere have become increasingly 
aware that “the more [modernity] assumes itself to be the summit of human 
achievement, the more its dark side appears.”97 This has been the source of much 
concern to many analysts and all the more so as they find that the logic of 
modernity is deeply contradictory. It is both “constructive and destructive: its 
victims are as numerous as its beneficiaries.”98 It is, this Janus-face of modernity 
that many Muslim thinkers, including Yassine, find troubling especially because 
they believe that their societies have suffered from “the destructive face” more than 
they have benefited from “the constructive one”. 
5.2.3 Towards an Islamic paradigm of modernity 
Can there be an Islamic paradigm of modernity? Most, if not all Muslim thinkers 
would not hesitate to give the answer in the affirmative. For this reason Yassine 
calls for the establishment of a new model rooted in the Muslim land and culture, 
but open to learning from others‟ successful experiences. Europeans have pursued 
their own road to effect their transition from the Middle Ages and there should be 
no reason for apology if Muslim societies embark on a different road, if need be, to 
get out their present predicament. Aware of what this approach may entail, Yassine 
speaks about the need for hard work and perseverance to foster gradually the 
emergence of a system that he qualifies as “friendly to man and environment.”99 He 
writes: 
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We will slowly have to adapt social practices of the jungle by softening them, 
progressively humanizing them, taming the savage brutality of globalization intent 
on destroying the biosphere and keeping four-fifths of humanity destitute so that a 
minority might wallow in luxury and strut in their joyless opulence and bovine 
consuming.100 
Some critics find that the ideas of Yassine and his like-minded contemporaries are 
rather unrealistic in this respect, but Yassine has repeatedly asserted that historical 
logic is on the side of Muslim world. His intention, however, is not to engage in a 
fierce contest or a competition with a modernity which, in his view, unless drastic 
remedial work is undertaken, seems to be heading on a slippery slope. His 
intention is to persuade proponents of Western-style modernity to refrain from 
thinking in black-and-white terms and accept that there can exist other alternatives 
and not only a single one. Here Yassine meets with many recent writers who have 
started to challenge the classical vision of modernity and to use instead the notion 
of “multiple modernities”.101 The question that arises here is: how does Yassine 
envisage the emergence of a new Islamic model? The answer may be summarized 
in the following points: 
First, he states that the goal of the voices he represents is not to emulate but learn 
intelligently from the Western model and gradually construct their own; and to 
achieve this, they would seek to acquire the scientific and technological means and 
adapt them to their societal and individual end-goals which are justice and 
spirituality, respectively. This is one of the major implications of what he calls in 
French “islamiser la modernité”, that is, making modernity Islamic or building an 
Islamic modernity. 
Second, he points out that he is aware that some Westerners will be tempted to 
sow obstacles in their way and try to abort their plans. That would only confirm that 
the culture of distrust and rejection with regard to former colonized peoples is still 
alive but would not alter the course of the thrust of events: the voice of Islam is 
being discovered and the answers it offers to resolve existential crucial questions 
and to satisfy basic human needs are increasingly appreciated and heeded. 
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Third, another great mistake that Western governments should give up is that they 
stop supporting corrupt rulers because stability in the region cannot be achieved 
“by betting on the losing horse in the short or mid-term.102 Here Yassine is 
obviously addressing a message to Southern Europe and France and Spain in 
particular. He maintains that the great disservice Southern Europe could render to 
European Union would be to keep its unconditional support to a corrupt political 
class in North African countries.  
Fourth, he considers it “an insult to the future and a misreading of the present to 
buy into xenophobia”103 and to continue to spread the image that Islamists are 
terrorists, enemy of the West, of human rights, democracy, etc. It is an insult to 
human intelligence, he stresses, to accuse modern Islamist movements of 
atrocities committed by masked bands104 or to blame them for stupid crimes 
carried out by a handful of persons who, out of frustration and despair or because 
they have not had the opportunity to receive the required education to know how to 
cope with the injustices they may have suffered, have engaged in meaningless 
violence.  
Fifth, he considers it in the interests of Europe that people in Morocco as well as in 
other North African countries should be allowed, if not aided, to build healthy 
modern societies on their terms. “The European Union,” he argues, “cannot fly 
unless the wing of this side of the Mediterranean is healthy and in working 
order.”105 It is for this and other historical and ethical reasons that Europe should 
assume its responsibility and engage in a sincere reappraisal of its policy towards 
the only credible political force –for the time being at least– in the Arab World; it 
should not be mistaken as to who the future interlocutor will be. Yassine does not 
deny that there are some historical, social and political problems that need to be 
tackled, but he believes that “reciprocal recognition and mutual respect will iron out 
difficulties and permit a fruitful exchange, with dignity and with the interests of each 
guaranteed.”106 He does not exclude other options or other partners to secure the 
needs of his country; nonetheless, he thinks that “it is inconceivable that we should 
seek to satisfy our need of modernization and development from far away regions 
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so long as Europe […] is within calling distance.”107 The underlying message is that 
it is up to European governments to decide; the ball is in their court. 
Finally, he calls on European scholars, academics and thinkers whom he believes 
are in a better position to read the situation well to alert decision-makers of the 
gross error they would incur if they succumbed to “short-sighted pragmatism”. It 
seems that the same mistakes are being made again and again, and this means, in 
Yassine‟s view, that the lesson from the downfall of the Shah of Iran “has been too 
quickly forgotten or not noted at all.”108 European decision-makers, he implies, 
should be cautious not to listen to those who tell them what they like to hear but to 
those who tell them what they should hear.109  
Such were the reasons and the conditions deemed crucial for the establishment of 
a new form of modernity that shuns the obnoxious aspects which Yassine, like 
many critics in the West, has vehemently criticised and for taking a path of 
development which may benefit from other experiences, but is not necessarily 
identical to the one pursued by Western societies. One thing for sure is that this 
vision means that al-Adl wal-Ihsan will be facing a double challenge: how to turn 
what has been put on paper into tangible reality and in the meantime what are the 
chances for the new suggested model not to produce its own “dark side”? 
5.3 Al-Adl wal-Ihsan and the status of women 
“The most perfect of the believers in faith are the best of them in moral 
excellence, and the best of you are the kindest to their wives.”110 
Prophet Muhammad 
On 12th March 2000 Moroccan Islamists staged a huge demonstration, the largest 
since Morocco‟s independence in 1956, gathering more than two million marchers 
in Casablanca.111 The reason for this massive rally is that Said Saadi, then 
Secretary of State for Childhood and Family Issues, proposed what he called “a 
national plan” to improve the situation of Moroccan women and facilitate their 
integration in development. Said Saadi, member of the former communist Party for 
Progress and Socialism, was not, in the view of Moroccan Islamists and 
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conservatives in general, to be trusted with a project of such importance. 
Furthermore, the proposed plan, suspected of being dictated by some international 
organizations, is believed to contain provisions violating established Islamic 
principles. Hence, it was vehemently opposed and eventually withdrawn, but the 
implications of the event did not stop there. Given their decisive role to make the 
government reconsider the plan, Islamist groups, and particularly al-Adl wal-Ihsan, 
were claimed to have provided irrefutable proof, in theory as well as in practice, 
that they were against the liberation of women and “confirmed enemies” of their 
rights.  
It is interesting to note, however, that although at least half the demonstrators  who 
marched in Casablanca against the government plan were women and led by 
highly educated women, that did not seem to prompt some writers to pause for a 
while before they could dismiss the demonstrators in Casa as “an obscurantist 
horde of Moroccan Taliban,”112 Does it make sense that those women, many of 
whom were highly qualified,113 came to rally to tell the government in the clearest 
way possible that they liked to continue to suffer and that they did not need any 
social, political or legal rights? Is it conceivable that they demonstrated because 
they did not care if they were brutishly mistreated or if their husbands took four 
wives or as many concubines as they liked to revive, if they wished, the harem still 
flourishing, albeit under different forms, in the shadow of some rulers? Could it be 
that they went out to express their joy and satisfaction with an expanding network 
trading in what is sometimes referred to as “human flesh” or “white slavery”, 
sexually exploiting teenage girls living in abject poverty, deprivation, and with no 
education or skills? 
Such questions, simple and self-evident, though, seemed to have escaped the 
attention of some writers who were quick to denounce the March 2000 
demonstration in Casablanca as a move taken by the “Moroccan Talibans” to abort 
a valuable opportunity to usher in a new era for women. This section, however, 
would not dwell much on a single event despite its importance, but would rather 
use it as a springboard to consider the issue in its entirety, that is the position of al-
Adl wal-Ihsan and its leader on what is often referred to as “the question of 
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woman”. But before we do so, a bit of history is in order to help us clarify the 
situation and identify the real issue. 
5.3.1 Brief historical overview 
When Islam first emerged in the pagan Arabian society, women were subjugated to 
all forms of injustice one could think of. They were treated like property to be kept 
or disposed of as the male guardian saw fit. They were not allowed to inherit or to 
choose their partners and not even to give their consent to being married. It was 
the father, the brother or a male relative who decided their fate the way he wished. 
They were exposed to various kinds of humiliation, but the inhumanity reached its 
climax when the birth of a female child was considered an evil omen and 
consequently many were buried alive.  
With the advent of Islam, the situation changed completely. All the humiliating 
practices and customs from which women were suffering were abolished, and 
Muslims were instructed to treat women with dignity and respect without any 
discrimination or prejudice whatsoever. One of the oft-quoted sayings of the 
Prophet which is considered definitive in establishing the fundamental principle of 
male-female equality is: “O people! Your God is one and your forefather (Adam) is 
one. There is no claim of merit of an Arab over a non-Arab, or a white over a black 
person. Only God-fearing people merit a preference with God.”114 It is no wonder 
that women played an important role in the first Muslim community. The Prophet‟s 
wife, Khadija, a successful businesswoman, was the first to embrace Islam and 
support the Prophet in his mission; and the first person to get martyred for the 
cause of Islam was also a woman called Sumayyah bint Khayyat. „Aisha, whom the 
Prophet married after the death of his first wife, Khadija, was another outstanding 
woman who took part in numerous events and excelled in knowledge to the extent 
that one prominent Companion of the Prophet said: “I did not see a greater scholar 
than „Aisha in the learning of the Quran, shares of inheritance, lawful and unlawful 
matters, poetry and literature, Arab history and genealogy.”115  
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However, the numerous rights and provisions which came into being with the 
coming of Islam and accorded women the dignified, honourable status to which 
every human being, male or female, is entitled were not maintained in practice for 
long. A few decades after the death of the Prophet the early signs of decline with 
regard to women‟s condition began to permeate, albeit gradually, the Muslim 
society and some un-Islamic traditions started to encroach upon a number of 
women‟s rights. Though it can be argued that throughout Islamic history there are 
many women who have been successful in various fields and have been able to 
achieve remarkable accomplishments, the prevalent picture to this day is far from 
satisfactory, to say the least. 
The question that arises is why the thrust triggered by the emergence of Islam lost 
its initial élan. In other words, what hastened the deterioration of women‟s condition 
in the Muslim world? This question has been debated by many historians and 
writers and a vast literature has been produced to identify the factors responsible 
for Muslim decline in general and the worsening situation of women in particular. It 
is thus difficult to do justice to this question by surveying what has been written on 
the subject within this small section. However, one woman writer called „Aisha 
Bewly will be cited here. She is an American convert who is considered today one 
of the most prolific translators of classical Arabic works. In her view the decadence 
is due to several internal and external reasons which could be summarized as 
follows: 
1. a re-assertion of pre-Islamic patriarchy; 
2. the adoption of the pre-Islamic practices of conquered peoples (Byzantine, Persian 
and Hindu). For instance the adoption of the Byzantium gynaeceum which became 
the Ottoman harem; 
3. the infiltration of Western ideas, including the view of women as inferior (which was 
the Western position on women until fairly recent times); 
4. an active policy on the part of the colonialists to keep women down; 
5. a legacy of colonialism: that Islam is “barbaric” while European, Western customs 
and traditions are civilized. This is reinforced by the ruling elites who inherited the 
mantle of colonial power […].116 
If some writers like Bewly maintain that it is only in the last three hundred years 
that the decline set in, the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan argues that it started much 
earlier. He believes that its sour seeds were sown the moment the first Islamic 
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system of rule, called Khilafah ar-Rashida, was toppled and replaced by an 
oppressive, hereditary monarchy in clear violation of the Islamic principles. Since 
then Muslim history took a wrong trajectory and the empowering community 
established by the Prophet and maintained by his four successors suffered a 
serious blow the dire consequences of which are still reverberating in all Muslim 
societies to this day. For Yassine the status of women cannot be dissociated from 
the condition of Muslims as a whole. He explains: 
The decline in the status of the Muslim women is part of the general decline of all 
Muslims. The decline started with the destructive transformation of the Islamic 
political system from a caliphate on the Prophetic model into an oppressive 
hereditary monarchy […]. Thus the woman was gradually turned into a 
commodity, a slave-servant in palaces and a neglected object.117 
There is yet another factor which, in the view of Yassine despite being a 
consequence of the anchoring of political illegitimacy, has also adversely affected 
the situation of women in the Islamic world. It is often referred to in his writings as 
“the rigid jurisprudence”, that is, the interpretations produced in various historical 
circumstances by some jurists which tended to be rigid in matters concerning 
women, especially after the alleged closure of the gate of ijtihad in the fourth 
century of the Muslim calendar. These interpretations which acquired with the 
passage of time a certain degree of sacredness, as if they were part of definitive 
Islamic principles, coupled with alien cultural customs, have hampered greatly both 
sexes, but women particularly, from developing their full potential and participating 
in the advancement of their society.  
5.3.2 A roadmap to empowerment  
While there is general agreement on the need to reconsider the condition of 
Muslim women in order to overcome the unfortunate situation in which local 
masculine injustice and backward traditions have placed them, views seem to differ 
on how to achieve that goal. Broadly speaking, these views may be classified into 
two competing tendencies. One is upheld by proponents of the secular trend in 
general. It is simple, clear and backed by a living modern reality: Westernization or 
the Western model is the solution. The rationale behind such a view is that religion 
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is seen as the problem and that it is only when it was discarded and marginalized 
in the West that the condition of women improved. Therefore, the same path 
should be followed to achieve the same results. One prominent Egyptian author 
went as far as to write a few decades ago that Arab countries should emulate the 
West in everything, “in its good and its bad, its sweet and its bitter!”118 This may 
sound exaggerated, but this is the core of the secular liberal proposal, though there 
may be those who would prefer less extreme arrangements. 
This position for the advocates of the other competing view, the Islamists in 
general, is neither justified nor realistic despite claims to the contrary. It is not 
justified because it is based on wrong assumptions. If women suffered in the 
Christian world because of the negative position the Church entertained against 
them for a long time, this is not the case with Islam as we have briefly seen above. 
It is only when Islamic principles were overlooked that women‟s condition started to 
deteriorate. And it is not realistic because “to copy” a model developed in a certain 
cultural and civilizational context and “paste” it in a completely different setting is 
doomed to fail, however appealing it might be. As a matter of fact, the secular 
project has already lost much of its apparent glamour and people in the Arab world 
seem to appreciate increasingly their Islamic heritage. It is no wonder that 
nowadays whenever fair and transparent elections are held, it is the Islamic parties 
that hold considerable sway. 
Such being the case, the view to which mainstream Islamist groups, including al-
Adl wal-Ihsan, subscribe is claimed to be more appropriate and viable. It rests, it is 
argued, on a model that did take place more than 14 centuries ago, and the 
principles and provisions that led to its emergence are still valid and alive and need 
only be re-activated. It is a model with which the crushing majority of Muslims feel 
more at home and trust it would provide an enabling environment where justice 
prevails and a decent life is secured for all. It happened in the first Islamic 
community established by the Prophet and continued with his four successors and 
there is no reason why it should not materialize again if the required conditions are 
met. This raises the question about those conditions and how they could be 
satisfied, and this is indeed where Islamists‟ views seem to differ. 
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For al-Adl wal-Ihsan, “to deliver the contemporary Muslim woman and draw her 
from the abyss of injustice and negligence where she languishes,”119 there must be 
a comprehensive view in order to identify the root problem and know how to cope 
with it effectively. What is needed at this stage is not the laws which exist already 
and many more may be enacted, if necessary, to improve the situation of women, 
but rather the suitable political environment which makes reform possible and sure 
to bear fruit. 
To defend their position members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan refer to several initiatives 
taken by the Moroccan government and the recent one being the New Family 
Code which was introduced in January 2004. They argue that almost nine years 
have already elapsed and yet the results are far from being encouraging. It is 
enough, they contend, to pay a short visit to any Moroccan court or hospital where 
some ladies have delivered outside on the pavement in front of strangers because 
they have been kept waiting or even denied entry because they have not had the 
required sum of money to be admitted, or to go to some companies and factories 
where women and girls are employed … to have an idea about the misery and 
humiliation which women are still being subjected to. This is why al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
never trusts the initiatives taken by the present regime because it believes that it 
cares neither about men nor about women and the issue of women has been used 
as a mere ploy to circumvent the real problem which, in the view of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, lies first and foremost in an archaic system of rule infested with corruption to 
the core.120 
Consequently, to improve the condition of women requires a comprehensive 
package of reforms targeting both government and society, an adequate approach 
and genuine political will which, according to al-Adl wal-Ihsan, is still missing. 
Women, therefore, should make no mistake about it; they should know that the 
road to real change is long and arduous, but it is crucial to get involved, “since 
everything has its beginning and the greatest marathon departs from point zero.”121 
It is not enough, maintains Yassine, that the Muslim woman just knows the rights 
that true Islam grants her; “she should be able to reclaim their application.”122 She 
should not wait for others to do the job for her. No one, argues Yassine, is in a 
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better position than her to bring hope to “the rest of female population [who] 
vegetates in ignorance, not daring to imagine the least bit of change.”123  
Does Yassine mean that men and women should not cooperate and that women 
should work on their own to restore the confiscated rights and bring about the 
required change? Definitely not; he merely intends to emphasize that women‟s 
participation is crucial in the efforts to liberate society from the shackles of 
backward customs and practices which have accrued over a long period of time 
and hindered Muslim women from realising their full potential. He also seeks to 
encourage competition in good work and to stress that there is no harm that there 
should be various associations rivalling one another in raising the awareness of 
their people, male and female alike. 
It is also important, in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, to overcome not only the alien, 
demeaning traditions which have been wrongly tacked on Islam, but also the 
juristic interpretations and fatwas which were produced in different historical 
circumstances and tended to place unwarranted restrictions on women, 
disregarding the Islamic principles and the practices of the Prophet himself. As it 
has been pointed out earlier, at the time of the Prophet women participated actively 
in the establishment of the first community and got involved in activities some of 
which cannot be claimed to be easy or safe like battles, though in certain cases 
they were not compelled to do so. They were also present in discussions about 
faith or other important issues, and in order to catch up with men, the Prophet went 
as far as to devote extra sessions to instruct them and answer their questions. 
When some women expressed their concern that the Quran seemed to address 
men only, divine response came immediately afterwards to reassure them that was 
not the case and that the Quran addresses both sexes, men and women alike.124 
Thus, women felt empowered and were indeed able to play their undeniable 
important role in society. It is because of this new liberating understanding of the 
status of women in Islam that Umar, the second Caliph, did not hesitate to appoint 
a woman, ash-Shifa bint AbduAllah, as the administrator [Muhtasib] of the market 
of Madinah, a job which entailed not only working outside the home but also 
interacting with men and women125. 
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The leaders of Al-Adl wal-Ihsan have repeatedly emphasized that they refuse to be 
dragged into what they describe as “marginal struggles” over matters of less 
importance or which do not constitute priorities such dress codes, the issue of 
women‟s work outside the home, polygamy which, apart from very rare cases, has 
almost disappeared from today‟s Moroccan society and the like. They think that 
such issues no matter whoever bring them to the fore and whatever his or her 
intention only serve to distract the public‟s attention away from the more serious ills 
that plague Moroccan society as a result of a long history of tyranny, 
mismanagement and failed policies. This is why, it is claimed, they did not want 
initially to get involved in the debate about Muduwwana [code of personal status] 
and the so-called government plan to integrate women into development we have 
referred to above. It is only when the issue was politicized and some secular 
strands decided to take the matter to the streets that the movement responded “to 
send a clear message to all those who sought to further alienate the Moroccan 
society from its Islamic roots and values.”126 Otherwise, the policy of the movement 
is to focus on what it considers the major sources of the prevailing socio-political 
and economic crises, i.e. authoritarianism and corruption and more importantly on 
the ways and means that help create the conditions for change. 
To combine theory with practice, the movement has tried from the beginning to 
encourage women to get engaged in organized activism and it seems that it has 
been successful in this respect, since at least half of its members are now 
female.127 However, the task, according to members of the movement, was no 
small or easy one at the beginning not only because of the deeply entrenched 
traditions but also of the risks incurred in joining an organization under constant 
harassment since it came into existence. Even when female members started to 
join the movement, it was not easy either to bring them together to organize a 
common event. Now many events are commonly planned and carried out, though 
women may still want to organize their own activities for one reason or another.128 
Women are also well represented in the governing bodies of the movement and 
according to some senior members, al-Adl wal-Ihsan compares favourably with 
many Islamic groups inside as well as outside Morocco.129 It is true that the bodies 
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and committees of the movement are not all mixed-gender and that, as we have 
seen in Chapter three, there is a section for men and another for women, but this 
does not mean that there is a clear divide between the two sections. There are 
mixed-gender committees at every level of the hierarchy to ensure coordination 
and cooperation. As for the political section which is one of the major components 
of the movement, it comprises female and male members at all levels.  
Like men, women are also encouraged to be present wherever they could 
contribute significantly to spreading the message and what is believed to be an 
enlightened understanding of Islam and raising the awareness of people using 
various means: audio and videotapes, booklets, speeches, lectures, internet, social 
gatherings, etc. This is in keeping with the overall strategy of the movement which 
focuses specifically “on a long-term grassroots project”130 and direct contact with 
people. It is what is termed “le travail de fond” [substantive field work] that is 
required in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan to bring the bulk of female population from 
afar and help them to get involved whatever the degree of engagement might be. 
The aim is not necessarily to win over new members to the movement but rather to 
make them aware of their dignity and to open new horizons for them, stressing the 
value and importance of their contribution. This is the policy that the movement has 
opted for and seeks to undertake today, tomorrow and ever: to stay connected with 
people, work with them and amongst them.131 And this is what they apparently 
mean when senior members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan say that politics is one of their 
concerns but not all that matters. In fact, in Yassine‟s view even in the case an 
Islamic government is established, it “can only clear the road and smooth the 
difficulties: what is required is the joint effort of men and women to take to the field 
and act, to invest themselves and to persevere.”132 Only then can the aspired 
change be reached. 
5.4 Conclusion 
Despite a substantial amount of writing produced by al-Adl wal-Ihsan and 
particularly its leader covering a wide range of topics, the attitude of the movement 
towards democracy, modernity and the status of women is still poorly understood 
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and in certain cases it could be said that it is even distorted. The position of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan on these or on any other issues is said to be inspired by an Islamic 
vision and as such it is no wonder that it should differ slightly or significantly from 
other positions informed by different worldviews. In fact, al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
challenges the view which maintains that the only values that should be invoked 
and respected are those of the Enlightenment philosophy and that those who 
adhere to revelation, tradition or any mode of thinking should be dismissed and 
cannot be said to be, in any significant way, engaged in promoting the 
development of modern society in their countries. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan finds such a 
view arbitrary and exclusivist. There is no reason in its view that the parameters 
and boundaries of the field of discussion of topics like the ones raised above 
should be formulated in an absolute dichotomised way: “You‟re either for or 
against.” Neither does it find it convincing that a certain worldview should set the 
standards and expect the rest to unquestioningly acquiesce. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
stands for the view that Muslim societies should have the right to define their 
discourse and apply their own criteria to deal with issues like the ones discussed in 
this chapter. 
Thus if al-Adl wal-Ihsan cannot be said to subscribe totally to the notion of 
democracy as it is understood by some Westerners, it would be unfair to claim that 
it stands on the opposite shore, that is, favouring autocracy, theocracy or any other 
form of tyranny, whatever its shape and hue, religious or otherwise, that 
confiscates people‟s freedom and denies them the right to have a genuine say in 
their own affairs and to choose their representatives and rulers in free and fair 
elections. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan stands for a form of government that should be the 
outcome of free public debate and accountable to people. As it finds that its view 
converges with democracy on many crucial points, it sees no reason why it should 
quarrel with it, as long as democracy is not hostile to Islam and does not get mad 
at the sight of a small piece of cloth that some girls choose, of their own volition 
and for religious reasons, to put on their heads. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan denies allegations 
that its attitude to democracy is tactical or one-way process to be endorsed only if it 
is sure to establish Islam in power, or, as some critics sarcastically put it, it is “one 
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vote, one man, one time”. Besides being considered unfounded, such claims are 
impossible to undertake nowadays. It seems that the international environment, for 
various practical reasons, no longer condones usurpation of power in any country, 
and al-Adl wal-Ihsan is not willing or anxious to take a course of action which it 
rejects on principle and not just because it is doomed to fail.  
One rule that informs the behaviour and attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan towards 
democracy, modernity or any other issue for that matter is that anything that is 
beneficial and does not contravene established and conclusive Islamic principles is 
not just acceptable but should be sought and adopted. This is why though Yassine 
seems to be very critical of what is called the “dark side” of modernity, it does not 
mean that he rejects it wholesale and disregards its positive achievements. 
Furthermore, many of his criticisms, admittedly harsh, often overlap or confirm 
those voiced by Western critics themselves; and if these cannot be accused of 
advocating a return to the Dark Ages, the same should also apply to Yassine and 
his group. By criticizing what some analysts describe as “the destructive aspects” 
of modernity, he does not intend to defend the status quo or seek to return “to a 
presumed golden age of tents and camels”. Yet Yassine believes that there is no 
reason for apology if Muslim societies take a different road to development and 
devise their own model of modernity. The world, it is argued, despite agreed 
common values, is plural and diverse and it is neither required nor possible to try to 
make “a melting pot” of what is by nature and definition “unmeltable”. 
This line of thinking also applies to what al-Adl wal-Ihsan proposes for the 
liberation of the contemporary Muslim woman. It is a model that draws on Islam on 
the grounds that the latter grants her rights that women in the West were denied 
until very recently. That some Westerners or Westernized elite in Morocco or 
elsewhere may not partly or totally appreciate it, is quite normal because they are 
using their own standards. However, what al-Adl wal-Ihsan intends to stress is that 
there are other standards derived from another worldview to which more than a 
billion Muslims subscribe that should also count and be understood and respected. 
If some women feel that a certain vision ensures dignity, justice, social harmony 
and the well-being of all and decide to support it, are they to blame? The issue is 
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not even to compare between models and claim supremacy of one over the others, 
but the real issue for al-Adl wal-Ihsan is that the last word should be left to the 
Muslim woman herself; and when she makes her choice, she should be respected. 
This seems to be the vision that underpins the behaviour and attitude of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan towards the issues we have discussed in this chapter as well as others 
which, for reasons of space, could not have been raised. It is based on the 
movement‟s understanding of Islamic teachings and the Muslim history, an 
analysis of the realities of contemporary Muslim societies and the changing 
modern world and on a type of ijtihad some aspects of which have been discussed 
in the previous chapter. It is this vision that seems to account for the type of 
activism that the movement has chosen to build up a force able to press for change 
as we have seen in chapter two and three, that appear to account for the approach 
taken to tackle a number of Islamic issues as it has been discussed in chapter four 
and also for the nature of strategy advocated by al-Adl wal-Ihsan to reform society 
and government as we will see in more detail later on, after exploring two major 
reform strategies pursued so far in Morocco in the following chapter.   
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Chapter 6 Revolutionary and “Democratic Struggle” Strategies in Morocco 
and their Outcomes 
A classical question which seems unavoidable to those who happen to be still 
living under repressive regimes is how to put an end to an abnormal situation and 
emplace a system of rule whereby the people can be free to choose their rulers 
and representatives and their choice be respected and implemented. The answers 
have differed depending on the circumstances of each country and the forces 
engaged to find a solution to their predicament. There are those who seek a way 
out whatever the sacrifices and the sooner, the better. Others, however, are keen 
to overcome their problem in a more sober and rational way and try to formulate an 
effective strategy to bring down authoritarianism to lay to rest once and for all with 
the least cost. 
In Morocco the same sort of debate has occurred with some differences in details 
of course. In the pre-colonial era the dominant question was how to throw off the 
yoke of colonialism and recover independence. In post-colonial Morocco, a 
different question soon started to take shape and acquire significance, especially 
when the late king Hassan II showed that he favoured to rule alone, unimpeded. 
Since the consequences of such an option began to be felt acutely in the country, 
the issue of prime concern for some political forces was how to curb if not to 
eradicate the emerging despotic rule and provide the conditions for the people to 
have a genuine say in the affairs of their country. Two broad visions were, at the 
beginning, discernible. One preferred to negotiate reform with the Palace and the 
other believed in revolution and even the necessity of arms. The irony is that 
neither those who sought change through violent means nor those who had faith in 
working from within the system to change it succeeded. What may account for 
such failure? 
This chapter examines these two trajectories. The first section focuses on what is 
referred to as “the revolutionary option” and tries to find out about the reasons 
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behind its emergence, its basic characteristics and why it did not work. The second 
is devoted to the study of “the democratic struggle” represented by L‟Union 
Socialiste des Forces Populaires (USFP) [Socialist Union of Popular Forces], one 
of the major national political parties in Morocco, and see why its choice, like the 
revolutionary option, failed to yield any significant results. Is it due to any perceived 
flaws in the pursued approaches or to the resilience of a system in which the 
monarchy continues to retain all the levers of power and dominate the political 
scene, or to any other factors?   
6.1 Revolutionary option in Morocco 
“The revolutionary option”, refers to a strategy designed by the famous opposition 
leader, Mehdi Ben Barka, in an attempt to resolve the question of power in 
Morocco and create the conditions for sustainable comprehensive development. It 
is claimed to be based on an in-depth analysis of the prevailing socio-political 
situation in the country and an objective evaluation of the conditions of 
independence. In this section we will examine, as it has been pointed out, the 
context in which it emerged, the reasons advanced for considering it as a viable 
course of action and why it did not manage to achieve the intended results.  
6.1.1 Rationale 
When Morocco regained its formal independence in 1956 after nearly half a 
century of colonialism, the euphoria caused by the event was only increased by the 
wild promises made soon afterwards. Upon his return from exile, Mohammad V 
pledged in his first speech that an independent government would set up 
“democratic institutions that were the product of free elections, and founded on the 
principle of the separation of powers under a constitutional monarchy.”1 What 
some nationalists understood or expected at the time was that the king would not 
get involved in political struggle and that he would “adopt at best the role of an 
arbitrator or mediator or even a symbol.”2 It soon became clear, however, that the 
monarch did not mean that and he intended to reign and rule, though he would not 
mind the participation of other political groups in the management of the affairs of 
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the state as long as the monarchy is ensured a dominant position within the 
political scene. This intention was translated into a number of practical measures. 
The most urgent one was to set up the police and the armed forces and make sure 
that they were maintained under the king‟s direct control;3 a second one which is 
equally important was to keep key ministries and posts to his loyal friends whereas 
the rest, which could be filled by other politicians, would serve other important 
purposes.4   
For an outstanding political figure, like Ben Barka, he could not have 
misunderstood the nature of the political system that was being built, and he once 
spoke about his concern to an American journalist, telling her that King Mohammad 
V no longer seemed to trust the Istiqlal Party and “he attributed this change to the 
influence of Prince Hassan.”5 When the latter took office upon his father‟s death in 
1961 and the government headed by Abdellah Ibrahim was dismissed, Ben Barka 
lost all hope to introduce the reforms that he and his comrades thought necessary 
to establish what they believed to be “a new and just order.”6 In a report which he 
initially intended to present to the second congress of the National Union of 
Popular Forces [UNFP] in May 1962,7 a party which he had formed in 1959 after 
breaking away from the Istiqlal Party, Ben Barka explains in detail how he came to 
that conclusion and what he suggests to relieve Morocco of what he describes as 
“an absolute and archaic regime.”8  
In this report, which makes the major part of a publication under the title The 
Political Thought of Ben Barka: I. Revolutionary Option in Morocco, the leftist 
leader repeatedly asserts that the country is “under a regime of repression and 
absolute power,”9 and it is no wonder that all the initiatives and projects 
presumably taken to improve the condition of the Moroccan people have failed. 
The social and political policies failed because they did not appeal to those 
concerned or because they tended to serve the privileged minority and 
neocolonialist interests, and the constitutional organization failed because it 
provided the ruler with absolute power. This is not, affirms Ben Barka, what the 
people expected after all the sacrifices they had made to put an end to the colonial 
rule, nor does it conform to the promises given in the first days of independence. 
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Failed policies, unfulfilled promises and the growing misery of the people have only 
widened even further the gap between them and the rulers, and consequently the 
regime now seems to be more fragile than ever. 
If the situation is as described by Ben Barka, then how can we explain the survival 
of the monarchy despite the serious attempts made to curtail its powers if not to get 
rid of it altogether? In the view of Ben Barka, there are a number of reasons. One 
obvious one lies in the monopoly of the levers of power and force, the police and 
the army. This explains why in the wake of independence the establishment of the 
security forces, as mentioned above, was given utmost priority and has since then 
been considered the royal “private domains”10. However, this source of support, 
notes Ben Barka, may not always be reliable; in fact, it may even become a serious 
threat.11 Here Ben Barka seems remarkably right: so far al least twice has the 
military tried to overthrow the monarchy and, according to some observers, future 
attempts are not to be ruled out despite the failure of the previous ones. The 
reason that is usually referred to in this respect is that nobody is spared 
humiliation, whatever their position might be, and stories to this effect are too 
numerous to be dismissed as mere gossip.12 
Another major source of support, explains Ben Barka, comes from abroad in the 
form of financial aid, intelligence information and sophisticated security equipment, 
arms, training etc. These services are, of course, not offered for free, but to 
empower the regime to protect the interests of what Ben Barka calls “the imperialist 
and neocolonialist forces.”13 It may be argued, however, that the palace does have 
its reasons to be suspicious and even scared. The early 1960s was not a rosy 
period for Arab monarchs. In Jordan King Abdullah was killed in 1951; in Egypt 
King Faruk was toppled in 1952; in Iraq King Faisal was assassinated; and in 
Tunisia, Bourgiba put an end to the dynasty of Beys in 1957.14 These events must 
have had their impact on the Moroccan monarchy to be sceptical towards the 
internal political groups and to be disposed to cooperate or even collaborate with 
some foreign powers. But in Ben Barka‟s view these countries may not continue to 
back a bankrupt regime permanently. They may be brought to switch positions if 
they feel that the alternative socialist construction does not necessarily entail 
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severing “the relations of cooperation and exchange with advanced capitalist 
economies”, an idea which Ben Barka does not reject provided it is established “on 
the basis of strict reciprocity.”15  
A third pillar which the regime relies on represents a group of high and middle 
officials who are, according to Ben Barka, “literally bought by privileges.”16 The 
basic flaw of this system is that loyalty takes precedence over competence and as 
a result the administration has become notoriously inefficient and corrupt. The 
petty functionaries try to imitate their superiors who, through bribery, make 
scandalous fortunes in a very short time. Worst of all is that nothing, under the 
prevailing circumstances, seems possible to remedy a rotten administrative organ 
whose efficiency is considered vital for a country‟s development.  
These are the main sources of support for the regime. Nevertheless, if these 
elements have helped it to survive on one hand, they have on the other hand 
eroded its social base to a great extent and thus increased its isolation further and 
exacerbated its vulnerability. Furthermore, nothing can guarantee, as we have 
seen, that the endorsement drawn from these sources is reliable or permanent. 
The other aspect dealt with in the report prepared by Ben Barka concerns the 
social condition in Morocco.  It is in his view no better off than the political situation. 
In fact, he believes that the contradictions have become so evident that one can 
safely devise a viable strategy to undertake the required social and political 
change, which is what he has been trying to do in this document. Broadly 
speaking, four social sectors are quite discernable in the Moroccan society and 
according to Ben Barka they are as follows:  
1. a big bourgeoisie that has abdicated its political aspirations and allied itself to semi-
feudal interests; 
2. a working class which is the prime revolutionary force and which must define 
clearly its trade union tasks and political aims; 
3. a discontented small and medium bourgeoisie potentially revolutionary, but which 
hesitates to renew the struggle for its national liberation; 
4. a peasant mass of small landless fellahs de khemmes who need a clear vision of 
their tasks and a framework within which to organize their own unity with the 
working class.17 
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The analysis of the social as well as the political circumstances in Morocco has led 
Ben Barka to draw two important conclusions: the first is that the situation inside 
and outside Morocco is suitable for what he calls the progressive forces to assume 
their responsibility and take what is necessary to bring about the change that the 
country is need of; the second is that the revolutionary option is the only viable way 
to achieve such an objective. Meanwhile, he believes that some conditions must be 
met to be sure of success. 
6.1.2 Conditions for success 
Two conditions are of prime importance: self-criticism and ideological clarity. With 
regard to the former, Ben Barka thinks that the Nationalist Movement committed 
three fatal errors between 1956 and 1960 and they must not be repeated in order 
for the revolutionary option to succeed. The first relates to the evaluation of the 
compromises that the leaders of the Nationalist Liberation Movement had to make 
with the colonizers when they accepted the Aix-les-Bains agreement.18 For Ben 
Barka it was a pure trap because it was concluded at the very moment when the 
political awareness of the people was gathering momentum in scope as well as in 
depth and when the unity of the anti-colonial struggle among the people of the 
Great Maghreb was taking shape and root. The colonial powers understood the 
trends of events better than the nationalists, argues Ben Barka, and hastened to 
strike an agreement which prima facie seemed a victory for Morocco but in reality it 
was the surest way to secure the colonialists‟ interests and maintain their influence 
after the country‟s formal independence. What is even more regrettable, notes Ben 
Barka, is that the compromise of Aix-les-Bains was adopted completely and 
presented to the public as an outright defeat of French colonialism. It was not, 
affirms Ben Barka; “it was only a deceptive and wisely-calculated concession.”19 
One of its dire consequences is that the revolutionary élan of the people was 
cooled down and the vision of the militants was blurred when the real objective of 
the struggle was reduced to the mere return of a sultan from exile.20 The 
overwhelming impression was that the battle was over and that the goal had been 
achieved.   
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The second fundamental error is that between 1956 and 1960 many battles were 
fought behind closed doors, in the villas of the leaders of the Istiqlal Party or behind 
the high walls of the royal palace, but the people knew nothing about what was 
going on. They knew nothing about the struggle in which the nationalists engaged 
to make all levers of powers, including the army, the police and the constabulary, 
under the orders of the government in order for the latter to have the means of 
applying its tasks, but it was all in vain. People had no idea either about the battles 
that Abderrahim Bouabid, Ben Barka‟s comrade, had to fight to implement even the 
minimal economic reforms, nor did they know anything about the efforts they had 
made in order for the “list ballot” to be used in the district elections, but without any 
success. It was the other type of ballot, the uninominal, that the king and his 
advisers preferred for obvious reasons that was adopted in spite of the fact that the 
majority of political groups were against it.21 
Ben Barka also refers to the in-fighting they had within the Executive Committee 
and the Political Commission of the Istiqlal Party about a number of issues, 
particularly the question of the Resistance and Liberation Army and the Moroccan 
Labour Union, and deplores how the position of some leaders was far from being 
ethically acceptable, to say the least. Ben Barka believes that if the people had 
been informed about all these issues and the bitter struggles they entailed at the 
time, they would have been spared lots of time, pain and frustration.22 
The third serious error incurred by the leaders of the Nationalist Movement was 
related to the vagueness of their political position. They did not explain clearly what 
they stood for and what their objectives and priorities were. The pressing issue was 
that of independence and the clarification of preferences or differences was not 
considered a priority. The result is that when independence was recovered, there 
was no agreed, clear idea about the kind of economic, social and political 
organization to be adopted in Morocco.23 If the aims and priorities, implies Ben 
Barka, had been clearly defined, the chances of an absolute regime getting 
established in the wake of independence would have been very bleak. 
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Such errors, concludes Ben Barka, have had grave consequences, and to avoid 
repeating them in the future, he insists on the practice of self-criticism and on 
transparency. No engagement should be made without explaining in full to the 
public what it truly entails and if any compromise were to be accepted, its gains as 
well as its losses should be clarified and not be presented as a total victory for any 
reason whatsoever. 
The second condition for the revolutionary strategy to succeed is that the aims 
should be not only well defined but also well understood. This is what seems to be 
implied by the ideological clarity. In this respect, Ben Barka makes a distinction 
between what he describes as long-term and short-term objectives. This distinction 
is, in his view, important because it helps to know where a certain degree of 
flexibility is permitted, if not even required, and where it is not. Concerning the 
long-term objectives of the revolutionary path, Ben Barka declares that they are 
based on true scientific socialism which, according to him, is characterized by the 
following: 
1. the correct solution of the problem of power, that is the establishment of political 
institutions which will permit the democratic control of the masses over the state 
apparatus as well as the distribution of resources and the national product; 
2. an economic structure that will uproot the bases of imperialist domination, an ally of 
feudalism and the parasitical big bourgeoisie; 
3. a political and social institution that will organize and educate the masses with a 
view to the mobilization of all national resources needed for accumulation.24 
What should be noted, however, is that though these objectives have been 
definitely established, Ben Barka admits that one cannot expect them to be 
achieved overnight. Therefore, a long period is needed to lay down the bases of a 
socialist society, and this could be realized through a number of short-term 
objectives which constitute what is described as “the minimum programme”25 At 
the economic level, the key targets of “the minimum programme” are: 1) planning; 
2) nationalization in the agricultural, industrial, commercial and banking sectors; 
and 3) an agrarian reform in order to destroy the colonial structures and create new 
ones suitable for accelerated development.26   
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At the political level, Ben Barka believes that no true reform could take place within 
the context of an absolutist power. Hence, he insists on the democratic solution 
which entails, among other things, setting up genuine popular institutions and the 
participation of the popular masses in handling their public affairs.27 In the field of 
foreign diplomacy, he advocates total solidarity with the international revolutionary 
movements in Africa, the Middle East and elsewhere, fighting for their dignity and 
freedom and seeking to put an end to imperialist domination. Not all anti-imperialist 
tasks, remarks Ben Barka, should be placed on the same level of importance, but 
the dialectic interaction between the internal and the external in the revolutionary 
strategy requires the emphasis on two key targets: “an agrarian reform at home 
and the creation of a united Arab Maghreb abroad.”28 
The question that arises now is: how to achieve these objectives, the immediate as 
well as the long-range ones? Though Ben Barka recognizes that it is no easy 
question, he, nonetheless, believes that L‟Union National des Forces Populaires 
(UNFP) [National Union of Popular Forces], the party he founded in 1959, is the 
only tool capable of turning the aims into reality provided that three aspects are 
given special attention: one is related to organization; the second, to ideology; and 
the third, to praxis. 
Concerning organization, the party should maintain in the current stage centralism 
and democracy within its ranks.29 It should also have a new central body to be 
called the Central Committee whose function is “to ensure cohesion, the unity of 
viewpoint and thought of all party chiefs on the central and provincial levels.”30 With 
regard to the ideological aspect, Ben Barka emphasizes that the militants should 
be well aware of what the revolutionary strategy entails. Hence, the necessity of 
intense ideological preparation in order to have the militants and the cadres able to 
rise to the lofty tasks they are expected to fulfill.31 
As for the third aspect which has to do with praxis, Ben Barka notes that, apart 
from the exploiting classes and the allies and bulwarks of neocolonialism, the 
UNFP is “the party of the people” and, as such, should be expanded socially to 
include all social sectors and geographically all regions. To achieve this practically, 
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it should establish its parallel organizations including trade unions, organizations of 
peasants, students, professionals, women, youth and the like to cover all fields of 
interest. More importantly, the party, by virtue of the driving force it stands for, must 
play the leading role in integrating and directing the struggle of all these sectors. “In 
this way,” concludes Ben Barka, “we can guarantee ideological unity, dynamism 
and the unity of all popular forces which will enable us to advance with firm steps 
towards our objectives.”32  
6.1.3 A critical appraisal of the revolutionary option  
The big question that poses itself persistently: why did a strategy so carefully 
crafted suffer complete failure? Why was the UNFP party unable to mobilize the 
masses and gather enough support to translate dreams into reality? Was it due to 
some deficiency in the proposed approach or in the tool of implementation or in 
both or to other internal or external factors? There is no easy answer to such 
questions, especially if we take into account the mastermind behind this 
revolutionary strategy. It could not be said that it was a rash or botched initiative 
taken by an inexperienced young politician fascinated by the Marxist tools of 
analysis and by the Soviet, Chinese and Cuban models of modern society. Ben 
Barka was of unquestionable talents. All his friends and foes acknowledge that the 
man was very dynamic and, as one writer has put it, “of feverish imagination, an 
unsurpassed energy and a keen intelligence.”33 Born in 1920, he showed early in 
his life that he was highly gifted and eventually he joined the University in Algiers 
where he graduated in mathematics. Back in Morocco, he worked as a teacher of 
mathematics and one of his students was Crown Prince Hassan whom he taught 
for six years. It is no wonder that Hassan II knew his former maths teacher well and 
had this to say about him: “He [Ben Barka] used to speak with passion and energy 
and with an intelligence that sparks from his eyes, his nose, his ears and fingers. 
He was kind of a formidable intellectual machine.”34  
Ben Barka joined the Istiqlal Party since its inception in 1944 and became one of 
the youngest members of its Executive Committee. When Morocco recovered its 
independence in 1956, he was elected President of the first National Assembly. At 
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one moment he was considered one of the three or four powerful men in the 
country.35 He travelled a lot and became friends with many international 
personalities, including presidents of some countries. Among his international tasks 
was the organization of the first Three Continents Conference to be held in Havana 
in January 1966. His dynamism and widening influence must have been a source 
of disturbance to the Moroccan Monarchy. Before he ascended the throne, Hassan 
II once told an American journalist the following: “Mehdi is too ambitious. He wants 
to do too many things and won‟t accomplish anything important. I‟m ambitious too, 
but I‟ll settle for four or five grands coups in a lifetime […]”36 
It is not clear whether Crown Prince meant at the time that two persons apparently 
cherishing, or so it seems, “the same ambition” could not live under the same roof 
even if it were as large as the world itself and whether one of his “four or five 
grands coups” included getting rid of a serious rival. Whatever the case might be, 
Ben Barka was not going to live for long after Hassan II took office in 1961. He was 
kidnapped in broad daylight in Paris in 1965 and was never seen again. In the view 
of many observers the involvement of the French secret services and Moroccan 
high security officials in the heinous murder of a figure of international renown 
seems unquestionable, but strangely enough after nearly fifty years, l‟affaire Ben 
Barka, as is commonly referred to, is still an unresolved mystery. 
Could the early disappearance of the socialist leader account for the failure of the 
revolutionary option and for the quick demise of UNFP, the party which was 
expected to be the instrument of implementation? As a matter of fact, various 
explanations, though they may overlap or complement or even contradict each 
other, have been put forward. For reasons of space only a few examples will be 
mentioned here. 
According to one explanation the failure of the revolutionary option in Morocco is 
due to the regime‟s ruthless repression.37 Indeed, since the foundation of the 
UNFP in 1959, and more particularly after the dismissal of the government headed 
by the leftist leader Abdellah Ibrahim in May 1960, the UNFP Party became a 
target of the Moroccan authorities. A number of its members were arrested and 
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imprisoned for questionable reasons, and some of its influential leaders, including 
Ben Barka, feeling to be seriously threatened, had to go into exile. To justify the 
campaign against the UNFP Party, the authorities claimed to have uncovered plots 
to overthrow the regime and replace it by a republic.38 How many of these plots 
were real or merely fictitious may be hard to say, but one thing for sure is that the 
Moroccan regime used scores of pretexts to silence or crush its opponents, which 
was achieved without grave consequences save the case of Ben Barka which, 
because of the errors incurred by the plotters, received maximum media coverage 
and caused a scandal particularly in France, where the abdication and 
assassination were carried out.39 Otherwise, the Moroccan regime capitulated well 
on the prevailing circumstances of the cold war era and thwarted all the attempts to 
reform an authoritarian system on the grounds that they were meant to turn 
Morocco into a socialist republic. 
One possible criticism of this explanation, however, is that there are other 
revolutionary movements in other places which have succeeded despite their 
having been subjected to similar or even more difficult circumstances. Indeed, in 
any struggle, especially if it involves power, you cannot expect your enemy to cross 
their hands and wait until they are done for. They will resort to whatever they have 
at their disposal to maintain the status quo. Thus, though repression is a factor that 
should not be overlooked, it alone may not account for the failure of the 
revolutionary option and explain the whole story satisfactorily. 
Another explanation claims that the failure of the revolutionary option lies in the 
leadership of the UNFP party itself which was torn between two trends in terms of 
organization. One group favoured horizontal organizational structure which allows 
for few or no layers of intervention between the masses and the leadership and 
ensures that the militants are directly involved in the decision-making process. The 
other group preferred the hierarchical model whereby the chain of command is 
important and the decision-making rests with the top leaders. This was thought to 
be the best format to keep the members away from petty differences that would 
erupt now and again within the leadership and thereby maintain the cohesion of the 
party.40 If such a conflicting view did exist within the leadership of the UNFP about 
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an organizational issue like this one, and if it was so acute as is claimed, then the 
party which was expected to lead the people along the revolutionary path was 
suffering from a serious flaw which might have contributed to its eventual demise. 
A third explanation blames the de-politicization of the trade unions for the failure of 
the revolutionary option in Morocco. It is claimed that the strength of the UNFP 
depended largely on the powerful trade union of UMT [Union Marocaine du Travail/ 
Moroccan Labour Union] with which it had allied in the 1959 Istiqlal split. The 
political maneuvering of the palace, however, succeeded in separating between 
the two organizations, but the declared reason at the time was that trade unions 
should focus on the well-being of the working classes and not engage in politics or 
align with any political parties.41 Ben Barka himself alludes to this issue in his 
report to the second congress of UNFP and warns against the dire consequences 
of not including political revolutionary demands in the struggle of trade unions, 
stressing that the battle of the Moroccan people to relieve their country of what he 
describes as “an absolute and archaic regime with an inert and corrupt 
administration,”42 must not be fragmented. But the breach between UMT and 
UNFP seemed irreparable, and the latter, having lost a powerful ally, suffered a 
fatal blow which, according to this perspective, left the revolutionary project bereft 
of any chance of success. 
A fourth explanation attributes the failure to the nature of the revolutionary option 
itself. It is argued that the inability of the UNFP Party to mobilize the masses 
around its project is basically due to its discourse, which only appealed to a limited 
number of people with a certain ideological preference. It did not take into 
consideration the nature of the society within which it was operating. The political 
jargon of its leaders which drew on the leftist ideologies and the use of terms such 
as imperialism, feudalism, neocolonialism, comprador and the like to communicate 
with a population the majority of which was still illiterate because of the colonial 
policies for nearly half a century all did not help much the UNFP Party to increase 
its base. Furthermore, their attitude towards religion which was considered “an 
impediment to progress”43 and rumours that they were Communists, that they 
scorned Islamic symbols and that they did not fast during the month of Ramadan 
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are claimed to have deprived them of a crucial source of support. Many people, so 
goes the argument, were not encouraged to actually engage though they might 
appreciate some of their social and political stances.44  
Whatever the reasons behind the failure of the revolutionary option, one cannot 
deny that it was a serious attempt to cope with a thorny issue which, to this day, is 
still unresolved in Morocco. The question that persists, however, is: how to seek 
social and political reform if it cannot be achieved along revolutionary lines? In 
other words, what is the alternative? Proponents of what is called the “democratic 
struggle strategy” claim they have the answer. To what extent can such a claim be 
substantiated by the reality on the ground? This is the question to which we shall 
return in the following section, taking as an example the case of the USFP party. 
6.2 Democratic struggle strategy 
As the revolutionary strategy did not seem to work, the “democratic struggle” 
emerged as an option with more confidence as a viable alternative. Though variant 
forms may be identified with this strategy, they have all a common feature: the 
belief, if not the necessity, to work from within the system to achieve social and 
political change. It may take time, it is admitted, but the prospects of success are 
claimed to be high. In this section we will focus on the case of the Union Socialiste 
des Forces Populaires (USFP) [Socialist Union of Popular Forces], one of the 
major political parties in Morocco which enjoyed a wide popularity and was in 
opposition for many years before it participated in the government of alternance in 
1998. We will see how it came to espouse what it calls the “democratic strategy” 
and what justifications it provided for taking a new path of struggle against an 
authoritarian system of rule and, more importantly, the outcome of what was 
vehemently defended as a carefully well-thought alternative.  
6.2.1 A new party with a new trajectory 
Though the new trajectory began to take shape in 1972, it did not become quite 
clear until January 1975 when the USFP held an extraordinary convention to 
finalize the new strategy it would adopt to pressure the regime to ease its grip on 
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power. The founding members of the new party were fully aware of the importance 
of the event because most, if not all of them, were former members of a party 
which favoured the revolutionary option. Consequently, to provide a convincing 
explanation for this shift in strategy and for the creation of a new party, albeit 
indirectly, was deemed necessary. A carefully prepared report for this event argues 
that the new strategy rests on a solid ideological base and an in-depth analysis of 
the whole situation in Morocco.   
With regard to the ideological aspect, the report confirms the adherence of the 
USFP to socialism, regarding it as the unavoidable necessary solution of the 
internal contradictions lying at the heart of the capitalist system. It goes on to stress 
that “socialism has indeed become the only way out of the abject and inhumane 
situation the peoples of the three continents have been placed in by global 
colonialism and imperialism.”45 The oppressed peoples of the world have become 
increasingly aware of this reality and for this reason, “socialism has come to mean 
for them at one and the same time the achievement of national independence, 
unity and the abolition of exploitation in all its forms.”46 
Since socialism may mean different things to different people and to dispel any 
possible confusion, the report states that the scientific version which the USFP 
advocates is characterized by two basic features. First, it refuses “to make living 
reality subject to preconceived, static intellectual patterns;”47 and second, it entails 
the adoption of a comprehensive strategy in order to build a socialist society in line 
with the Moroccan specificity.48 
Then the report proceeds to identify what it considers the root causes of the 
prevailing miserable situation in Morocco, bringing underdevelopment to the 
forefront. It argues that Morocco was able to maintain its independence for more 
than eleven centuries despite having been targeted by foreign powers from all 
sides. However, to achieve this, it had to live in almost complete isolation, which 
deprived it from keeping abreast of the technological progress and of the reformist 
cultural and political trends that emerged in the Arab Mashreq in the 19th century. 
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Accordingly, the social, economic and cultural structures sank into a long period of 
stagnation, which paved the way for colonial rule.49  
Besides underdevelopment, colonialism is regarded another major factor behind 
many of the problems still facing Morocco. The report points to the constant foreign 
pressure to which Morocco was subjected during the 19th century, which compelled 
it to make concessions of its sovereignty to the extent that when the Protectorate 
agreement was signed with the French in 1912, it only confirmed the dominant 
foreign presence which had been in place since the Algeciras Conference of 
1906.50 Once the colonial authorities took effective control of the country, they 
adopted a policy that made the Moroccan economy serve the needs of the French 
Empire. This is why, it is argued, the colonial powers were keen, from the 
beginning, to determine and control Moroccan products and direct them all to 
exports to satisfy their interests. Even some basic infrastructural facilities such as 
roads and railways were designed to facilitate transport of agricultural products and 
raw materials intended for export.51 Thus it soon became clear that the colonial 
authorities did not come, as claimed, to help Morocco to overcome its problems, 
but to create new ones and not to eradicate backwardness but to reinforce its 
conditions. When the Moroccan people rebelled against such injustices and the 
colonialists felt the danger of the rising revolutionary trend, they handed over the 
reins of power in 1956 to their allies and agents in the country. 
The third gruesome factor is represented by dependency which was further 
reinforced after Morocco regained its formal independence. “The local reactionary 
forces managed to control the course of events in a way that served their vested 
interest.”52 On the grounds of realism, the policies pursued at the economic level 
ignored the needs and the rights of the masses to employment, education, 
healthcare and dignity and instead benefited an oligarchy which tied its fate 
completely to that of foreign capital and acted as mediator to help it to lay its grip 
on the country‟s natural resources, causing more poverty, corruption, injustice and 
repression.53 
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At the political level the inherited administrative structures from the Protectorate 
which had served the colonial economy remained by and large the same and 
continued to deliver the same function. Thus what was called the Moroccanization 
of the administration was devoid of any significance. Instead of establishing an 
administrative apparatus according to objective criteria such as competence, ability 
and expertise, it was maintained as it had been during the colonial era. Only some 
figures were replaced by others, but clientelism, corruption and abusive use of 
public power intensified even more after independence.54 The end result is that 
Morocco seems to have been caught in a vicious circle: underdevelopment led to 
colonialism, and colonialism created dependency which in turn has aggravated 
underdevelopment. The question is how to break this vicious circle and cope 
effectively with this gruesome three-dimensional scourge? 
The report proposes a plan comprising three basic components: liberation, 
democracy and socialism. To achieve true liberation the report stresses that there 
are a number of tasks that must be implemented. Agrarian reform should be in the 
forefront because no social justice can be imagined without reforming such a vital 
sector in the country. The importance of reform in this sphere is emphasized not 
because it would enable the producers to benefit from their production activities 
and thereby secure a decent life but also because it would open up wide trading 
opportunities for the products of other economic sectors namely the industrial 
sector and allow for fruitful interaction between agriculture and industry.55 
A second task is to build an industrial base for development, and “this requires 
establishing integrated industrial projects which ensure the unity of the economic 
system and in the meantime severs all the chains that tie the various branches of 
production in the country to the imperialist-capitalist decision-making centres.”56 In 
this way, it is argued, an important step would be taken on the way to liberation 
and socialism.  
A third task is that foreign economic relations and trade should come under control 
through the implementation of measures that seek not only to nationalize partly or 
wholly the country‟s export but also to liberate gradually the channels of trade 
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activities and coordinate between the various production branches of the national 
economy.57 A fourth important task that the report stresses is that collective needs 
should take precedence over individual interests. This is not only one of the major 
requirements of true liberation and social justice but also a condition upon which 
economic efficiency depends, for it allows for sustaining and enhancing the existing 
workforce.58 
The other important element in the plan to overcome the different crises facing 
Morocco is democracy. In the view of the USFP, it is impossible to conceive of 
democracy taking root in the country unless the monarchy is reformed and 
replaced by a constitutional monarchy that allows for the emergence of democratic 
institutions.59 This is the true beginning for the state to become what the USFP 
calls “the national democratic state”. It should be noted here that “the national 
democratic state”, as understood by the USFP, has nothing to do with the concept 
adopted by the Russian revolution in 1917 for the simple reason that the prevailing 
circumstances in Morocco differ thoroughly from those that were dominant in 
Russia at the time; nor is it similar to the existing model in European capitalist 
countries where the bourgeois national state tries to conceal its nature through the 
democratic game. The national democratic state which the USFP claims to cling to 
is a state for all of its citizens and could only be achieved through a continuous 
process of liberation with a socialist horizon.60 The implication here is that though 
much emphasis is placed on democracy, it does not mean that the USFP has 
given up its socialist ideology. On the contrary it is still faithful to it as always, but it 
believes that socialism could be realized under democracy and with democracy, 
especially if free and transparent elections are held regularly.61 This, according to 
some observers, attests to a crucial shift in the position of the USFP.62  
The third element in the plan adopted by the USFP to reform government and 
society is socialism. The report contends that socialism is not a mere slogan, but 
rather a system that entails, among other things, “the collective ownership of the 
means of production and the major exchanges which should be under the direct 
control of the producers to determine the choices, the criteria and priorities in the 
spheres of development and management, taking into account, before anything 
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else, the interests and the needs of the masses.”63 Another component of socialism 
is socialist planning which, in the view of the USFP, entails the establishment of 
regional development areas in order to deal with the concentration of economic 
activities in the places and fields chosen by the regime at the expense of other 
regions in the country. By spreading economic activities evenly, it is argued, the 
national economy would play a crucial role in achieving social coherence, a high 
degree of integration among the different regions of the country and a just 
distribution of income.64 
However, the USFP warns against the pitfall of bureaucratization. It maintains that 
socialist planning should not be carried out by “a coercive organ which imposes its 
decisions on everybody including the proletariat itself in the name of the proletariat 
dictatorship.”65 In such a case, it would become an autonomous apparatus with its 
own demands and interests instead of representing and being at the service of the 
whole society.66  
6.2.2 Coping with embarrassing issues 
In the early days after its founding, the USFP had to address three major issues to 
dispel any possible misunderstandings that could brew under the cover of one 
reason or another and overthrow all the efforts made to devise a new effective 
strategy in the struggle for political change. The first concerns the decision of the 
USFP to join and get actively involved in the so-called “national consensus” to face 
the new challenges arising from the Western Sahara conflict. Some militants, as 
well as some observers, maintain that after two failed coups d‟etat and growing 
public protests against the regime, Hassan II brought to the fore the issue of 
Western Sahara to divert the people‟s attention and unite them around a common 
cause. Therefore, though the idea of “national consensus” into which the USFP 
was dragged seemed to serve a national cause, in reality it benefited more a 
regime that was in deep crisis than the opposition. It was also claimed that by 
endorsing “the national consensus” created by the monarch, the USFP sacrificed 
the class struggle for the national question, which contravenes the ideology of the 
party. Furthermore, by its support of “the national consensus”, the USFP, whether 
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it liked it or not, conferred “national legitimacy” on a system of rule it claimed to 
oppose. 
On the eve of its third convention in December 1978, the USFP tried to clarify all 
these points. It argued that joining the other Moroccan political parties to defend a 
national common cause did not in any way affect its attitude towards an absolute 
system of rule. It claimed it was the first party which called for the return of the 
occupied Western Sahara in 1972 and it even proposed some ideas on how to 
secure its liberation. The reference here is to a statement released on 8th October 
1972 by the UNFP Central Committee, urging the Moroccan authorities to take the 
necessary steps to complete the liberation of the remaining occupied Moroccan 
lands, that is, before the so-called UNFP group in Rabat led by Abderrahim 
Bouabid split from UNFP and founded a new party, USFP, in 1974.67 
The USFP also denied the allegation that by joining “the national consensus”, it 
had virtually sacrificed the basic aspect of its ideology. The USFP, faithful to its 
ideological line, claimed to be the party of the oppressed people including workers, 
small farmers and traders and revolutionary intellectuals whereas the historical 
adversary of these oppressed people is the conservative class which is comprised 
of feudalists and exploiting bourgeois; and when the USFP refers to its adversary, 
it means exactly this exploiting class and therefore cannot condone its practices or 
its hegemony on the country‟s national resources at the expense of the deprived 
people.68 
Furthermore, assuming that the battle to reclaim the country‟s long occupied south 
provinces entails that a national issue should take priority over class struggle, is 
there anything wrong with that? The answer of the USFP is a resounding NO. For 
this reason the USFP claimed that it had taken the right stand and managed to 
avoid the fatal error that some leftist groups had incurred when they focused on the 
class struggle at the expense of the national question and as a result found 
themselves isolated from the masses and more vulnerable. That said, the USFP 
pointed out that it did not agree that the national and class struggle should be 
perceived through the prism of priorities. It believed that the two types of struggle 
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were necessarily linked and could not be separated, particularly in the third world 
and as long as the exploiting class in these countries was represented by 
imperialist and colonial forces whereas the local exploiting class acted merely as 
their agent.69 
Concerning the claim that by joining “the national consensus”, the USFP conferred 
“national legitimacy” on a regime it sought to change, the leaders of the party 
dismissed it as baseless. The proponents of such a view, claimed the leaders of 
the USFP, seemed to forget that all classes, whether they are feudalists, bourgeois 
or proletariat in an independent country all enjoy “national legitimacy” for the simple 
reason that they all belong to the same nation. Thus, it would be irrelevant to raise 
the issue of “national legitimacy” unless it involved a foreigner whereas the existing 
political power in Morocco since 1956 has been managed by Moroccans and not 
by foreigners. However, though the Moroccan regime could not be denied “national 
legitimacy”, it was certainly neither “popular” nor “democratic”. The core idea that 
the USFP seems at pains to defend here is that there is no contradiction between 
engaging in the struggle to reclaim the Western Sahara from within “the national 
consensus” and the struggle for democracy and change from within and without 
“the national consensus”.70 
The second issue that the USFP had to address related to its attitude towards the 
elections which had always been massively rigged and there was no indication that 
they would truly reflect the will of the people under the prevailing circumstances as 
the elections of 1976 and 1977 clearly showed . The political report delivered by 
Abderrahim Bouabid at the third convention of the USFP explains how and why the 
party took part. It states that the decision was taken, after responsible, fruitful 
debate, by the higher governing bodies of the party for two basic reasons. The first 
is that the higher authorities in the country pledged to respect freedom of voting in 
order to usher in a new era of democracy in Morocco and to enhance national unity 
to be up to the challenges surrounding the country‟s territorial integrity. The second 
reason is that the party wanted to seize the opportunity of the elections to 
communicate directly with the masses about local and national problems, and this 
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in and of itself was claimed to be very important because it would help to deepen 
democratic and socialist awareness among the Moroccan people.71 
As is usually the case under authoritarian regimes, promises are easier made than 
fulfilled, and it is no wonder that the elections of 1976 and 1977 were far from 
being fair and transparent. Strangely enough, though the USFP denounced what it 
described as fraud-tainted elections, it decided to continue to work from within the 
institutions on the grounds that it wanted to uncover corruption and exploitation and 
also so as not to give “the enemies of Morocco‟s territorial unity” the opportunity to 
use the party‟s withdrawal from the parliament and municipal councils to carry out 
their smear campaign against the Moroccan people.72 Admittedly, it seems that 
there is some reason why some people were not totally convinced by this 
argument. 
The third issue that imposed itself persistently after the foundation of the USFP 
concerned its organizational situation. Wasn‟t the party well organized? Not quite, 
according to an internal document drafted by the Preparatory Committee for the 
third convention of 1978, noting that the USFP was until then more of an 
ideological and political force than a well-organized party.73 Meanwhile the leaders 
of the USFP were not unaware of this flaw and they knew from their former 
experience in the UNFP the dire consequences it could have. Therefore, as they 
got prepared for the third convention, they thought the moment had come to take 
the necessary measures to have a well-organized and firmly coherent party able to 
make decisions and have them implemented quickly and effectively. To achieve 
this, the party declared that it firmly clang to the “democratic centralism”, a concept 
defined by Lenin as “freedom of discussion, unity of action.”74 Nevertheless, further 
clarifications were deemed necessary and all the more so to make sense of a 
concept that is seemingly contradictory. 
By “democratic” it is meant that all the governing bodies of the party should be 
freely and transparently elected by the party members, but the decisions are taken 
after free debate by the governing bodies and not by the members. As for 
“centralism”, it means that once the decisions are made, as explained, all members 
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are expected to uphold and implement them as required without discussion. This 
does not mean that the party members are not allowed to voice their criticisms. On 
the contrary, criticism and self-criticism are legitimate, but they should not be made 
public. They should be raised at the meetings of the party organizations and the 
governing bodies at the local as well as at the national level. What is not 
acceptable, however, is to use criticism as a tool to harm the party coherence or 
impede its activities. Criticism, it is argued, is welcomed but it should be 
constructive with the aim of improving the performance of the party and 
strengthening its unity.75 
With regard to accountability, it should be practised top-down and bottom-up. The 
local governing bodies are accountable to the national party leadership, and the 
local and national leaders are accountable to the party members who are entitled 
to renew or withdraw their support of any leadership member when they stand for 
election at the local and national conventions.76 With such measures and 
safeguards, the USFP claimed it would be safe against both “absolute centralism” 
which would make the party subject to despotic leadership and “anarchic 
democracy” which would weaken the party and speed up its disintegration.77 The 
question is: were these measures enough to secure the intended results? 
6.2.3 A critical assessment of the “democratic struggle” strategy 
When we consider the early years of the USFP, especially after its extraordinary 
convention in 1975, the hopes it stood for at the time and the respect it 
commanded even from those who did not share its ideological line, we hardly 
believe the sad current situation into which it has degenerated. In fact, the 
precipitous collapse is so perplexing that it may constitute a phenomenon in its 
own right worthy of a separate study. A plethora of questions may come to mind 
when one ponders the fiasco of a party, believed for some time, and rightly so, to 
be the country‟s premier political party. The failure we are referring to here is not 
just of the strategy it devised to bring about the social and political reforms it had 
dreamt of, nor merely of the instrument/ the party which was expected to be 
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decisive in the accomplishment of those goals and dreams, but also of the image 
of “the committed socialist militant” in the country.  
What many Moroccans have found incomprehensible is how someone who had 
militated for years denouncing corruption, injustice, poverty, gross social inequities 
and as a result he may have endured all sorts of suffering ranging from 
harassment and torture at the police stations or in secret detention centres to long 
years of imprisonment or exile – how this very person, when given a chance to 
practice what they preach, failed the test resoundingly. Many people could not 
believe how a mature person who may have spent the bulk of his life defying, and 
for very good reasons, an absolute system of rule turns out to be plus royaliste que 
le roi [more royalist than the king] or worse, and as corrupt if not more than the 
ruling elite. If the reference here is only to one or a few cases, one may not be 
surprised, for something of the sort does happen everywhere, but the phenomenon 
is of such a magnitude that it should give cause for serious reflection. So what 
happened? 
To begin with a very simple common explanation, some believe that there is 
nothing surprising in the experience of the USFP. They contend that this is just “a 
band of opportunists” who battled not to reform the political system but rather to 
secure their share of the cake. Once they were given the opportunity, they 
behaved as expected. One critic goes even further to infer from the willingness of 
the USFP to continue to take part in government despite its humiliation in 2002 
when the king ignored the party that won the elections, i.e. the USFP, and chose 
Driss Jettou, a technocrat to lead the government that the Moroccan politics 
demonstrates that “the predatory mentality is dominant. […] The struggle is 
implacable for the immediate sharing of the spoils… For politicians, the culmination 
of a political career is to be minister.”78  
It seems, to me at least, that to regard a whole generation of militants and 
intellectuals who endured a lot of suffering in their fight against authoritarianism as 
“a mere band of opportunists” or just “seeking to secure their share of the spoils” 
and that each was longing to be a minister one day- this type of explanation, 
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though common, seems to be rash if not simplistic. It only describes the outcome 
but does not delve deeper into the phenomenon to analyze it carefully and try to 
find out a more convincing explanation. 
However, Najib Akesbi, a respected economist and former member of the USFP, 
has a different view. He thinks that the failure of the USFP was a consequence of 
deadly errors, which he summarizes as follows: 
Since 1989… the party abandoned its political strategy adopted in the 
extraordinary convention of 1975, had for the first time in its history said “yes” to a 
constitution that was barely indistinguishable from its previous ones, participated 
in many general elections and accepted their results which were as fraudulent as 
in the past, and allied itself with (royalist) parties to form a majority with strange 
bedfellows and a government without a soul.79 
Though this passage accurately depicts what happened, it does not explain why 
this series of blunders occurred, unless it considers the shift in strategy as the root 
cause of the rest; nor does it tell us why the whole party engaged into such a 
slippery trajectory until it virtually crumbled. We are not talking here about a small 
group or a few individuals, but about a major, if not the most important party in 
Morocco. Wasn‟t there anything or anybody that could have rescued the party and 
prevented its downfall? In the view of a former leading member of the USFP, 
Mohamed Sassi, it was too late, adding that when the party joined what was called 
the alternance government in 1998, it had already lost control of its members, most 
of whom had become more concerned about their own personal interests than 
anything else. Thus, the decline of the USFP seemed unavoidable.80 
According to another explanation, the failure of the strategy adopted by the USFP 
to yield the expected results is due to a serious vacuum in leadership after the 
death of the party‟s secretary general, Abderrahim Bouabid, in 1992. It is argued 
that A. Bouabid was an eminent figure with “strong political abilities as a leader”81 
and that “he brilliantly succeeded in maintaining unity and continuity, giving the 
USFP an identity and a sense of purpose that other parties lacked.”82 He also knew 
well how to cope with “a ruthless but canny authoritarian regime.”83 But when he 
died, nobody seemed to have the leadership qualities he enjoyed to lead the party 
along the path it took in 1975. Since his death, so runs the argument, the party 
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“never recovered from the passing away of its towering figure.”84 Problems 
accumulated and cleavages started to develop until the party became almost 
paralyzed. What can you expect from a party in such a state? 
Granted that the leader of the USFP was as described, does it make sense that a 
big, modern party like the USFP should be dependent on a single person to the 
extent that it thrives as long as the leader is alive, but if he disappears, it quickly 
follows suit and sinks into oblivion? If such were the case, we might just as well 
consider that the USFP was never in any significant modern way a political party 
and that its failure was a matter of course. 
In the view of other critics the failure of the “democratic struggle strategy”, as the 
USFP calls it, was expected from the outset. It was just a matter of time. The 
reason is that the USFP was never as coherent as it looked. Since its inception it 
faced many structural and political issues and despite the efforts it made, it never 
managed to address them satisfactorily. As a result the internal quarrels about 
almost everything never stopped and when they did appease under particular 
compelling circumstances, they soon broke out again, causing tension and disarray 
within the ranks of the party. It is these infightings, it is argued, that eroded the 
party, tainted its credibility, hampered its progress and thwarted its plans. When 
Abderrahman Yousfi assumed the leadership of the USFP, he himself spoke on 
numerous occasions of the ills that were plaguing his party.85 Such being the case, 
it is implied, one can hardly expect a party suffering from such debilitating 
obstacles to achieve anything worthy of merit. 
It is true that internal differences and contradictions are not very helpful for a 
political party, or any group for that matter, keen to undertake a serious project, let 
alone seeking to change a despotic system of rule. A certain degree of difference 
is no doubt understandable and even desirable for the organization‟s internal 
dynamics, but if it exceeds a certain limit, it will become a disaster. However, it is 
hard to say for sure whether the differences that existed within the USFP were of 
the type that could be tolerated or not and whether they were the most decisive 
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factor or just one among others that contributed to the failure of the strategy 
pursued by the USFP.  
Unlike the explanations which tend to focus on the political culture or the 
inefficiency of the tool of implementation -the party-, there is yet another 
explanation that blames the failure on the nature of the strategy itself adopted by 
the USFP. Anouar Boukhris, a Moroccan researcher, has remarkably summarized 
the idea: 
The socialists‟ entry into government on the king‟s terms [emphasis mine] in 1998 
and their agreement to rejoin the government in 2002 after being denied the prime 
ministry brought an end to a chapter in which the party, despite all its flaws and 
contradictions, had resisted outright cooptation. Yousfi, like Ibrahim before him 
and those who thought they could democratize the system from within [emphasis 
mine], was outmaneuvered by the monarch who successfully enticed them to 
enter his government and legitimize his dominance of society without giving 
anything substantial in return.86 
Two key points should be underlined in this passage: the first is the “entry into 
government on the king‟s terms”; and the second concerns “those who thought 
they could democratize the system from within”. Here, in my view, lies the clue for 
a better understanding of the root cause of the problem. Put it simply, the strategy 
of working from within is fundamentally flawed and as such is doomed to fail, 
irrespective of whoever adopts it and whatever their political persuasion. 
Proponents of this strategy assume that it would be possible to reduce the 
domination of the despotic ruler bit by bit until he gives way completely to the 
establishment of a true democracy. They do not seem to be aware of the risks 
lurking in such a line of thinking. They assume that the ruler knows nothing of their 
intentions or that he would gladly let them curtail his authority substantially or even 
remove him from power if they saw fit.  
This is the fatal error that the leaders of the USFP made. It seems that they 
underestimated the monarch‟s strategies and tactics.  The reality is that when he 
allowed their entry into the system, he had made his own calculations and was 
sure that the chances for the success of his plans were higher than those of his 
opponents. Given the resources at his disposal, he would try whatever he could to 
tarnish their reputation, encourage division among their ranks, try to co-opt key 
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members in the party and thereby abort their plans. If some members still showed 
some resistance, time and the eroding effect of the system would take charge of 
them. 
Imagine, for instance, a modest wage- earner who can hardly make ends meet 
suddenly finds that his income has increased by ten to twenty times after winning a 
seat in Parliament or being offered a high-ranking government post. His living 
conditions are bound to change dramatically and he is likely to find out that more of 
his interests can be secured with ease. Would this person still be determined to 
press for the required reforms whatever the consequences? Perhaps, but some, at 
least, are likely to become pawns to the new living circumstances and they may 
think twice before they engage in what may expose them to the risk of losing the 
newly acquired privileges. Those who do not experience a complete change of 
heart may still try to find every excuse to justify policies and decisions they are 
normally expected to oppose. This is not to say that these people are rascal by 
nature or that they are all out just for personal gain, but rather to underline the 
logical outcome of adopting an approach that involves, among other things, 
eroding the politics of resistance, taming defiant wills, and shaping submissive 
attitudes and perceptions, a process that is sometimes referred to as “the 
engineering of consent”87. 
To be sure most, if not all, autocrats find the strategy of luring their opponents into 
the system more effective than outright oppression. For this reason, some theorists 
have warned against the traps that lurk in the idea of accepting to work from within 
an absolute system to try to reform it. Gene Sharp, for example, who has written 
extensively on the subject, argues that although the call to work from within can 
sound appealing, the traps and dangers abound and are very serious. He explains: 
When the issues at stake are fundamental, affecting religious principles, issues of 
human freedom, or the whole future development of the society, negotiations do 
not provide a way of reaching a mutually satisfactorily solution. On some basic 
issues there should be no compromise.88 
This does not mean that he endorses violence as an effective option to cope with 
dictatorships, but he believes that negotiating with autocrats or using violence 
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against them, both strategies are detrimental and play in the hands of dictators 
more than they benefit the oppressed people. If we accept such a view and 
consider that entry into fake institutions and on the ruler‟s terms is no better or no 
more helpful than is engagement into violent action as a means to bring about 
political change, then it is no wonder that the search for a strategy that works 
should continue to be a subject of special interest.  
6.3 Conclusion 
Since the early years of independence, especially when it became clear that the 
monarchy was determined not to share power but to rule as it saw fit, the question, 
as we have seen, which has dominated the hearts and minds of many Moroccan 
people is: how to throw off the yoke of authoritarianism and establish a system of 
rule that recognizes the dignity, freedom, and sovereignty of the people? The more 
this awareness increases and continues to spread among the population as to the 
source of the mounting social and political grievances, the more that question 
acquires acuteness and urgency. “Why not us?” many young people wonder as 
they watch TV and follow the news or read about democratic countries, just within 
a stone‟s throw, where the people‟s voice makes a difference and where heads of 
states or of government come and go without any fuss.  
As discussed above, the revolutionary and the democratic struggle options have 
been tried to find the long-awaited answer and resolve what is sometimes referred 
to as “the Moroccan equation”. The leftist leader Ben Barka and his comrades 
opted for revolution on the grounds that it was the only solution to pave the way for 
radical change. Though this strategy did pose serious threat to the regime for some 
time, it failed to achieve the intended results. Various explanations have been 
advanced to explain its failure. Though it may be hard to pinpoint the decisive 
reason why it did not succeed, three factors, to my mind, are worthy of note: the 
first is its violent nature; the second has to do with external relations; and the third 
relates to underestimating the culture of the Moroccan people. That said, the 
attempt was crushed ruthlessly, and “the revolutionary option” became a thing of 
the past with many lessons to ponder. 
197 
The USFP, a major national political party in Morocco, tried another option which it 
called “the democratic struggle strategy”. It sought to reform the system from 
within, claiming to have learnt from the bitter experience of the revolutionary 
choice. However, it suffered the same fate, if not worse. Its entry into the system 
and on the king‟s terms proved a disaster. Instead of changing the system, it was 
the party which was processed until it was completely sapped dry. The tragic 
consequence of this attempt is that given the success of the regime to co-opt most 
prominent members of the party, the image of “the committed socialist militant” 
suffered a deadly blow and so did the value of politics and political engagement in 
general. Disillusionment, distrust, political apathy and the like became widespread 
among the Moroccan people. Once again the regime emerged victorious and it 
shifted its attention to focus on a new fast-rising opposition force represented by al-
Adl wal-Ihsan. What strategy does the latter propose? Could it be a viable 
alternative? This is the issue to be explored in more detail in the next chapter. 
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Chapter 7 Al-Adl wal-Ihsan’s Third-Way Strategy  
Two quotations may be fitting to set the scene for examining the strategy of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan in this chapter. In the first, commenting on the idea of a form of power-
sharing between the Islamic movements and the tyrannical rulers advocated by 
some voices, Sheikh Yassine states: “It is indeed an unjust arrangement and an 
unfair division according to which the “obscurantists” would be accorded a dark 
bleak corner in the government to undertake some tasks while the dictators have 
the upper hand and the final word. […] We will never agree to such a position.”1 In 
the second and in the same vein Yassine expresses resolve “to dash any hope of 
seeing ourselves one day committing the political mistake that is both a moral fault 
and a default on our commitment to non-violence, that is, of laying ourselves open 
to civil war…”2  
These two statements tell us in a nutshell about the attitude of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
towards the “revolutionary option” as well as the choice which seeks change “from 
within the system”. Yassine and his group seem adamant in their rejection of both 
options. The former, in their view, involves violence and bloodshed and the latter 
boils down to meaningless politics and, at best, delay of better days indefinitely. 
However, if “neither participation nor revolution”3 seems to work, then what is the 
alternative? Bearing in mind that the least they ask for is that those responsible for 
the misery of the Moroccan people should go, how do they plan to achieve such a 
daunting objective? Is what they propose practical and plausible or is it merely an 
exercise in wishful thinking? Can the strategy they advocate as an alternative to 
the previous ones allow for the accomplishment of two objectives which appear 
hard to reconcile: radical change through peaceful means? 
These are indeed some of the frequently asked questions that this chapter tries to 
examine closely. It will try to find out about the nature of the suggested strategy 
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and how it differs from the ones the movement rejects and what it proposes at the 
practical level in order to secure the conditions for an orderly change with less 
tension and disruption. This chapter will also shed light on the factors that inspire 
confidence in the proponents of and sympathizers with this strategy and how it is 
perceived by some critics. However, before delving into these issues, it is useful to 
start first with the analysis that underpins the movement‟s attitude and seems to 
account for its choice of what it considers a viable third way.  
7.1 Diagnosing the current situation 
Two serious events in the Muslim history are claimed to have devastating 
consequences. In fact, they are regarded as the root source of most, if not all, of 
the serious problems from which the Islamic Umma is still suffering to this day. The 
first, described by the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan as “the great deviation”, occurred 
in the seventh century –the first century of the Islamic Calendar– when the Islamic 
system of rule called khilafa ar-Rachida was toppled and replaced by a hereditary 
despotic monarchy in 663.4 This opened the way to all the disasters that have 
befallen the Muslim nation since then. With the end of the remarkable, consultative 
form of government, argues Yassine, which was established by the Prophet of 
Islam and maintained by his four Rightly-Guided Caliphs, shura [consultation], 
freedom, justice and ihsan were all gone too: “voices speaking against what was 
wrong and unacceptable were silenced; free speech was suppressed and ijtihad 
[independent reasoning] was brought to an end.”5 Scholars were not allowed to 
deal with political issues such as the right of the Umma to choose its leader and 
the necessity of the ruler‟s accountability to the people and the like, and those who 
did not comply and challenged the political authority were ruthlessly crushed. 
“[It] was a severe blow,” contends Yassine, “and its repercussions reverberated 
throughout our history like the convulsions of an earthquake.”6 He even expresses 
his dismay how some scholars turn a blind eye to this shattering event in the 
Muslim history and tend to underestimate it and focus instead on the positive 
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accomplishments of that period which, despite their importance, cannot offset the 
disaster incurred by the establishment of despotic hereditary monarchy.7 The 
authoritarian form of government, monarchical or otherwise, which still dominates 
the Muslim lands in clear violation of the Islamic principles started to take effect 
and root since that moment when the Islamic rule was struck at its foundation and 
turned into coercive rule.8 
It follows then that for the Islamic Umma to restore its dignity, freedom and its 
confiscated right to choose its rulers and hold them accountable, there must be an 
end to authoritarianism whatever shape and whatever hue, religious or secular, it 
has taken. Sheikh Yassine believes that no reform is possible nor is any 
development unless the corrupt regimes dominating Muslim countries are removed 
or radically reformed. This is a crucial idea on which the movement of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan insists in its discourse. It is considered an important step on the way to a 
sound awareness without which the people might just as well indulge as long as 
they like in wishful thinking. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan holds that the people must face hard 
facts and be prepared to get involved to recover their freedom and cope with the 
present predicament. 
The second event which is equally serious, though it may be regarded from 
another perspective as a result of the first, is colonialism and its sequels. 
Capitalizing on a period of weakness and hard times which the Islamic Umma was 
undergoing as a consequence of centuries of despotism, the colonial powers 
occupied Muslim lands by force, controlled their political and economic affairs and 
subjected the people to all sorts of exploitation and humiliation. 
Yassine directs a scathing condemnation to the colonial powers for their hypocrisy, 
arrogance and the inhumane policies they unscrupulously implemented in the 
occupied countries. They never admitted, he remarks, that the aim of their 
transgression was to rob and pillage these countries and use them as markets for 
their products, recruit cheap labour for their industries and their businesses, 
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employ the indigenous people in large numbers in European wars such as World 
War I and II or to send them fight in places as far as Indochina where most were 
either killed or injured. The declared mission of the colonizers was to civilize these 
nations, help them to get out of the stage of barbarism, embrace modernity and get 
involved in civic life.9 
The consequences of the unjust and unjustified policies carried out by the colonial 
authorities are, in the view of Yassine, more deleterious and far-reaching than it is 
usually assumed. Unlike some writers who tend to focus their attention on the 
material losses, Yassine underlines the psychological effects. He maintains that 
one the most serious damages inflicted upon the Muslims during the colonial era 
was not confined to the fact that their wealth was plundered or that many of them 
were killed or maimed in wars not theirs, but rather lay in the process to which they 
were subjected till they accepted the colonial division as an unquestioned fact, 
allowing this sense of divisiveness to take root in their hearts and minds to the 
extent that the economic and administrative structures in their countries were 
tightly linked to the colonial capitalist system.10  
The other devastating damage, continues Yassine, resulting from the domination of 
the colonial powers was to succumb to the sway of the invaders‟ cultural 
hegemony.11 Admittedly, remarks Yassine, this submission did not come about 
immediately or spontaneously. It was rather the outcome of years of inculcation in 
the minds that the invaders were entitled to dominate because they were superior 
and so were their culture, language and customs. To facilitate the spread of such 
an idea among the indigenous people and make sure that it got absorbed and took 
root even if they had to leave later, they used the sector of education and set up 
some schools where they imposed their own curricula and their own values. 
Though these schools were limited in number and were not accessible to 
everybody, they were enough to produce a generation totally alienated from their 
own culture. This is what Yassine refers to as “the offshoots of imperialism”,12 an 
elite formed in French schools in Morocco or in France or elsewhere and brought 
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up to deride their Islamic heritage, their Arabic language and culture and to take 
pride in and identify with the values of the conqueror. It is this westernized elite, 
continues Yassine, that was going to take over from the colonialists when they 
departed and that was going to be even harsher towards its fellow citizens than the 
colonial powers themselves.13 
The psychological defeat suffered by young Muslims is in Yassine‟s view more 
serious than the military defeat. Indeed, Yassine is not alone to hold this view; a 
number of writers have spoken about the same idea. The reason, it is argued, is 
that if you are defeated militarily but not psychologically, you will still aspire to do 
better the next opportunity whereas in case of psychological defeat the individual‟s 
personality is shattered to the extent that they lose all hope and see themselves as 
unfit to accomplish anything worthy or meet any challenges.14 This phenomenon, 
according to Yassine as well as other thinkers, largely accounts for the spread of 
many negative social and psychological aspects such as indifference, political 
apathy, passivity, loss of self-esteem, frustration and the like in Muslim societies, 
though the latest signs of a potential rise after decades of slumber under 
repressive regimes appear to be promising. 
It follows from this discussion that the core problem in Morocco has, in the view of 
the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, two aspects: one is political and the other is cultural. 
The question is then how to get rid of political despotism and cultural defeatism. 
7.2 Towards a new strategy of liberation 
To identify the problem is certainly an important step, but it is not enough. The 
crucial question is how to solve it and the answer is not always obvious or easy to 
assume its consequences. This appears to explain why the issue of strategy has 
been assigned a great importance in the writings of the leader and theoretician of 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan. The strategy he proposes is claimed to be devised after years of 
in-depth study of variety of sources, Islamic and non-Islamic, and of numerous past 
and recent experiences. It has tried to avoid the flaws and pitfalls of the option that 
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favours violent rebellion and the one that sought to work from within the corrupt 
system. Only some of its basic features will be presented here. 
1. Non-violence: Yassine rejects the revolutionary option because it involves a 
typical aspect of jahiliyya. “We do not like violence,” he says, “and we do not 
consider it as an option. We seek refuge of God against any traits of violence that 
is a typical characteristic of jahiliyya.”15 The revolutionary solution is also refused 
because it is regarded as unrealistic. Because of its rashness and lack of maturity, 
it thinks it is enough for the change to occur to upset the balance of power and tilt 
to the preferred group of people and ideology, as if the whole operation is like 
turning the page to a new one. 
Many Islamic texts are quoted in the writings of Sheikh Yassine to prove that his 
movement‟s preference for peaceful struggle is motivated not just by practical 
reasons or some compelling or tactical considerations but rather by moral 
principles. From the Quran he cites: “Call towards the way of your Lord with 
wisdom;”16 “Offset that which is evil with that which is best;”17 “Peace is best;”18 etc. 
From the Prophet‟s sayings he mentions: “God is rafik [gentle] and he likes rifk 
[gentleness] and he rewards for gentleness what he does not reward for 
harshness;” “Whoever is deprived of rifk [gentleness] is deprived of all kheir 
[goodness];”19 and many others. It appears that the purpose of these texts is not 
only to explain the choice of the movement but also to serve as a response to two 
categories of people: those who hold extremist ideas, though small in number, 
thinking wrongly that Islam sanctions violence; and those who claim that the 
movement is “too much peaceful” and has negatively impacted the aspirations of 
young people for serious social and political change.  
Despite criticisms from opponents and provocation from the Moroccan authorities 
to drag the movement into violence, al-Adl wal-Ihsan seems to have taken its 
irreversible choice, that is, never to resort to violence as a means to achieve its 
goals, whatever the circumstances, and is determined to remain as its leader has 
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put it in French in his letter to King Mohamad VI: “Nous restons cette „force 
tranquille‟ de proposition.”20[Italics mine] 
2. Gradualism: It is an established fact, notes Yassine, that “it usually takes 
some time, persistent struggle and perseverance before people can respond to the 
caller to God, and before faith enter their hearts and be expected to come together 
and get organized.”21 This is why, he continues, sabr [patience] is described in the 
Quran as one of the most prominent characteristics of God‟s Prophets and 
Messengers and they are cited as an example for all to follow. Patience, positive 
patience, he means, is essential because it is very difficult for people to give up 
their old customs and habits especially when they are deeply entrenched and have 
come to dominate the lives of certain people.22 This psychological aspect should 
not be ignored in order not to be frustrated or take rash decisions. Time is decisive 
in the equation of reforming societies; hence the importance of gradual process.  
Al-Adl wal-Ihsan is said to be for incremental reform also because the legacy of 
centuries of tyranny is appalling and to cope with it and restructure society on a 
solid basis cannot be achieved at the stroke of a pen. “The gross error,” argues 
Yassine, “that some revolutionary groups make is that when they see that their 
numbers have grown, they start to think they can realize the impossible… Thus, 
they may embark upon an adventure the outcome of which may be catastrophic for 
them and their fellow citizens.”23  
3. Clarity: It is another principle that the Islamists, in Yassine‟s view, should 
strictly adhere to: clarity of objectives, clarity about what steps to take and what 
course of action to pursue, etc. He also believes that it is in line with this principle 
that the people must be faced with the hard reality, and the hard reality is that the 
corrupt political system “has devastated the moral fibre of the community, corroded 
its economy, squandered its wealth and dispersed the oppressed far and wide… It 
is the root cause behind the spread of unemployment, drugs, diseases, alcoholism, 
prostitution and a host of other ills and hardships.”24 The idea here is not only to 
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stress that the situation is catastrophic and define those responsible but also to 
emphasize that these problems would not be resolved if the people continued to 
just complain and adopt the wait-and-see attitude. They must know that the road to 
reform is long, requires sacrifices and the engagement of everybody. The efforts of 
a small group are not enough and cannot by themselves work miracles and sort 
out all grievances.25 
4. Cooperation and dialogue: Al-Adl wal-Ihsan does not claim it can shoulder 
the burden of building a viable political system on its own, nor has it the capacity to 
do so even if it wanted. In fact the leader of the movement considers it a serious 
blunder that an organization, whatever its size, should seek to resolve by itself the 
complex socio-economic and political problems of Morocco or that it should burn all 
bridges of communication and remain isolated in an ivory tower, living in a dream 
world of its own.26 Therefore, his movement is said to be committed and ready to 
cooperate with others whatever their political convictions and whenever and 
wherever this is possible provided this cooperation does not infringe or run counter 
its strategic peaceful course of action. It has announced on various occasions that 
it is open to dialogue in order to work out a formula that allows the vital forces of 
the country to come together in order to create the conditions in which a peaceful 
transition and comprehensive reform can succeed. However, this does not mean 
that the movement intends at any moment to negotiate any deal with what it 
considers a rotten regime determined to maintain the status quo. The strategy of 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan, as its leader has put it, differs from the strategy of some hesitant 
elements of the Islamic movement who are seeking conciliation with the fraudsters 
and deceivers.27 
5. Flexibility: Apart from established principles, Yassine believes that “rigidity 
and fixity are synonyms of death.”28 A dynamic organization, in his view, should be 
flexible in order to coexist with the various political sensibilities in the country.29 
Flexibility is also important in case of unexpected occurrences or dire necessities30. 
It is especially important when it comes to the methods and mechanisms to be 
206 
 
used in the struggle against political illegitimacy. A distinction must be made, it is 
argued, between the goals and the means. If the goals are fixed, the means should 
be subject to constant reassessment, improvement or even change. It should be 
noted, however, that contrary to certain ideologies which consider that the ends 
justify the means, the Islamic principles do not permit such an idea and demand 
that the means as well as the ends must be legitimate.  
That said, the Islamists, in the view of Yassine, should diversify their means and 
methods and be alert to what he terms “the historical moments”. No one can 
predict, he argues, when, how and what factor or incident may be the straw that 
breaks the dictator‟s back. Consequently, the Islamists should not underestimate 
anything or waste any opportunity to achieve further gains; and whatever is gained 
should be preserved.31 The question that arises here is how to keep this balance 
between resistance and flexibility. Yassine does not give an answer, probably 
because it is a question of perception and judgement which may differ significantly 
according to circumstances. Whatever the case may be, the Islamists should be 
true and sincere to themselves and others. This is their valuable capital, and if 
some people rely on crowd manipulation, fraud and wild promises they never 
intend to fulfill, “our strategies,” says Yassine, “to win over supporters and set up 
an effective force should be different from theirs.”32 It should be based on clarity, 
transparency, truth and responsibility.33  
6. Priority of social empowerment: In his book, Justice: The Islamists and 
Power, Yassine writes: 
The Islamic solution is a great challenge to the people of dawah and could pose a 
great danger if they were all to leave their dawah work and be transformed as 
managers, ministers, advisers, leaving the mosques and the company of the 
people and relinquishing their primary duty of training and educating the rising 
generations.34 
These sentences tell a lot about the strategic vision of al-Adl wal-Ihsan concerning 
the way to bring about the envisioned change. They explain why it is considered of 
prime importance to get well established at the grass-roots level and not to 
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compete for seats in parliament or for ministerial portfolios in the government. This 
is not to downplay the significance of these institutions or to undermine their role. 
Far from it; al-Adl wal-Ihsan does recognize the importance of such institutions 
and, as is clear from numerous pronouncements of its leaders, if free and 
transparent elections were to be held, it would not hesitate to seek to be 
represented but only to a degree that should not deviate it from its strategic 
trajectory, which is to stay close to the people. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan claims to have a 
“comprehensive societal project” and it is at the level of society that “le travail de 
fond” [substantial work] should be undertaken. “It is there where the decisive 
struggles should be fought,” as one senior member of the movement has put it.35 
Some critics claim that al-Adl wal-Ihsan focuses on charitable services and exploits 
the poverty of the people in order to increase its following. Providing educational 
and medical assistance to some poor families, housing assistance to some 
students coming out of town, helping some poor people to meet the expenses of 
Islamic Eids, or of marriage, birth or death ceremonies and the like services are not 
meant, according to these critics, to merely assist the needy without expecting 
anything in return, but rather to recruit new members and enhance the movement‟s 
popularity. The leaders of Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, however, deny such an allegation, 
arguing that it is not by encouraging alms-giving or, as one has put it, by promoting 
beggary that the battle of freedom, justice, dignity and development could be 
won.36 Though the idea of providing help for the downtrodden is certainly 
appreciated and not to be excluded, to reduce the project of al-Adl wal-Ihsan to 
charity activities is regarded as unfair. Its outlook is said to be much broader and 
more profound than that, as Yassine explains in the following words: 
Our goal is to free the people from the bond of slavery, from submission to others 
without questioning, to awaken them to get rid of their passivity, of their “follow the 
herd” mentality resulting from a long tradition of submission and indifference so 
that they can understand, choose, get involved and take action and not to be at 
the mercy of others or live as hostages.37  
To achieve such a goal, Yassine and his group believe that more time, energy and 
work need to be devoted to social empowerment which in turn can only be realized 
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if the Islamists stay close to the people and frequent their markets, work places, 
schools, universities, clubs and wherever they are in the rural as well as in the 
urban areas.38 Only in this way, they think, can the people recover their confidence 
in their capabilities to imagine, aspire to and work for a better future.  
7.3 Supporting factors 
It appears that the goal set by al-Adl wal-Ihsan is no easy one, calling for nothing 
less than the removal of an absolutist system of rule which has been in place for 
centuries. Meanwhile, its claim and insistence that it could be achieved through 
peaceful means seems to be perplexing and intriguing. How can we expect, one 
may wonder, such a goal to be realized by the pursuit of such an approach? Could 
it work? 
According to the leaders of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, there are a number of factors that 
inspire their confidence in the viability of their strategy. One of these is the 
behaviour of the regime itself. The policies it is pursuing cannot even alleviate, let 
alone resolve in any significant way, the various socio-economic and political ills 
that are plaguing the Moroccan society. This confirms, so runs the argument, the 
growing inability of the present regime to rule the country. Problems are 
accumulating such as unemployment, corruption, moral degeneration and crime, 
and popular discontent is intensifying as protests and sit-ins are staged almost 
every day; worst of all, there is no clear strategy that gives a flicker of hope that 
these crises are going to ease or be resolved any time soon. The regime has 
proved unable to find a solution even to an issue like road accidents which are 
claiming thousands of victims every year. Given the way the country is managed or 
mismanaged, it appears that the Moroccan regime is creating more problems than 
it solves. 
Furthermore, the failure so far of the various attempts to push the monarchy to 
ease its grip on power, and the determination of the latter to continue to dominate 
the political as well as the economic fields, and its interference in almost 
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everything, even in the appointment of heads of certain political parties, 
associations, committees and the like practices all attest to an insatiable desire to 
rule alone, preventing all the political forces from bringing their input into the affairs 
of their country. This has generated a political atmosphere that is fraught with 
worry and increasing risk to the country, unless some drastic changes are 
introduced. According to the analysis of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, there is no indication that 
the regime in Morocco is disposed to consider taking serious steps towards what 
should be done to improve the conditions of the Moroccan people. 
A second factor which has come into play recently is the development, availability 
and the wide use of the social media. Gone is the time when the regime‟s human 
rights violations and injustices could have passed unreported. Now the situation 
has changed completely and any transgression may be reported on the spot via 
Skype, YouTube, Facebook, Twitter, or other means that are being made available 
by the new information and communication technology. Even the poor conditions of 
the people and the humiliation they may be facing in slums and shanty-towns have 
nowadays more chances to be known widely. A recent video, to cite one example, 
showing a Moroccan family living in a public toilet compared to a prince‟s 
extravagant palace, has been circulating widely on the Internet and is likely to have 
a profound effect on many viewers. 
This shows that the chances for people to expose their plight are more available 
than it used to be, with the potential of intensifying popular discontent. If the regime 
controls the national media outlets, it cannot extend its censorship to the social 
media networking without incurring the wrath of world human rights organizations 
and tarnishing its already-not-too-bright image even further. Thus, it has tried to 
respond in a way which cannot be claimed to be very ingenious or creative: it has 
invested a lot in setting up its own “social networking sites”. The question is: can it 
succeed to counter or neutralize the millions of Internet users? It seems doubtful if 
not impossible. 
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A third factor –close to the one just mentioned– relates to the spread, even among 
the poor population, of TV dishes and hence the ability to follow world TV 
channels. Until recently the Moroccan people, like other peoples in the third world, 
could only see the state‟s controlled TV which offers programmes devoid of any 
value, to say the least: tedious reports on the monarch‟s speeches, visits, 
ceremonial events, and other boring activities. This was more or less the daily dish 
being served to the viewers. There were no other alternatives. Over the last two 
decades or so the situation has changed and the Moroccan people, like other Arab 
audiences, are now exposed to a wide range of international TV channels and 
have a variety of TV programmes to choose from freely. 
More importantly, many topics such as the fabulous riches of the ruling elite, their 
extravagance, corruption and the like, considered taboo in the past, are now 
discussed live on air in some TV shows with the chance for the viewers of joining in 
the live discussion. The daring debates which a TV channel like al-Jazeera, for 
example, has pioneered in the Arab world have enhanced the opportunities not 
only to inform the public but also to sharpen its awareness for the need of political 
accountability, freedom, democracy, justice and equality. 
A fourth factor relates to the rise of the Islamic awareness. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, 
though it enjoys a wide popularity, represents but one part of the current Islamic 
trend. The frequency and the size of mosque attendance are increasing steadily to 
such an extent that it has become commonplace that on Fridays thousands of 
people have to pray outside, in the open areas and streets around the mosques 
because of the lack of space inside. Though each neighbourhood may have a 
mosque, the number of attendees is usually more than it can accommodate. This 
seems to run counter to some strands of modern theory which claimed that religion 
was about to disappear or at best to play “an increasingly limited societal role in the 
future.”39 What seems to be surprising is that this powerful return of Islam to 
society is dominated by young males and females, whereas a few decades ago it 
was confined to middle and old-aged people. Moreover, these young people come 
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to religion not because they are born in Muslim families which are generally 
conservative and respectful of Islam, but rather out of personal conviction and of 
their own volition. Most of them are educated and are fully aware of the nature of 
their choice. 
These developments, in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, point to the direction into 
which Muslim societies are evolving. It is now almost certain that whenever and 
wherever free and transparent elections are organized in the Muslim world, Islamic 
parties are bound to emerge victorious. This seems to indicate that a significant 
social and political trend is in the making, though “the process is still in its 
infancy,”40  and is likely to have its impact in the Islamic and Arab world in the 
future. This is in line, it is believed, with a number of prophecies made by the 
Prophet of Islam concerning the future of the Islamic Umma. They all point to the 
restoration of justice, dignity and freedom after centuries under repressive regimes. 
Such prophetic texts strengthen further Muslims‟ trust and confidence in the future 
and boost their determination to demand for their confiscated rights.41 
A fifth factor concerns the attitude of foreign powers towards the present rulers in 
the Arab world. It is no exaggeration that without foreign support, most, if not all, of 
these rulers may collapse at any moment. However, there is no guarantee that 
they will continue to be aided forever. At the moment that a ruler becomes, for one 
reason or another, irrelevant or the thrust of events seems to take a direction that 
any further support would endanger the interests of those behind him, he could be 
let down “like a dead rat,”42 to use the words of one of the Shah‟s generals.  Ben 
Ali of Tunisia, Mubarak of Egypt and Qaddafi of Libya may be just the forerunners 
of similar events that are likely to follow suit sooner or later. 
In Morocco, though the monarchy still enjoys the support of countries like France 
and USA, the increasing problems resulting from mismanagement, incompetence 
and widespread corruption have become more and more embarrassing to the 
regime‟s friends. Issues like illegal immigration –from Morocco and other African 
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countries using Morocco as a transit point–, drugs dealing which includes not only 
the type produced in Morocco but other dangerous types imported from Latin 
America before they find their way to Europe, the expanding slums which have 
become the breeding ground for crime and terrorism… all these issues have 
become a matter of concern for the neighbouring European countries. In other 
words, if the regime persists in handling the affairs of the country in the way it is 
doing, and it is likely it will, it is bound to become a source of trouble not only at the 
national level, but also at the regional and the international level. 
These are some of the factors that al-Ald wal-Ihsan take into consideration in its 
analysis of the current situation in Morocco. Furthermore, these factors as well as 
the principles the proclaimed strategy is said to be based on also account for a 
range of ideas and suggestions which have been elaborated and put forward to 
build consensus building and provide what may be described as a road map for 
peaceful political change in Morocco, an issue to which we shall turn now. 
7.4 Steps for peaceful transition in Morocco 
Whatever the reasons behind adopting a different strategy, the question is: how 
does the movement intend to translate it into practical suggestions able to ensure a 
peaceful transition from what it considers an absolutist system of rule? It is indeed 
a question that is raised frequently by many observers who are keen to know what 
the movement proposes to get the country out of its prolonged socio-economic and 
political inertia. Drawing on the writings of Sheikh Yassine, some documents 
produced by the political section of the movement as well as some interviews and 
pronouncements delivered to various media outlets by senior members of the 
movement, especially its spokesman, Fath Allah Arsalan,43 four key elements 
appear to form the core of the movement‟s proposal for a peaceful transition in 
Morocco. This section will examine each in turn.  
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7.4.1 The need for a national pact 
7.4.1.1 On the meaning and utility of a pact 
In the English Oxford Dictionary the word “pact” is defined as “a formal agreement 
between individuals or parties.” In the studies concerned with the process of 
political change from one regime to another, “a pact can be defined as an explicit, 
but not always publicly explicated or justified, agreement among a select of actors 
which seeks to define (or, better to redefine) rules governing the exercise of power 
on the basis of mutual guarantees for the vital interests of those entering into it.”44 
It is a device to which political forces under certain circumstances may resort “to 
move from a poor equilibrium with transgressions and the lack of fundamental 
limits on the state to a stable equilibrium of limited government that can support a 
stable democracy.”45 Pacts, however, are not always easy to make. It depends on 
the circumstances and on the actors concerned. The reason in the view of some 
scholars is that the core of a pact requires “a negotiated compromise under which 
actors agree to forgo or underutilize their capacity to harm each other by extending 
guarantees not to threaten each other‟s corporate autonomies or vital interests.”46 
The question that arises here is: under what circumstances may those actors be 
willing to agree to strike such a deal? In one scenario it is suggested that making a 
pact may be possible when no social or political group is sufficiently dominant to 
impose “its ideal project”. It would be “a second best solution which none of the 
actors wanted or identified with completely but all of them can agree to and share 
in.”47 
There are a number of countries –in Latin America, Southern Europe, Africa– 
where pacts proved helpful in the transition from authoritarian rule to the 
installation of some form of democracy. Though the circumstances and the details 
of each case may be different from the others, one common feature is that pact 
making was an important factor that contributed to the creation of a suitable 
environment for social and political change. It is little wonder that some political 
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activists in countries still under despotic rule call for the use of such a device to 
extricate from authoritarian status quo without violence and bloodshed. Al-Adl wal-
Ihsan is one of those political forces which believe in the importance and the 
viability of a political pact as the first step towards peaceful change in Morocco. It 
has advanced a number of reasons to explain why such an arrangement is highly 
desirable, if not indispensable, in the situation of a country like Morocco. One of 
these is that it would constitute a viable beginning to save the country from the 
politics of divide and rule and possible internal breakdown.48 The consequences of 
the dominant logic are far from reassuring as there is not a single sector in the 
country which is not plagued by corruption and mismanagement. How long people 
can endure before an explosion of social unrest may erupt, nobody can tell. One 
thing for sure is that the country may not be very far from such a scenario.49 What 
some people fear most is that in the case of social explosion some issues which 
may not be a priority or of less importance would crop up and complicate the 
situation even more. Thus al-Adl wal-Ihsan is of the view that the most appropriate 
beginning to avoid the worst would be to conclude a pact which all the vital forces 
of the country should agree to and share in. 
For al-Adl wal-Ihsan, as well as for other social and political forces concerned with 
the current situation in Morocco, a lot of time has already been lost and the country 
cannot afford any further delays in introducing the required reforms. The Moroccan 
people, especially the youth, are frustrated as they see no indication of any 
possible improvement in the short, medium or even the long run. No wonder that 
many of them take all sorts of risks to cross the Strait of Gibraltar to get to the other 
side of the Mediterranean where they think their dream of a decent life would be 
realized.  The risks incurred and the tragedies suffered by many of those who had 
already tried that course of action attest to the worrisome level of despair and 
frustration permeating society and especially its expanding poor sectors. Thus a 
serious initiative based on an agreed political pact would, in the view of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, resurrect hope in the hearts and minds of the Moroccan people for a better 
future. It would also restore credibility to politics.50 The Moroccan people have long 
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ceased to trust politicians, nor do they expect them to bring any significant 
improvement to their lives. Not surprisingly, the rate of turnout is very low 
according to the official statistics themselves and the reality may be even worse if 
we know that the figures are usually inflated and do not reflect the true picture. 
Even the last parliamentary election, held on 25th November 2011 and claimed to 
be relatively free compared to the previous ones did not succeed in dissipating 
growing public scepticism. Of about 25 million eligible to vote, only 13.6 million 
registered and less than half (6.1million) bothered to go the polling stations.51  
A new beginning is therefore believed to be crucial for the re-emergence of 
meaningful politics and for encouraging people to get involved, which is a 
prerequisite for the success of transition and for the ability to overcome the 
challenges of reconstruction. People may be willing to make sacrifices only if they 
trust their government and feel that it serves the whole country and not a corrupt 
minority already “stuffed to the brim”.52 Once the majority of people are reassured 
that their voice will not be ignored any longer and that a new era is bound to begin, 
they are likely to support the efforts needed for comprehensive social and political 
reform. 
A pact is deemed necessary not only to secure people‟s motivation and support but 
also to allow for smooth, peaceful transition at the least possible cost. This 
instrument of pact-making has been successful in a number of countries and al-Adl 
wal-Ihsasn claims that it is likely to be also helpful in the Moroccan case.53 In 
countries where the rulers stubbornly stuck to their position, the losses incurred 
were extremely high: they neither secured an honoured exist, nor did they spare 
their countries heavy human and material losses. A pact is consequently believed 
to be conducive to an arrangement that is beneficial to all. Certainly no one would 
get what they wanted but they would not lose entirely either. However, what each 
would win would be significant enough to make the establishment of a new political 
system worthy and rewarding. It is interesting to note that some rulers refused to 
make such a move while they were in a better position to do so and that when they 
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did agree to such an arrangement, they found that the opportunity had been lost for 
ever. When Ben Ali of Tunisia addressed the Tunisian people saying, “Now I‟ve 
understood you,”54 it was too late. More interestingly, similar incidents have 
occurred several times in history, yet the lessons have amazingly gone unnoticed. 
A final reason which is equally important in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is that pact-
making would secure the independence of the Moroccan political will and reduce 
the risk of foreign intervention which might be solicited by the weaker parties 
seeking protection.55 Experience demonstrates that where foreign intervention 
occurs, it becomes hard to reach an agreement unless it is befitting those behind 
the scenes. Thus, many strategists have warned against such a scenario and 
advise that the political forces seeking change should try to keep the decisions in 
their hands and not open the door for foreign influences.56 
7.4.1.2 Conditions of success 
As stated earlier, to make a pact is not always easy, however desirable or even 
necessary it may be. For this reason al-Adl wal-Ihsan thinks that some conditions 
have to be met in order to enhance the chance to make it a successful option. The 
first important condition is that there should be a climate of reconciliation and 
mutual trust and respect. Addressing what he calls “honourable democrats”, 
Sheikh Yassine invites them to forgo their misgivings and stop their smear 
campaigns against the Islamists to help create such an environment. “Do not pass 
judgment on our intentions [but on our deeds],” he says, “and do not deny us the 
right to express our views.”57 Yassine is here pointing to the allegations leveled at 
the Islamists concerning their attitude towards democracy. It is claimed that their 
intention is to use democracy as a means to come to power, but once they are 
firmly established, they will install a theocratic system worse than the monarchical 
rule in place. To be suspicious of one another, contends Yassine, or fight one 
another or spread rumours and trade in scaremongering only plays in the hands of 
the monarchy and does not promote the conditions for constructive dialogue and 
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fruitful cooperation. Thus Yassine repeatedly makes the point that his movement is 
committed to dialogue and persuasion as the only means to further their objectives. 
“Our only weapon,” he asserts, “is the word, truth and transparency.”58 He also 
pledges, as noted earlier, that his movement will never “hang on to power against 
the consent of the electorate…”59 
Another important condition to make the pact a success is that it should be 
inclusive: all political parties, without exception, socio-economic actors, influential 
figures, regardless of their convictions, should come together to debate in order to 
work out a suitable formula to effect a peaceful transition. It is important that all the 
country‟s political sensibilities should get involved, given the nature of the socio-
economic and political problems and the inherited burden of decades, if not 
centuries, of corruption and mismanagement.60 The role of the Islamists in the 
process is, according to Yassine, unavoidable. “Since we are close to the people,” 
he argues, “we are in a better position to recognize the weighty legacy and its 
magnitude and thereby the need for the cooperation of all the vital forces to bridge 
the gaps and rally the scattered efforts to confront the internal devastating factors 
and the tools of servitude and backwardness.”61 Yassine advances another reason 
which makes, in his view, cooperation and consensus building crucial. He 
maintains that “it is foolhardy to think that a single group, no matter how great its 
numerical strength and howsoever well-equipped, can bear all the burdens of the 
past, confront all the tragedies of the present and realize the people‟s aspirations 
for the future.”62 Such statements, besides reflecting the harsh realities on the 
ground, are probably meant to dispel the cloud of scepticism that hangs over the 
Islamists‟ intentions with regard to power: the message is that it is inconceivable 
that they could possibly lay a monopoly on power even if they wanted to. 
A third condition for the pacted transition to succeed concerns the role of the 
people. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan supports the view that all the necessary measures should 
be taken to enable the people to follow and participate directly or through their 
representatives in the general debate.63 The Moroccan people have long been 
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marginalized and kept in the dark about the affairs of their country. They are only 
expected to acquiesce and applaud whatever decisions taken by the government. 
No wonder that political apathy has become widespread and those who bother to 
turn up on election day or even register to vote are decreasing incessantly. 
Therefore, it is necessary to implicate them in the process of change and raise 
their awareness of the importance of their voice. More importantly, they should be 
implicated in order to get prepared for the required sacrifices to shake off the yoke 
of authoritarianism and pave the way for a decent life and a better future. Yassine 
and his group do not seem to favour what is termed the “elite pact”, that is, an 
agreement about which the public do not know much or understand what it entails. 
This may sound utopist or hard to realize. But for Yassine and his movement, a 
sound beginning requires that the opportunity should be available to all to know 
what is going on and be able to distinguish reality from fantasy and fact from cheap 
propaganda.64 
In the transition period, as envisioned by al-Adl wal-Ihsan, national media outlets 
are required to play an important role. They should contribute actively to 
enlightening the people about the issue under debate. The task should be 
undertaken in a professional and unbiased manner. All the views should be 
accurately presented so that people can know for sure who “said what and why” 
and not fall prey to rumours or biased reports. Furthermore, besides providing a 
space for the people‟s voice, stifled for so long, the media, if it were to function 
properly, would make it possible for the different ideas to be tested, challenged and 
elaborated. In this way it is believed that the “good ideas” take hold and the “bad 
ones” come unstuck.65  
7.4.2 The need for a new constitution  
In the narrower meaning the word constitution refers to “a document having a 
special legal sanctity which sets out the framework and the principal functions of 
the organs of government within the state, and declares the principles by which 
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those organs must operate.”66 In the wider sense the term refers to “the whole 
system of government of a country, the collections of rules which establish and 
regulate or govern the government.”67 The former definition applies to most of the 
world constitutions; only few [like UK] conform with the latter. 
Constitutions are established in different ways, not all of which are considered 
democratic or acceptable.68 One way, regarded as the worst, is when a constitution 
is unilaterally imposed by the ruler who does not give the people the opportunity to 
take part in its making. It is a constitution octroyée, usually to circumvent the 
consequences of mounting popular pressure or to give the appearance that the 
system in place is similar or very close to any established democracy. The 
problem, however, is not only in the way it is drafted but also in its contents and the 
manner in which it is approved. It is often tailored to keep all the powers in the 
hands of the ruler and adopted in a referendum by the notorious “four nine” 
(99.99%). 
Another way to make a constitution, termed sometimes as “contractual”, is when 
the ruler and the ruled agree, under certain circumstances, to negotiate a formula 
whereby the vital interests of both sides are maintained. Putting aside the content 
of such a constitution and the extent to which it reflects the people‟s aspirations, 
the fact that the ruler take part in its making according to certain terms and 
conditions means that the ruler holds a significant share in the people‟s sovereignty 
and this contravenes the idea that sovereignty resides in the people alone.  
A third way to make a constitution is to set up a constituent assembly. This 
method, widely believed to be democratic and effective in reflecting the people‟s 
wishes, consists of a body of elected representatives of the people with the 
mandate to draft a constitution and nothing else; and when this task is completed, 
it is dissolved. It is not necessary to submit the document to the people for 
approval in a referendum, since it was drafted by their elected representatives in 
the first place. 
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A fourth way to enact and adopt a constitution is by means of a referendum. 
According to this method a committee, whose shape and members may be the 
outcome of negotiation between the country‟s active political forces, is set up to 
fashion out a constitution to the country. However, their proposal is not valid until it 
is submitted to the people for approval in a referendum. This method is also 
considered democratic because the people have the final say: they can accept or 
reject it.  
In Morocco the first time the issue of constitution was raised dates back to the 
beginning of the last century when Abdellah ben Said, a Moroccan scholar, 
submitted in 1900 the first draft of a constitution to Sultan Moulay Abdelaziz. Then 
a group of scholars proposed another draft in 1906. Another elaborated attempt 
was made in 1908 when a group of scholars proposed a constitution of 93 articles 
to Sultan Moulay Hafid.69 These incidents are sometimes cited to make the point 
that the Moroccan Ulama (scholars) were the first to demand a constitution for the 
state, before any other social or political force in Morocco. Unfortunately, those 
initiatives were thwarted because of the prevailing circumstances in Morocco at the 
time. As the country fell under the French colonialism in 1912, the demand for a 
constitution seemed to have given way to more pressing issues, particularly the 
ramifications of the foreign presence and their effects on the social and political 
situation in Morocco. Thus the country had to wait until it recovered its 
independence in 1956 before the question of constitution was brought to the fore 
again. 
As noted earlier, when Mohammed V returned from exile on 16th November 1955, 
he delivered his first speech two days later in which he promised great changes 
and stressed that the establishment of “a constitutional Arab Muslim democratic 
monarchy” would be given top priority.70 However, more than five years elapsed 
and the Moroccan people were still waiting for that promise to be fulfilled. 
Mohammad V died on 26th February 1961 and his son, Hassan II, pledged to 
honour his father‟s promise. In 1962 the first constitution was indeed drafted, but 
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unfortunately it fell far short of what was expected. To use the words of one 
observer, it was cleverly tailored to help the monarch “retain a free hand in politics 
as befitted his conception of a king,”71; and though it was revised during his reign 
five times (in 1970, 1972, 1980, 1992 and 1996), nothing substantial changed and 
the common feature of them all is that the real power remained in the monarch‟s 
hands72. In fact he was not only able “to retain but [also] enlarge upon his 
prerogatives.”73 Yet, he always considered it one of his outstanding achievements 
and prided himself to be its “author and editor.”74 
The situation does not fare any better under the present king, Mohammad VI, 
despite claims to the contrary and despite the wild promises and slogans launched 
upon his ascension to the throne in 1999. Violations of human rights continue and 
freedom of speech and assembly suffer seriously while corruption reigns 
supreme.75 When the Arab world was rocked by the Arab Spring and three regimes 
collapsed, the Moroccan monarchy responded quickly and once again promised 
serious reforms and a new constitution. If some people did believe, for a while at 
least, such promises on the grounds that there was no room left for the old tricky 
games, others, however, could tell from the way the new constitution was prepared 
and finally written that the prospects would not be that bright. Indeed, as the saying 
goes, from the huge cleft in the mountain peak there slowly emerged a tiny little 
mouse: playing upon words, vague phrasing to allow for different interpretations, 
splitting some articles into shorter ones while keeping the original content almost 
intact, making minor concessions here and getting in return significant gains there 
and the like techniques which have led some observers to conclude that “the king‟s 
executive powers remain unchecked.”76  
The king, according to the so-called amended constitution, appoints six of the 
twelve members of the Constitutional Court, including its president; he appoints the 
ministers of the government and dismisses them if he wants; he can reshuffle the 
Council of Government whenever he likes; he presides over the Council of 
Ministers whose prerogatives far outweigh those of the Council of Government, 
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including the right to appoint high security officials, governors, ambassadors, the 
central bank governor and executives of strategic public enterprises and 
establishments; he is the Commander-in chief of the armed forces and makes 
military appointments; he presides over the Supreme Security council and the 
Ulama (scholars) Council and, as Commander of the Faithful, he can intervene in 
various ways and make crucial decisions; he decides on strategic orientations and 
at his initiative he can dissolve the parliament and many more de jure or de facto 
practices! The following figure [Fig.7.1] demonstrates, in a simplified form, how the 
king still retains extensive powers: 
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As if the various provisions included in the constitution are not enough to 
guarantee the supremacy of the monarchy, the electoral system and the drawing of 
district boundaries are engineered in such a way that no political party can even 
win more than 20% of the seats in the parliament.77 Consequently, to form a 
government would necessarily require a broad coalition of parties the loyalty of 
most, if not all, to the monarchy cannot be suspected. At any moment and at the 
slightest signal from the monarch, they can withdraw and make the government fall 
apart. Even if we assume that the party which emerges first in the elections wanted 
to press for important reforms, it would find itself paralyzed and bound hand and 
foot to the royal will. 
What is the point, one may wonder, of having a constitution of the sort? A major 
function of the expected constitution is that it should lay out the basic structure of 
the government in such a way as to prevent confusion of powers and despotic rule. 
If a political system, as one author points out, fails to do so and instead puts all the 
major powers in a single hand, then that system “has no constitution at all.”78 
Following the same logic one may ask what is the point of having a parliament if it 
is inhibited constitutionally and practically from carrying out its normal functions 
properly? This argument may be pushed even further to question the value of a 
government when all the important decisions are made by the monarch and his 
entourage and when the serious projects are entrusted to independent committees 
set up by the king himself and subservient to his will. A political system that does 
not allow for a functioning parliament and a free government able to assume fully 
its responsibilities, then that system may well be said as having “neither a 
parliament nor a government.”  
For al-Adl wal-Ihsan this situation must end and a new constitution is crucial to 
move away from autocracy. It is regarded the next important step once the pact is 
concluded and the basic stages of a transitional period have been agreed upon. To 
the question how to ensure that the new constitution reflects the wishes of the 
population, Yassine‟s answer is that “in contrast to a constitution from on high, we 
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will have to elect an assembly representing the entire popular spectrum crowning a 
long public debate. No political entity or independent personality should be 
excluded.”79 It is clear here that Yasine and his group prefer the third method 
referred to above to make a constitution. They believe that the election of a 
constituent assembly would provide the conditions for the emergence of a stable 
political system provided that enough time is given to public debate and the people 
are encouraged to get involved. Furthermore, Yassine is keen that this free public 
debate involvement should lead to a document, well-thought and bound to endure 
and with which the people could identify. Yassine seems to favour a rigid instead of 
a flexible constitution, as he explains: 
To insure that a constitution debated in assembly and submitted to referendum 
not merely a paper weathervane, an iron-fast juridical body would prevent a call 
for revisions every time a sudden whim or novel fad tickles imaginations […] By 
“iron-fast juridical body” I envision something at the raised level of a parliamentary 
majority necessary for amending the constitution.80  
7.4.3 Convoking elections 
To say that the Moroccan regime has never made enough effort to hold free and 
fair elections is an understatement. Fraud has become an art of the state, a mode 
of governance and the fact that elections in Morocco have always been, and still 
are, to this date at least, an effective instrument to control the political landscape 
comes as no surprise. Nothing is left to chance and the regime would do whatever 
at its disposal to be sure of the desired outcome of any election. What is worthy of 
note, however, is that though fraud has been a consistent practice since the first 
general elections held in independent Morocco in 1963, it has not been exercised 
in the same manner. Whereas in the early elections the authorities intervened 
overly and sometimes violently to rig the results, in the recent years they have 
developed more sophisticated ways to keep the whole process under control. It is 
enough to know, as stated above, that the current electoral system and the way the 
electoral districts are designed make it impossible for any one political party to win 
more than about a fourth of the seats in Parliament. Under such circumstances the 
obstructive interventions of the past have become unnecessary. However, these 
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methods, though elaborated, have their limits of which the regime is not unaware. 
One way to deal with those “loopholes” is to simply exclude the political forces 
which could upset its calculations, and al-Adl wal-Ihsan has been subject to this 
policy since its inception.  
For the transition to occur smoothly, the leaders of al-Adl wal-Ihsan maintain that 
there must be some guarantees in order to hold free and fair elections. All the 
actors concerned, as an expert in transitology would put it, should “agree to 
compete in such a way that those who can win greater electoral support will 
exercise political superiority in such a way as not to impede those who may win 
greater support in the future from taking office; and those who lose in the present 
agree to respect the contingent authority of the winners to make binding decisions, 
in exchange for being allowed to take office and make decisions in the future.”81 
The leaders of the movement support this idea and all the more so because of the 
scepticism voiced by some secularists about the Islamists‟ intentions. A classical 
allegation, referred to above, is that if they ever had the opportunity, they would 
make it “one man, one vote, one time”.  Al-Adl wal-Ihsan has repeatedly stressed 
its commitment to respect the people‟s choice.82 The argument they often advance 
in this regard is that it is nowadays inconceivable to build a viable political system 
through force and overcome the daunting challenges of development. Unless a 
legitimate government is established and endorsed strongly by the people, it 
cannot be expected to hold for long, much less to cope with the current crises and 
the tragedies bequeathed from the past. “We are not very enthusiastic,” says one 
senior member of the movement, “to set up a political order that is doomed to fail. 
What‟s the use?”83  
Once all the guarantees that no political force will try to monopolize power against 
the people‟s consent have been made and an agreement on the type of electoral 
system and on the size and number of constituencies and other related issues 
have been reached, to hold a free and transparent elections remains a central 
moment in the transition period. They should be organized, according to al-Adl wal-
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Ihsan, after the new constitution is approved in order to have a new parliament that 
will hopefully represent the Moroccan people. 
7.4.4 A transition period with a national unity government and a common 
platform 
Morocco is already suffering from various serious crises which are prone to 
intensify even more under the prevailing conditions. At one point the regime is 
likely to find itself up against the wall and a bold initiative should prove unavoidable 
to save the country from absolute breakdown. Then, cooperation would be seen 
not just as a matter of choice but rather of dire necessity. No political force, as 
senior members of the movement are never tired of stressing, would have the 
capacity or the means to cope, on its own, with the heavy inherited legacy.84 Even 
if one party were able to devise an excellent strategy and this strategy had the 
chance to be implemented, the outcome of such a strategy would not be felt until at 
least a decade or so has elapsed. Assuming that such a scenario were plausible, 
the losers in the elections would try to exploit the difficult aftermath of autocratic 
rule and demonstrate that they have better solutions for the country‟s problems. 
Trade unions might find it the appropriate moment to press for their demands 
which may be hard to satisfy, given the precarious economic and financial situation 
of the country. Other social and professional sectors might also find it opportune to 
take to the streets to secure some legitimate gains. Thus, an atmosphere of 
instability would set in and the promised reforms by the new government would be 
hard to achieve. The business community might be already sceptical of the 
competencies of the new government and, fearful of the mounting mood of 
instability, are likely to respond, as O‟Donnell puts it, “with the weapons they have 
closer at hand: disinvestment and capital flight.”85 This would indeed jeopardize the 
whole process and the country would be in serious trouble, to say the least.  
To avoid such a scenario, al-Adl wal-Ihsan claims that it is in the interest of all that 
a national unity government be formed on the basis of a common platform, 
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featuring the most urgent issues about which there is little, if any, disagreement.  
On the other hand, should a political force, Islamist or secularist, feel that it is 
strong enough to shoulder the task of change alone and is confident of its success 
because of the wide popular support, real or imagined, it enjoys, it is most likely to 
discover shortly, much to its chagrin, that the realities are harsher than it has 
anticipated. Those who occupy the opposition benches would be in a more 
comfortable situation, using the easiest available weapon, that is, to criticize and 
try to put the rod in the wheel to demonstrate the inexperience and incompetence 
of the new ruling team. For this reason, al-Adl wal-Ihsan tirelessly insists on 
cooperation and consensus building. “We greet such a coming together,” remarks 
the founder of the movement, “with all our heart.”86 As for the national unity 
government, whether it is to be set up in the early days of the transition period or 
after or before the general elections are held is open to discussion. One thing for 
sure is that al-Adl wal-Ihsan seems to endorse the idea in all cases, provided it is 
based on an agreed common programme.  
7.5 A tentative appraisal of the proposed general strategy 
It may be a little early to evaluate the non-violent strategy advocated by al-Adl wal-
Ihsan. Unlike the other two options, discussed in the previous chapter, which were 
pursued to the end, the strategy adopted by al-Adl wal-Ihsan is still operating and 
seems to be still appealing to large swathes of Moroccan society, at least for the 
time being. Indeed, some people believe that it is well-crafted and promising, for it 
has enabled al-Adl wal-Ihsan to take root in the Moroccan society without making 
any concessions to an autocratic regime. Furthermore, the fact that al-Adl has 
chosen to focus on society empowerment and grassroots activities attests to its far-
sightedness and a sound awareness of the nature of reform needed in Morocco 
and what it all entails. Those who want al-Adl wal-Ihsan to take part in sham 
institutions, it is argued, seem to be oblivion of the disastrous consequences 
resulting from such a course of action. All the opposition parties which have 
pursued that trajectory have not only failed to achieve anything worthy of mention 
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but also ruined themselves and tarnished politics for a whole generation of young 
Moroccans. They have lost their membership, their credibility and squandered their 
“militant capital” built over years of political engagement.87 The worst part of it all, 
according to these people, is that the chances of their recovering from this downfall 
are scant if not nonexistent. If rational thinking entails, inter alia, considering 
benefits and costs and learning from the errors of others, then al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
seems remarkable in this respect, for it appears that it has learnt from other Islamic 
as well as secular organizations inside and outside Morocco. And if, for the sake of 
argument, the path pursued by al-Adl wal-Ihsan is deemed not sure to succeed, 
the other one to which it is invited is sure to lead to disaster. 
The strategy of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is also lauded for its nonviolent nature. Though the 
leader of the movement addressed a number of sensitive issues in Morocco like 
the status of “the Commander of the Faithful”, “the oath of allegiance” and the 
extravagancies of the monarch in an unprecedented way, he always warned 
against the use of violence as a means of change. 
What is particularly interesting, remarked a senior member of the PJD [Party of 
Justice and Development], is that the movement of al-Adl wal-Ihsan has 
successfully turned to its advantage the injustices it has suffered at the hands of 
the Moroccan authorities. He added that they, in Tawhid wal-Islah [Unity and 
Reform] and PJD, did not have similar cases, and this, in his view, explains the 
slow expansion of their movement and the rapid growth of al-Adl wal-Ihsan.88 
This positive view, however, is not shared by other people who perceive the choice 
of al-Adl wal-Ihsan differently. They argue that the strategy of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is 
rather unrealistic and seems to be promoting “the waiting mentality”. Instead of 
participating in the present institutions whatever their shortcomings or even flaws 
and trying to press for change, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has decided to stay away, 
apparently until everything is fine before it could join. Things can never be fixed by 
themselves; someone must intervene to do what is required. By the same token, 
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the political system in Morocco is never going to improve of its own volition. It is 
necessary, so goes the argument, to get involved and bring pressure to bear on 
the government. Not all that is required could be achieved the first day, or the first 
month or even the first couple of years, but a certain degree of reform, however 
modest, could be attained. Step by step other spaces could be overtaken until the 
preferred system of governance is put in place. But “to wait and see” is neither 
productive nor constructive. It is opting for the easiest alternative, that is, to criticize 
and nothing else.89 
Other critics claim that al-Adl wal-Ihsan strategy is rather outdated and as such has 
become irrelevant, to say the least. It is based, according to these critics, on a 
political outlook formulated by the leader of the movement three decades ago, at a 
time when the Iranian Revolution was a dominating event. Many felt then that other 
autocrats in the Arab and Muslim world would follow suit after the downfall of a 
powerful tyrant like Shah of Iran. The leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, it is claimed, is 
likely to have been influenced by the prevalent political mood of those years and 
consequently based his strategic vision on the assumption that the collapse of the 
Moroccan regime was imminent. Now nearly thirty years have elapsed and the 
monarchy in Morocco is still in place and powerful as ever; yet, al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
has remained stuck in its position. No reconsideration of its attitude seems to have 
been made in order to adjust its approach to the prevailing reality in the country. If 
politics is sometimes defined as “the art of the possible”, then al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
would do well if it could modify its strategy, taking into account the current 
constraints and struggle for the things that are possible.90 
Other critics still are more poignant in their evaluation. They claim that the major 
flaw in this strategy is that it is based on irrational thinking and superstition such as 
the belief in dreams, miracles and myths. One cannot expect a rational approach 
from those who sanctify their leader, thinking that “obeying the orders of the Sheikh 
[their leader] becomes the pass for Paradise.”91 Superstition can never provide a 
sound basis for a viable strategy. This explains, so goes the argument, why the 
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movement is unpredictable and the real motives behind its initiatives are hard to 
fathom. To illustrate this point, proponents of this view raise the case of 20 
February movement as an example. It is still unknown, always according to these 
critics, why al-Adl wal-Ihsan joined the 20 February movement from the beginning 
and participated actively and then all of a sudden it withdrew, at the moment when 
Morocco was about to enter a new era, if only those uprisings had been 
maintained. What were the reasons behind its sudden withdrawal? Was it the 
result of a dream or any other unexplainable motives? Nobody seems to know. 
One thing for sure is that a valuable opportunity to open a new chapter in the 
history of Morocco has been stupidly lost and for ever! 92 
7.6 Conclusion  
For over two decades after Morocco‟s independence, the two dominant options for 
seeking comprehensive change were, as explained in the previous chapter, the 
“revolutionary” and the “reformist” strategies. Proponents of the former wanted to 
overthrow what was perceived to be an archaic monarchical rule and start from 
scratch or retain a ceremonial monarchy whereby the monarch reigns but does not 
rule and then proceed to install the ideal form of government that was in vogue at 
the time, that is the “socialist system”; those who advocated the latter strategy, 
whether they sought to set up the same system or favoured a more liberal one, 
both opted to work from within the monarchical system to achieve their goals. As 
stated earlier, both strategies did not deliver the expected results. Surprisingly, 
whereas the former strategy lost much of its initial luster for various internal and 
external reasons, the latter, despite its utter failure too, still has its supporters from 
the secularist as well as the Islamist camp. Whether it is out of conviction that it is 
still considered the only way to achieve change and democracy “by installment”, as 
one author would put it, or out hopelessness and helplessness to coerce a regime, 
deemed strong and well-protected by its allies at the domestic as well as at the 
international level, is open to interpretation. The irony, however, is that it seems 
that both strategies, the “revolutionary” and the “reformist”, not only failed to deliver 
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but also helped to maintain the status quo and at some points even played a 
decisive role to save the monarchy from serious trouble. 
Unlike the proponents of the afore-mentioned strategies, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has 
distinguished itself since its emergence in 1981 by opting for a third way which 
could be termed “non-violent resistance strategy”. It seeks radical, albeit gradual, 
change through peaceful means. This formula may sound paradoxical, but since 
the regime has left no room for any other alternative, it is regarded the only viable 
option that suits the present circumstances. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan is aware that it is not 
the only political force in the country, though a major one, and is also aware of the 
efforts needed to rectify decades, if not centuries, of authoritarian rule and 
corruption. For this reason it insists on consensus building and cooperation.  It 
even puts forward what may be described as a road map to effect peaceful 
change. This includes the invitation addressed to all political forces to conclude a 
pact in order to decide on the general principles and orientations to manage the 
transition peacefully, the election of a constituent assembly to draft a new 
constitution before convoking general elections to set up a credible and 
representative parliament. Other ideas which are believed to promote trust and an 
encouraging environment such as the spirit of cooperation and the importance of 
national unity government are also considered worthy of discussion. Al-Adl wal-
Ihsan is keen to remain “a quiet force” able to formulate concrete proposals and 
not just to oppose and criticize.93 
Having said that, it may be too early to say whether the trajectory taken by al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan is going to succeed or not, but so far the movement appears to be still 
thriving. This does not mean that its choice does not involve any risks. A possible 
problem, as one author has pointed out, is that it runs the risk “of losing the 
popularity of its growing constituency,”94 if there is no serious change in the near 
future. It is indeed a challenge not to be undermined. Will al-Adl wal-Ihsan stay the 
course whatever the circumstances and remain coherent as it is now, or finding 
that the road is too long, will it succumb ultimately to the will of the makhzenian 
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regime? What are the prospects for its success? No definitive answers could be 
provided at the moment, but one thing for sure is that its overall position, 
notwithstanding some criticisms, is still appreciated by many Moroccan people and 
particularly because the recent events in the Arab world seem to confirm much of 
its analysis. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, however, believes that political action is not enough 
to achieve the aspired change. The educational issue, as will be seen in the 
following chapter, is another front which is considered at least as important as the 
political front. 
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Chapter 8 Education in the Movement’s Struggle for Change 
In May 2000 when Sheikh Yassine was allowed to go out after about ten years of 
house arrest, he held a press conference which was attended by a number of 
Moroccan and foreign journalists apparently eager to know what the leader of al-
Adl wal-Ihsan had to say now that he regained his freedom and the monarch with 
whom he had quarrelled for so long -Hassan II- was no more. One journalist asked 
him about his plans for the following years. Yassine replied succinctly and without 
hesitation: “At-tarbiya, then at-tarbiya and then at-tarbiya” [Education, then 
education and then education]1. Probably this is not the answer that the journalist 
expected, but Yassine merely made a point he had already emphasized on many 
occasions. Just about two years earlier he wrote in one of his French books, 
islamiser la modernité, “L‟éducation est notre métier.” [“Education is our 
profession.”]2 In fact, in all his writings and speeches the major theme which he 
comes to frequently and tackles from various angles is the issue of what is broadly, 
for lack of a better word, translated here as “education”. In a book, which he also 
wrote in French in 1979, La révolution à l‟heure de l‟Islam, he considers education 
as one of the two major fronts in the struggle for comprehensive social and political 
change.3 With the same enthusiasm and energy he continued to underline the 
crucial importance of education in his speeches and in whatever he wrote until he 
passed away on Thursday, 13th December 2012.  
Yassine was certainly not the only Muslim scholar or thinker who placed a high 
emphasis on education; others have done the same.4 However, the way education 
is expounded in his writings and adopted by his movement as a tool to build the 
character of human being, aware of their full rights, duties and responsibilities and 
to supply them, as he says, with “an attitude, a vision, a will that soars beyond 
historical contingencies and surpasses the narrow frontiers of geography,”5 seems 
to be a distinct feature of his project. If the previous chapter tackled the issue of 
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political action in the strategy of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and what was suggested to 
secure a peaceful transition, this chapter focuses on education. It will try to find out 
about the importance, the basis and the main characteristics of the kind of 
education advocated by Yassine and his group, the required conditions for it to 
bear the expected results, and some of the tools used to promote its aims. Thus, it 
would become, hopefully, clear how it is integrated into the movement‟s strategy to 
press for social and political reform.  
8.1 On the importance of education 
Before we get too far in our discussion, some clarifications need to be made. The 
theme of education on which this chapter focuses will be considered from an 
Islamic perspective which differs from the secular one. Thus, the word education 
used here covers at least two basic Arab terms: at-tarbiya which refers to the moral 
and spiritual dimension according the Islamic teachings, and at-ta‟lim which 
denotes knowledge and learning. In an Islamic context, the concept of education 
would refer to a comprehensive system, based on the Islamic principles and 
involving all the dimensions of the human being, moral, spiritual, intellectual, 
physical,… with the aim of enabling them to achieve a high level of excellence and 
happiness in this life and the next.6 Other definitions may be encountered, but 
though there may be differences in wording, the basic idea is generally agreed 
upon. However, if there is not much difference in theory, views tend to diverge and 
sometimes widely in practice, particularly on the way to achieve a well-balanced 
form of education, widely believed to be the “secret” of the success of the early 
Islamic community founded by Prophet Muhammad. 
Since its inception, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has placed a high premium on education to the 
extent that in certain accounts it has been considered, if not dismissed as, a simple 
Sufi order in the garb of a modern Islamic movement.7 For al-Adl wal-Ihsan, the 
emphasis on education is rather due to its conviction that this aspect has been 
glaringly neglected, in practice, though not necessarily in theory, by most Islamic 
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movements. Even those who are aware of its importance may be at a loss when it 
comes to the process of achieving the objectives of education. They often find 
themselves between two options neither of which appeals to those concerned with 
the current condition of the Islamic Umma which is far from enviable: the Sufi and 
legalistic options.8 In the former case spirituality is usually accompanied by 
withdrawal from the social and political affairs of society; in the latter, by insisting 
too much on the “rules” at the expense of God‟s love, an austere version of Islam is 
being offered and sometimes also accompanied by obedient submission to the 
corrupt ruling elite. Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, as noted in Chapter 4, advocates what it 
believes to be the “golden mean” which tries to avoid the extremes and 
weaknesses of both tendencies by emulating, as it claims, the model of the 
Prophet and his Companions.  
In all his publications, which exceed forty books of various sizes, as well as in his 
speeches, Sheikh Yassine insists on moral and spiritual education and even 
contends that many of the problems and failures experienced by the contemporary 
Islamic movements are largely due to the neglect of this crucial aspect of Islam. 
Whereas some people may think it is a private matter and every Muslim is normally 
expected to give it due consideration, Yassine has a different view. He believes 
that it should be given priority and should not be left to the discretion of the 
members of a movement engaged in the hard struggle to overcome the prevailing 
lamentable conditions and contribute to the establishment of a new political order. 
This does not mean imposing on the members some practices in order to boost 
their moral and spiritual fibre, but rather encouraging them to take care of their 
hearts and souls as they do with their minds and bodies. This sounds easier said 
than done, and it would be interesting to find out what the movement suggests in 
this respect. However, let us first examine the rationale and the basis of the 
proposed model, claimed to make the achievement of such daunting objectives 
possible. 
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8.2 Education and the Prophetic method 
How to acquire iman [faith] and achieve spiritual completeness? It is a question 
upon which a lot has been said and written and the debate is still open and is not 
likely to end any time soon. Though Muslim scholars agree about the full meaning 
of faith and the necessity to take practical measures not only to get the feel of it but 
also to sustain and improve it, they tend to disagree about the ways and conditions 
for acquiring a higher level, able to lead to the efflorescence of the believer‟s 
personality, much in the same way as it occurred with the first Islamic community 
at the time of the Prophet. Dissatisfied with a prevailing form of Islam sapped of its 
spiritual warmth and vigour, Yassine pondered this question for years during which 
he engaged in an in-depth study culminating in a Sufi experience which lasted 
about six years. When he refers to this phase of his life, it is usually to make a 
point that the answer he provides is not rash or speculative but rather well-thought; 
it is based not only on authentic Islamic texts but also on his personal experience 
and buttressed by testimonies of scholars of high calibre like Imam al-Ghazali, 
AbdelKader al-Jilani, al‟Izz ibn Abdessalam and others, some of whose 
experiences he discusses in his books, namely Al-Ihsan.9  
What makes Yassine‟s experience different, however, is that it tries to reconcile 
between what he calls “the individual and the collective salvation” and “the spiritual 
goal” and “the historical action in the world”. Whereas some people are only 
concerned with their own spiritual well-being and stay away from the affairs of 
society, Yassine‟s concern is to devise a model that allows for moral and spiritual 
accomplishment as well as social and political engagement. Both objectives are, in 
Yassine‟s view, integrated into the model set by the Prophet and there is no reason 
why they should be separated. 
The reality, however, is that the divide did take place and its early symptoms could 
be identified since the overthrow of the Islamic Caliphate and the usurpation of 
power by the successive dynasties which have been in control of most Muslim 
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territory to this day. Though the Islamic Umma has survived despite the severe 
blows it has endured since then, the moral, spiritual and intellectual coherence that 
existed during the time of the Prophet and his early Companions was deeply 
affected. According to Yassine‟s analysis this accounts largely for the emergence 
of various competing and sometimes conflicting tendencies in the Muslim history. 
Some focussed on the hadith and its sciences, some on Islamic jurisprudence, 
some engaged in what was to be called later asceticism and Sufism whereas 
others picked up other disciplines.  The phenomenon being described here does 
not reflect a natural development towards specialization so much as an outcome of 
intellectual disintegration. The common feature between these groups, however, is 
that, apart from a few voices which did rise against injustice and tyranny and paid 
the price dearly, the rest generally stayed away from political and constitutional 
issues; and those who did get involved in some theoretical debate, they were very 
cautious not to trigger the wrath of the incumbent rulers. These developments 
eventually led to the outright marginalization of the scholars of Islam. The great 
challenge now, argues Yassine, is to bring the constituents of Islam together in 
order to overcome the political disorder and the intellectual disintegration and 
rediscover the unity of Muslims and the greatness of Islam.10 
It is in this perspective that the model suggested by Yassine to reform the 
individual, society and government should be understood. In Yassine‟s opinion a 
comprehensive reform requires a comprehensive view that integrates the moral, 
spiritual and the rational into a project able to secure the well-being of the 
individual in a sound socio-political environment. It does not make sense, to his 
understanding, to search for spiritual elevation and ignore the realities on the 
ground. The two objectives are not mutually exclusive and there is no reason why 
they should not be both targeted, especially when there is ample evidence that the 
reconciliation is not only possible but necessary and has indeed occurred. 
Yassine‟s model is based on a Prophetic text which reads: “Iman [faith] consists of 
over seventy branches, the best of which is the declaration that there is no god but 
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God, and the least of which is the removal of harmful objects from the road, and 
modesty is a branch of iman.”11 This definition, however, only sets the general 
framework but does not mention all the seventy branches that make faith reach its 
highest standards. Only three are cited and the rest are to be gleaned from the 
corpus of the Prophet‟s Sunnah. This probably prompted an eminent scholar, 
Imam al-Bayhaqi (384 – 458 H), to collect the seventy plus branches in a single 
volume titled, Shu‟ab al-Iman [Branches of Faith]. Others have followed suit though 
they slightly differ, for good reason, from one another on the number, the manner 
and the sets into which they are classified. This is just a matter of trying to arrange 
them in an appropriate way and does not affect what faith basically means and 
entails.  
In the same vein but from a perspective that takes into account the need for 
comprehensive revival and reform of Muslim societies, Sheikh Yassine bases the 
proposed model of education on the Prophetic text just cited and arranges the 
seventy-seven branches into ten compartments, each of which highlights a major 
virtue. Thus, the first virtue is called as-suhba wa al-jama‟a [companionship and 
community] and describes the general environment where brotherly relationships 
and enduring bonds between Muslims could develop. The second virtue, dhikr 
[remembrance of God], refers to a core requirement for the moral and spiritual 
development of the individual as well as of the community. The third which is called 
sidq [sincerity] implies the provision of concrete services to prove the quality of 
one‟s faith and the extent to which one is willing to get involved. This branch and 
the two mentioned previously are considered crucial components of the proposed 
model and, as it will be seen later, also conditions for its success. 
The remaining seven virtues are applications of the first three mentioned above. 
Thus, albadl [ giving and sacrifice] comes fourth to indicate that a true commitment 
requires, among other things,  giving, making sacrifices and getting involved 
constantly in the efforts to set up an Islamic social and political order. The fifth 
virtue called al‟ilm [knowledge] is regarded as the torch that lights the way to follow. 
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The distinction is made between two types of knowledge: one type is incumbent 
upon every Muslim, for it shows and encourages them to take the way leading to 
God‟s pleasure; the other type is fard kifaya [sufficiency duty] and falls under the 
responsibility of the whole Umma to acquire all the necessary sciences and 
technologies to serve the needs of the Muslim people. The sixth is al-„amal [action] 
and connotes not only the acquisition of the necessary skills and the appropriate 
attitude to be a positive and functioning member of the community but also 
continuous mobilization of the people to build up and sustain the aspired Muslim 
society. The seventh, called samt [behaviour], means that the Muslim society 
should develop its distinct and appealing aspects and be a model worthy of respect 
and emulation. The eighth is at-tu`ada [moderation and discipline] and it involves 
the ability to endure hardships in the way of change, rejecting violence and 
rashness as means of achieving any legitimate aims. The ninth, al-iqtisad 
[economy], entails the emergence of a new generation which rejects the 
consumerist mentality and, with the intention to please God, partakes in the 
creation of a robust, healthy and growing economy. The final virtue is called al-
jihad. The implication of the order here is that after acquiring the qualities of what is 
perceived to be good character, in all its dimensions, there comes the wider realm 
of execution, which the term jihad connotes. Besides the continuous striving to 
dominate one‟s ego, the committed Muslim is also invited to work for the 
establishment of an Islamic order which cannot be achieved unless the individual is 
educated, trained and mobilized along a model into which all the branches of faith 
are integrated. This is what Sheikh Yassine has tried to do in what he calls “Al-
minhaj an-Nabawi” [the Prophetic method].12 
8.3 Characteristics of the required education 
8.3.1 The need for balance 
Three tendencies, in the view of the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, should be shunned 
in order to allow for a well-balanced education able to effect “a fundamental 
241 
 
change in the human being, to provide him with a strong will […] and liberate his 
mind.”13 He refers to the first tendency as “the intellectual or cultural Islam”. It 
should be noted here that though Yassine does not like to use “Islam” with 
“adjectives” (political Islam, modern Islam, conservative Islam, …), it seems that he 
cannot help resorting to the same practice from time to time to illustrate his point. 
By “intellectual Islam” he means the inclination of some Muslim activists to focus 
mainly on the world of ideas, concepts and the various intellectual, philosophical 
and ideological currents at the expense of other equally important concerns. In a 
book titled Hiwar ma‟a al-Fudal` ad-Dimocratiyin [Dialogue with the Honourable 
Democrats], he writes: 
Many of our Islamist brothers tend to place a higher emphasis on intellectual 
training and issues of revival. Though we do not argue about the importance of 
these concerns, it is not the education we are seeking. What we are seeking is a 
comprehensive and in-depth education of man‟s heart and ego in the first place 
before his intellect, bodily senses and organizational and activist skills.14 
The second tendency which, in Yassine‟s view, should also be discouraged is 
termed “the ascetic or Sufi Islam”. This should come as a big surprise from 
someone who had himself lived a Sufi experience and of which he was not 
ashamed. On the contrary, he acknowledged its impact on his personality in the 
clearest way possible and on numerous occasions. “All I am,” he writes in one of 
his books, “I owe to my Sufi masters.”15 If the Sufi merits are appreciated and 
extolled to such an extent, why is he then critical of their current political stance? 
Does it not sound paradoxical? 
In Yassine‟s view, his argument is quite clear and he sees no contradiction in his 
position. The fact that he believes that the Sufis, the true ones, have preserved 
“the secret” of what is sometimes described as “the major struggle” does not mean 
that their model is beyond reproach. The only model that qualifies as such and that 
should be emulated is the one set by the Prophet. In light of this he thinks that 
given the serious circumstances the Islamic Umma is undergoing, there is no 
excuse whatsoever for anyone, including the Sufis, to flee the social and political 
arena and not get involved.16 “What excuse could there be,” he wonders, “for those 
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adopting a neutral position towards the systemic invasion of our countries and 
minds?”17 Even Sufis themselves, argues Yassine, have not historically always 
favoured isolation and withdrawal from the affairs of society. Indeed there are 
scores of historical incidents showing them in the forefront in the defence of the 
Muslim territory, and there is no reason why they should not do the same now. The 
reasons for getting engaged in the present time are more compelling, now that the 
Islamic Umma is being exposed to the most serious challenges it has ever had to 
face throughout its whole history.  
The third tendency which Yassine warns against is termed “the activist Islam”. It is 
characterized by over-enthusiasm and engagement in so many activities to the 
point of neglecting other necessary duties, including even some obligatory acts of 
worship. Such an attitude, contends Yassine, does not reflect a sound 
understanding of the principles of Islam and its spirit and, what is worse, it could 
have detrimental consequences. Yassine goes on even to state that “the most 
serious educational and organizational damage often stems from the over-
enthusiasm of a hasty new comer and the elation of an activist who dissipate their 
energy in moments of overexcitement which soon subside.”18 
These forms of Islam are considered the “three pitfalls”19 that the Islamic 
movement must avoid in order to acquit itself well and advance successfully on the 
right track towards the desired change.   
8.3.2 Gradualism 
Gradualism refers to the principle or policy of seeking some goal gradually rather 
than quickly or violently. As Yassine sees it, if this principle seems to be highly 
recommended in politics, the same is also true in the field of education. The reason 
is that education has for its object the formation of character and the attempt to 
influence the behaviour and attitude of an individual with a particular past, different 
aptitudes and belonging to a certain social milieu and accustomed to certain habits, 
and here lies the complexity of the issue of education. Therefore, to deal with the 
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human subject requires a great deal of patience, flexibility and wisdom. It requires, 
adds Yassine, the use of a variety of styles of influencing, including mixing up with 
people in their homes and workplaces, travelling with them, sharing their joys and 
sorrows.20 
Yassine underlines the importance of the time factor in the success of education. 
People differ in temperament and character and it may take some of them some 
time before they mature or respond. There is no fast guide to deliver immediate 
results. Furthermore, quoting an old adage which says “it is much easier to move 
mountains than to change habits”, Yassine points out that the more people get 
older, the more difficult it becomes for them to alter their accustomed behaviour. 
Hence, it is important to allow sufficient time for the educational efforts to bear fruit 
and the change to occur smoothly. 
It is worthy of note that Yassine here is merely stressing an Islamic principle which 
is dealt with extensively in Shari‟ah books. On its importance „Aisha, the Prophet‟s 
wife is reported to have said that when the Quranic revelations began, the first 
verses to be communicated were those which mentioned hell and heaven. It was 
not until fifteen years later, when people‟s hearts had softened, that specific 
commands to desist from fornication and drinking wine were revealed in the Quran. 
„Aisha pointed out that if these commands had been revealed in the beginning, the 
Arabs would have stoutly refused to give up fornication and wine drinking.21 
To illustrate how the principle of gradualism was put into practice in the early years 
of Islam, one of the oft-cited examples concerns the prohibition of alcohol and 
gambling. In the beginning, neither was explicitly banned but it was understood 
from what was revealed then that their negative effects were greater than their 
benefits. Later, new verses came to announce that drinking alcohol should be 
avoided during praying, and in the third stage other verses were revealed to 
declare that intoxicants and gambling were absolutely and definitely prohibited. It 
was a psychological and gradual treatment of some deeply entrenched habits in 
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the Arabian society like gambling and drinking alcohol. On the basis of this method, 
the principle of gradualism is highly recommended where change cannot be 
implemented quickly or at one go, as in politics, education and the like spheres. 
8.3.3 Continuity 
Continuity is another feature of the form of education advocated by Yassine and 
his group. It is continuous and inclusive in the sense that it does not exclude any 
age, nor is it confined to new members only, nor does it stop at a certain stage in 
the life of the individual. Education is a must in the life of the individual at all times 
and in all places. No one can claim that he is “well-educated”, that he has had 
enough training or that he has got a stronger faith than the others. Education, like 
knowledge, is from the cradle to the grave, as the saying goes. “We should never 
give up,” asserts Yassine, “correcting and improving ourselves. If at any moment 
we think that we have perfected ourselves, we can be sure we are wrong, and to 
entertain such a feeling would mean that we have regressed and succumbed to 
hubris and frivolity.”22 
According to this logic, all individuals, regardless of age, gender, race, ability, 
qualifications, professions and social strata should be concerned with the need for 
continued improvement and view education as a lifetime experience. It is no 
wonder, then, that we find, as will be seen later, that al-Adl wal-Ihsan regularly 
organize some meetings which are accessible to all members, young and old, from 
the simple cleaner to the highly qualified engineer, to cultivate the feeling of 
brotherhood and humility. “There is no claim of merit,” as the Prophet says, “of an 
Arab over a non-Arab, or of a white over a black person, or of a male over a 
female. Only God-fearing people merit a preference with God.”23 And since only 
God can judge who is more God-fearing than whom, and given that the person‟s 
faith may go through ups and downs, no one can claim he is better off in terms of 
moral and spiritual achievement than the others. It is true that some people can 
say from a person‟s behaviour and deeds that he is, for instance, a hard worker or 
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honest or trustworthy but from an Islamic point of view they cannot say for sure 
who has a stronger faith or a purer heart. Hence it is necessary to stay humble, 
modest and to commit oneself to continuous improvement.  
8.4 Conditions of education 
On the basis of this analysis, Yassine sets three conditions for the required 
education to yield the expected results: as-suhba wal-jama‟a [companionship and 
community], dhikr [remembrance of God] and sidq [sincerity]. Let us take up each 
in turn. 
8.4.1 Companionship and community  
The first step for the success of education according to the model proposed by 
Sheikh Yassine lies in the existence of spiritual companionship and a community of 
believers able to provide a warm and encouraging environment to facilitate the full 
integration of “the new comer”.24 The term “companionship”, used here to translate 
the Arabic word “as-suhba”, goes beyond usual friendship and entails having a 
spiritual guide or, to use Islamic terminology, “Skeikh”,”Waliuallah” [a holy person] 
or “Arif bi Allah”[literally, a knower of God] ,who, in the view of Yassine and his like-
minded scholars, is the cornerstone in the journey on the path to God.25 It is the 
first step and not an easy one, given the widespread misconceptions that surround 
this issue. It is not surprising that Yassine repeatedly refers in his writings to this 
tense atmosphere where it may be hard for the uninformed to differentiate between 
facts and fiction, truth and superstition, and reality and rumours. He advises that 
unless one is deeply concerned and eager to know, one may not go far, and in 
what looks like a psychological motivating push, he states: 
The first step towards God is costly: if you can‟t pay the price, don‟t ask me to 
offer you a discount. If you don‟t face forward and strike out towards your goal 
without worrying about prejudice and suffering, bewail your insignificance and 
content yourself with an infantile sort of life, wan and without history.26  
Yassine here points out to some of the socio-psychological obstacles that are likely 
to emerge in the quest for iman [faith] and ihsan. Pressure, spoken and unspoken, 
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may come from peers, family members, close friends or simply from the internal 
resistance that one may experience towards modifying one‟s pattern of life. An 
education expert by profession and well acquainted with socio-psychological 
studies in addition to his personal experience, Yassine tries to alert his audience in 
advance of the possible hindrances they may encounter to undertake what he 
believes to be not only a rewarding experience but more importantly an existential 
need. Once the initial hesitation that usually precedes any serious undertaking in 
one‟s life is surmounted, there comes the essential step which Yassine describes 
as follows: 
Once the solitary test of detachment is passed, you‟ll have to seek an encounter: 
you‟ll need to go to another companion and there make a place for yourself. You 
will need to adapt yourself to another environment and be adopted. Nothing will 
take the place of a meeting of a spiritual companionship. Companionship is one of 
the most essential notions of Islam; in the path of the penitent, God often places 
persons with pure and limpid hearts.27 
Yassine is not unaware that the marketplace is full of those who claim they can 
assist in spiritual improvement. Many may be pure liars, magicians or, as he 
describes them, “charlatans” and “mercenaries”28. He consequently advises that 
one has to be cautious. The question that arises here is how to distinguish 
between the true and false spiritual companionship. In Yassine‟s view the answer 
is quite simple and it is enough to apply the Shari‟ah criteria to know where you are 
standing. If one finds himself in an environment where Shari‟ah is not respected 
and is deliberately contravened, then he must be certain that he is in the wrong 
place and has to leave immediately. It is important, asserts Yassine, to be sure that 
one is in good hands. 
Although the suitable companionship is considered the first step in the right 
direction, there are other factors, argues Yassine, that come into play in the pursuit 
of moral and spiritual completeness, namely the importance of the personal efforts 
to dominate one‟s ego and improve one‟s character. The implication here is that 
one should not despair if he finds that he lacks certain aptitudes. Though to be of 
good character is said to depend on the innate features, the educative role of what 
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is acquired is, in his opinion, of great value, especially if it is aided by a supportive 
environment.29 
A final point that needs to be made concerns the relationship between 
companionship and community. Why are the two concepts joined to form the first 
of the ten virtues that make the core of what is called the Prophetic model to seek 
comprehensive reform? Actually, Yassine is keen that the two concepts be brought 
together to cultivate the feeling of an indissociable unit. He does not want his 
movement to slip into the old Sufi pattern and focus on moral and spiritual 
concerns only or to be overtaken by a hollow form of activism. Neither option, 
according to his model, would do to face the present and future challenges, let 
alone playing a decisive role in the renewal of Islam, the reconstruction of society 
and the establishment of a just government. “There is no liberation,” he asserts, 
“without struggle, and no struggle without organization, and no organization without 
a system of leadership, and nothing of value can be expected from the whole 
organization without “tarbiya” [education].30  
It follows that tying in companionship with community is not seen just as an option 
among others, but rather the only viable way for Muslims to achieve true liberation, 
justice, dignity, democracy and a respected place in the world community. Yassine 
is careful that his position is supported by authentic Islamic texts from the Quran 
and the Sunna of the Prophet like the following passage in which the Quran says:  
The believers who stay at home –apart from those that suffer from grave 
impediment– are not equal to those who strive in the way of God with their wealth 
and lives. God has conferred on those who strive with their wealth and lives a 
higher rank than those who stay at home. He has promised all a good reward; but 
far richer is the recompense of those who strive for Him: rank of his own bestowal, 
forgiveness, and mercy. God is forgiving and merciful.31 
From this passage and many others to the same effect, abundantly quoted in his 
writings, Yassine, like many Muslim thinkers, gathers that the required Islamic 
position at the present time entails a struggle “which joins faith and action in the 
world.”32  
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8.4.2 Dhikr [Rememberance of God] 
The second important condition for a sound, effective education according to 
Yassine has to do with an Islamic practice called “dhikr” [remembrance of God]. 
The concept dhikr may refer to a restricted or a broad sense. When used in the 
narrower sense, it refers to the practice of uttering some phrases and formulas 
recommended by the Prophet as one way to remember God. Some formulas are 
advised to be reiterated at specific times of day or night or in certain places and 
circumstances; others are encouraged to be said at any time, with no specific limit. 
However, when the term is used in the broader meaning, it covers a wide range of 
devotional acts some of which may be obligatory [fard] like the five daily prayers 
whereas others may be supererogatory or voluntary like recitation of the Quran, 
reiteration of certain prayers, attending gatherings for knowledge and admonition 
and many more. 
Sheikh Yassine uses the term dhikr in both meanings and, like many scholars, 
places a high emphasis on its importance. He describes it as “a divine chemistry 
and a purifying remedy of the hearts; it is the confluence of the affluents of faith 
and the source of its light.”33 His belief that it is the most effective means to renew 
faith in the hearts takes into account a Prophet‟s recommendation which reads: 
“Faith wears out in the heart of any one of you just as clothes wear out, so ask God 
to renew the faith in your hearts.”34 It is clear from this hadith as well as other 
Islamic texts that faith is not static but rather dynamic. Its increase or decrease is 
correlated to the presence or absence of certain factors. Hence, it is important to 
make a constant effort to keep on ascending the path to God.  
To maintain that effort and stay determined, Yassine believes that the second 
important factor is to get engaged in some devotional exercises; some divine 
phrases, particularly “la ilaha illa allah” [there is no god but God] should be 
practised abundantly. Yassine argues that he is not making a simple point of view 
which could be easily challenged but rather following an explicit recommendation 
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made by the Prophet himself who is reported to have invited his Companions to 
revive their faith; and when they asked, “How can we revive our faith, O, 
Messenger of God?” he said, “Repeat this phrase frequently and abundantly: there 
is no god but God.”35 To make his case, Yassine alludes to various pieces of 
evidence from the major sources of Islam and quotes many outstanding scholars.  
It is not our concern here to support or refute his position or that of his critics. What 
should be noted, however, is that Yassine has made a great intellectual effort, as 
his corpus shows, to demonstrate that his model, despite being ijtihad in design, a 
proposal of his own, is based on, and supported by authentic texts and scholars of 
repute. In various statements he implicitly and explicitly points that with regard to 
this particular issue, that is, the safe way to God, he speaks about something he 
knows and he has lived and is not just speculating.  
Some people may argue that Yassine‟s model is reminiscent of the Sufi practice 
and from this they infer that Yassine has never overcome, or recover from, his past 
Sufism, despite claims to the contrary. Sheikh Yassine, however, maintains that if 
Sufis observe this practice (of remembering God), it does not make sense that it 
should be ignored in order not to be identified with them. The real question that 
should be asked: is it allowed by Islamic teachings or not? If it is, then it is the 
Prophet that is being followed and not the Sufis. Furthermore, his model cannot be 
confounded with the Sufis‟ for a simple, obvious reason: whereas “our brother 
Sufis”, as he would address them in recognition of the precious element they have 
preserved, seek to reform themselves only, he and his group are concerned with 
reforming themselves, society and the political system; and this, in his view, is the 
emulation of the Sunna of the Prophet in its entirety.36 
8.4.3 Sidq [Sincerity]  
Sincerity is the third condition for the education, as understood by Yassine and his 
group, to have its positive intended effects. Sincerity is a condition and, at the 
same time, a criterion to gauge to what extent a person is earnest in his quest for 
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moral and spiritual fulfilment and also in his social and political commitment. Thus, 
Yassine advises that one should first make sure that he is really serious about his 
quest before going further. “One must first take the time,” he says “to meditate and 
be assured that this vocation… that is, a calling from the heart, is not simply a 
fantasy.”37 Once he is sure of himself and is determined to go all the way, he 
should be prepared for “the jeers and the taunts”38 of friends and relatives to deter 
him from his goal. Yassine is probably thinking here of what he himself had to 
endure when he joined the Butshishi Sufi order and how peers and relatives 
derided him and went even to spread the rumours that the man had gone mad. As 
he knows from experience that “abandoning disturbing friendships is not an easy 
matter,” he advises those concerned to persevere and not be deterred. They have 
to brace themselves to overcome these barriers and “bear up without violence 
under annoyance and real harm, look straight ahead, without taking refuge in 
evasive attitudes for fear of being demonized or slashed to pieces.”39 
Then Yassine cites some aspects which he believes contradict sincerity and what it 
all entails. They are briefly as follows: 
1/ hypocrisy and its branches, the major manifestations of which are mentioned in 
the following Prophetic saying: “Three traits whoever possesses them is a 
hypocrite and whoever possesses some of them has an element of hypocrisy until 
he leaves it: the one who when he speaks he lies, when he makes a promise he 
breaks it, and when he is entrusted he betrays his trust;”40 
2/ adherence to inherited traditions, mentalities and egoistic attitudes which are 
alien to the principles and spirit of Islam; 
3/ adherence to the inherited Islam and the bygone creedal disputes which, in 
addition to other social and political ills, have had adverse effects on the situation 
of the Muslims and on the endeavours to bring them together to meet the various 
challenges;  
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4/ approbation of the illusions and superstitions which are widespread among the 
deprived, poor people and which, indirectly and sometimes overtly, are encouraged 
to keep large swathes of society in ignorance and mediocrity;  
5/ approbation of the half-solutions of the aspired objectives, seemingly in the 
name of pragmatic realism or gradualism; the reality is that this attitude often 
conceals the intention of total submission to the corrupt ruling elite and has nothing 
to do with the principle of gradualism which remains valid to achieve 
comprehensive reform; 
6/ seeking to swell numbers by indiscriminate recruitment, that is, without 
screening and selecting the right elements for the movement‟s membership: this 
practice which prioritizes quantity at the expense of quality has caused a lot of 
damage and even outright failures to certain Islamic groups; the members of the 
group should be alert and if someone should display a fundamental flaw which 
cannot be corrected, there is no need to keep them; 
7/ a last but not least aspect is that there should be no ambiguity about the 
individuals‟ intention and support of the thought of the movement and their 
acceptance of its style, organization and political line.41 
Such were the three conditions of the form of education as envisioned by Sheikh 
Yassine. Each represents a cardinal component of the process: one relates to the 
“educator and the environment”; the second to the core of the “curriculum” [dhikr in 
its broad sense, deemed essential for the revival of faith]; and the third has to do 
with the “educatee” who should be disposed and willing to get involved.42 The 
question that arises now and to which we turn in the following section is to see 
what practical means used to translate the suggested model into visible reality. 
8.5 Tools of education 
Sheikh Yassine is of the view that moral and spiritual flourishing is not achieved by 
reading books or listening to religious lectures and moral speeches or by attending 
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intellectual debates despite the importance of all these things, but rather by 
positive action and effective practical measures. Yassine finds that the discourse of 
many Muslim thinkers regarding this point to be rather broad and vague and does 
not deal with the pertinent question that many young Muslims ask: how to cope 
with the spiritual hollowness which has overtaken the young Muslim generation? 
And even when they do tackle this question, they do not provide a practical 
answer. Some thinkers may excel in the description of the greatness of Islam, the 
benefits of faith and the importance of Muslim contributions to human civilization. 
They may also be creative in speaking about the need to revive Islam in the hearts 
and minds of the Muslim people. However, they stop short at delineating clearly 
and in practical terms how to acquire this renewal and thereby fulfil the spiritual 
needs of many young Muslims.  
In dealing with this issue, Sheikh Yassine focussed on the know-how more than 
anything else, and here, in the view of this author, lies one of the strengths of the 
movement. Instead of long speeches or heated discussions about the necessity to 
take the question of faith seriously, he proposes a simple, practical programme of 
which some exercises are daily, some are weekly and some are monthly whereas 
others are spread over the year, depending on the members‟ time and 
circumstances. Broadly speaking, this programme may be divided into two parts: 
the first consists of the individual exercises and the second of those that should be 
carried out collectively or in small groups. Let‟s examine the first type, subtitled “the 
day and night of the believer”. 
8.5.1 The believer’s day and night programme 
In Yassine‟s view it is important for the Muslim to have signposts on his journey 
through life in order not to wander haphazardly or waste energy for no good 
purpose. He should know how to allocate his time and effort to fulfil his obligations 
and got deeply involved in what really counts and not in trifles; and whatever his 
work, profession or commitments, nothing should deter him from performing his 
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daily prayers on time and, as far as possible, in congregation.43 A certain balance 
between the spiritual, the cultural and social and political activism has to be 
maintained in order to develop a balanced personality able to partake in da‟wah 
work as well as in the struggle for comprehensive reform. To help him in this 
respect, Yassine proposes an eight-point daily programme which will be 
summarized as follows:  
1. The believer should wake up every day before al-Fajr [the dawn] prayer, an 
hour or so, to perform the “night prayer”, often referred to as the Prophetic 
“witr” and sit down for a few minutes to pray to God for forgiveness. If one 
cannot get up before the dawn prayer, or he is not sure to get up early 
enough, it would be better for him to do the “night prayer” before going to 
bed, though doing it before the dawn is best. 
2. To remain seated in one‟s place after the dawn prayer and get engaged in 
dhikr [remembrance of God] is a practice recommended by the Prophet. 
Yassine points out that it is a blessed time and could be devoted to 
remembrance of God, Quran recital and rehearsal or knowledge acquisition. 
Two chapters of the Quran should be read every day. 
3. Besides the obligatory prayers, the believer is strongly encouraged to 
undertake as many supererogatory and voluntary acts of worship as he can. 
These include the praying accompanying the compulsory five daily prayers, 
the fore-noon prayer [duha], the congregations of the Islamic Eids and all 
the voluntary services that one may like to conduct at any time of the day or 
night.  
4. At least three sessions of 15 minutes each [or one session of 45 minutes] 
should be devoted to reiterating the “blessed statement”: there is no god but 
God; one should try to keep the mind and heart concentrated on, and 
attentive to, God‟s Greatness and Grandeur. It should be noted here that 
this practice has always been a controversial point. It is approved by some 
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and rejected by others. In the view of Yassine and his like-minded, the 
benefits of this phrase are beyond imagination, and it is enough to know that 
it is recommended by the Prophet. However, Yassine advises that in order 
for this practice to bear fruit, one should fully yield to its logic. “If God is my 
sole Sovereign, argues Yassine, “it follows that me, his servant, I have to 
assume his law and struggle with all my energy for his cause.”44 If, on the 
other hand, the repetition of the said formula, considered the highest affluent 
of faith, only fosters a penchant for isolation and a form of contemplative 
improvement, then the essential objective is missing, that is, to promote the 
emergence of a committed believer willing to strive for the well-being of all 
and not just for his own goals, however noble these may be.45 
5. To cultivate love for the Prophet entails, among other things, sending 
abundant blessings and greetings on him every day and especially on 
Thursday night and Friday. It is a practice that is highly encouraged, and it is 
up to every one to find the suitable time to carry it out daily. 
6. Before going to sleep, the believer should call himself to account as to how 
he has spent his day. He should renew his repentance and invoke God to 
open for him all the avenues to strive in his way and win his pleasure. 
7. For those who are students, they should invest the effort and time needed 
for their study. Their first duty after prayer, recitation of the Quran, God‟s 
remembrance and the acquisition of the minimum share of Islamic 
knowledge is to succeed and excel in their studies.   
8. The believer should set some time to make some contribution, however 
modest, for the benefit of “da‟wa” [the call to Islam] such as assisting 
someone in need, implementing a task requested by the movement or 
seeking or imparting knowledge… It is important, stresses Yassine, that the 
believer should not waste his time in idleness and heedlessness or in 
trivialities, nor should he waste the time of others by long visits and lack of 
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punctuality. Time should be managed like a budget; it should be carefully 
planned and intelligently spent.46 
8.5.2 Collective training sessions47 
In addition to the individual programme, Sheikh yassine proposes a number of 
collective sessions which the members of the movement are invited to attend as far 
as they can. The importance of these gatherings lies in the fact that the participants 
are isolated for a while from the hustle and bustle of daily life, weaned, as it were, 
from their habituated customs and brought to concentrate on their aspired spiritual 
goals. These gatherings also provide the participants with an opportunity to learn 
from each other, strengthen their relationship and bridge whatever psychological 
gap there may be between generations and social strata.  
Furthermore, acts of worship are more efficient and beneficial when accomplished 
together. This would allow hearts imbued with deep piety to exert a positive effect 
on those that may be in a poor condition. One becomes more courageous in the 
company of brave people; even the psychic problems disappear in such a warm 
and loving atmosphere.48 It is no wonder, remarks Yassine, that these gatherings 
were, at the time of the Prophet, “recognized for their boosting effects on the 
people‟s virtues.”49 Convinced of their importance and impact, the movement of al-
Adl wal-Ihsan organizes various meetings, and for the sake of brevity only some of 
them will be mentioned here. 
8.5.2.1 I’tikaf [Spiritual retreat] 
The literal meaning of the word I‟tikaf in Arabic is to stick exclusively to something, 
whether it is good or bad. However, in Islamic terminology it means to stay in a 
mosque for a particular period of time with the intention of worshipping God and 
seeking his propinquity. It is a practice that the Prophet observed regularly in the 
last ten days of every Ramadan till the end of his life. Thus, there is no 
disagreement among scholars of Islam about its legitimacy.50 Given its perceived 
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spiritual benefits, every Ramadan al-Adl wal-Ihsan organizes this spiritual event 
wherever it happens to be operating and have members, and attendance is 
strongly encouraged. Those who cannot afford the last ten days of Ramadan can 
go for a shorter period.51 
A major obstacle, however, to doing I‟tikaf nowadays is related to the place where 
it should normally be held: the mosque. Since Morocco regained its independence 
in 1956, the mosque has been placed under an increasing control to such an 
extent that it is only opened for the five daily obligatory prayers and is closed 
immediately after each prayer. At the time of the Prophet and even until recently, 
the mosque used to open all day and played a pivotal role in the life of Muslims. It 
was not only a place of worship but served multiple purposes. It used to be a place 
of learning and, to use the words of one author, “a hub of ebullient and purposeful 
activity.”52 It was customary to find there several “study circles”, each of which was 
led by a scholar who would focus on a specific field of knowledge: the Quran, its 
memorization and proper pronunciation, the Arabic language and its grammar, the 
science of Hadith, jurisprudence, mathematics, astronomy, etc,. The mosque was 
the school, the college, and the university, and some mosques became of 
international renown. In Morocco, Jami‟ al-Qarawiyyin [al-Qarawiyyin mosque], 
founded in Fez by Fatima al-Fihri in 859 A. D., is one example among many others 
in different parts of the Islamic world.53 
In the post colonial era, however, the role of the mosque is reduced to an absolute 
minimum, especially when the late king, Hassan II, succeeded his father in 1961. 
Even the Friday sermon in Morocco is dictated by the Ministry of Endowments. No 
one can volunteer to give a talk or organize any activity without the permission of 
the official authorities. Though certain acts of worship have no political overtones 
whatsoever and used to take place in the mosque like I‟tikaf, they are not allowed 
any longer. Thus, as a temporary alternative, the members of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
have been compelled to use their homes as venues to hold I‟tikaf and the like 
events.  
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8.5.2.2  Ribatat 
The term “ribat” [pl. ribatat] is rich in meaning and has a long history. Arabic 
dictionaries tell us that the word “ribat” basically refers to three meanings: it refers 
to that which is used for binding, tying , fastening, connecting … such as a cord, 
string, rope and the like; it means to station and stay in a place to watch against 
sudden attacks from the enemy; and it also means to persevere in something.54 
The Quranic and Prophetic usage has broadened the term to accommodate other 
shades of meaning. In the sayings of the Prophet, it is used to mean, among other 
things, to endure in acts of worship and perseverance. It also signifies to await 
prayer after prayer and to stay in an outpost to protect the Muslim territory from 
enemy incursions. 
In Islamic history the “ribatat” refer to small military outposts that Muslims 
established to protect their land. Those who volunteered to carry out such a task 
were called “Murabitun”; they used to busy themselves with worship and learning. 
According to historians, it is “because of their military and spiritual alertness and 
their readiness for jihad [that] the residents of a “ribat” are called “Murabitun” in the 
sense the word is used in the Quran.”55 Even when the military significance of 
those “ribatat” was decreased because of other options, “the ribatat, however, 
maintained and in fact enhanced their spiritual character becoming centres of 
learning and devotion, permeated by the spirit of jihad.”56 In Morocco many cities 
and villages still bear the names they were given when they were first established 
as locations to defend the land against the enemy attack. 
Muslim scholars use the word “ribat” to denote either of two things: “the first is the 
location in which the mujahidun [sing. mujahid] gather to defend the land and repel 
the enemy attack; and the second to designate the place where righteous believers 
learn, worship and [perform acts of] remembrance of Allah and study fiqh 
[jurisprudence] in the affairs of this world.”57  
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With these varying, albeit overlapping, semantic, cultural and historical 
connotations of the word “ribat” in mind, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has picked the term to 
designate a type of gathering which may last from twenty-four hours to forty 
consecutive days. The purpose is to provide an environment for focussed spiritual 
improvement and knowledge acquisition, and the subjects covered may range from 
how to recite and pronounce the Quran properly to how to organize a meeting and 
make well-considered decisions. Various themes could be raised, depending on 
the needs of the participants. 
One may wonder why these people should be cut off from the outside world in 
order to study such subjects. The idea, as explained above, is to provide a suitable 
environment where attendees are not distracted and could concentrate on learning 
as well as on intensive acts of worship. Furthermore, such an environment is 
believed to cultivate the love for a continuous pursuit of knowledge and spirituality. 
The objective, according to this line of thinking, is not just to isolate some people 
for a few days to engage in worship and be taught a few lessons, but more 
importantly to inculcate in their hearts and minds the love to continue the pursuit on 
their own.  
Referring to a Prophetic tradition, Yassine explains how the perceived positive 
change in behaviour and attitude could occur in such friendly settings: “The good 
virtues,” he notes, “may pass from one individual to another, from one group of 
individuals imbued with a high level of piety and spirituality to others who may be 
pusillanimous and sick.”58 Some social psychologists might describe this process 
of change in human behaviour in certain settings as the outcome of “interpersonal 
influence”. In any case, the phenomenon is not odd or unusual. Honore de Balzac, 
a famous French novelist and playwright, puts it this way: “De même que le mal, le 
sublime a sa contagion,” [like evil, sublimity is also contagious]. Indeed, Yassine 
uses the word “contagion” to make the point that it is because the positive qualities, 
like the bad ones, are contagious that one should be careful in choosing friends. It 
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remains to point out that these “ribatat” are held by the movement four times a 
year: one in autumn, one in winter, one in spring and the fourth in summer.59    
8.5.2.3 An-nasiha meetings 
The term an-nasiha is one of the central Islamic concepts. Literally, it means 
“advice”, but in the Quranic and Prophetic usage, it has a wider scope with a strong 
emphasis on its value and role in the Muslim community. The importance of an-
nasiha, how it should be delivered, to whom and when and other related issues are 
dealt with extensively elsewhere and it is not our concern here to go into a detailed 
discussion of them. To give just a general idea about its place in Islamic thought 
and culture, it is enough to say that in one of the Prophet‟s sayings it is considered 
the core and the pillar of religion [“ad-din an-nasiha”].60 The implication is that it 
encompasses all walks of life, and unless it is offered properly and generously, 
corruption sets in and the whole society will be in danger. An-nasiha is not 
incumbent upon one person or a group of persons, nor is it conditional upon 
detaining power, of the pen or the sword; it is rather a common responsibility and 
everybody should get involved to maintain the well-being of society and protect it 
from the dire consequences of obnoxious behaviours and wrong policies. It could 
be delivered in words or deeds or both, and in whatever case, it should not be 
made through violent means or with the intention to look smarter, or to score a 
point against someone or to settle an account with an opponent. It is done as a 
duty to improve a situation but out of love and compassion and not to achieve 
cheap thrills and petty victories. 
It appears that all these shades of meaning were taken into account when the term 
an-nasiha was chosen to designate a type of meeting which, though it seems 
similar to the previous gatherings, has its special features and objectives. Unlike 
the previous events, it only lasts about twelve hours, from around 8:00 p.m. and 
ends the following morning at 7:00 or 8:00 a.m. It basically seeks to provide a 
focussed opportunity for the members to cultivate faith and ihsan. Thus, the moral 
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and spiritual topics and acts take precedence over political issues. Usually the 
meeting consists of a brief explanation of a few verses from the Quran, a 
discussion of a short biography of one of the Companions of the Prophet and 
reading of a short passage from the book, Al-Ihsan followed by a discussion in 
which all the participants take part. There is usually a special theme threading the 
different components of the meeting. An-nasiha is held every month or two months, 
depending on the circumstances of the provinces and regions. All the members are 
entitled, in fact encouraged, to attend, and if the participants are more than the 
meeting place can afford, they are divided into groups and assigned to different 
locations.61   
Despite the simplicity, in form as well as in content, of these meetings and their 
peaceful nature, they are not always interpreted that way by the Moroccan 
authorities. As pointed out earlier, the police intervened on numerous occasions, 
arrested the attendants, and took them to the police station to be interrogated. The 
repercussions of such campaigns made the headlines for quite some time but 
turned out to be in the advantage of the movement whose reputation was only 
enhanced by what many people believed to be meaningless if not illegal police 
measures. Instead of combating crime and drug dealing, many would say, which 
are gaining ground and making an increasing number of victims, the police wasted 
time and energy to target peaceful, spiritual gatherings. Lately, it seems that the 
Moroccan authorities have eased their attitude towards the organization of such 
events. Whether it is out of political maturity or a kind of stratagem or helplessness 
reinforced all the more by the recent “Arab spring” remains to be seen. One thing 
for sure is that these meetings, according to reliable sources, are now being held 
regularly, albeit in the members‟ private homes.   
8.5.2.4 Usra and branch meetings 
The smallest unit in the movement is called “usra”, which literally means “family”62. 
Unlike some organizations which use the term “cell” [khaliya], al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
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prefers “usra” most probably because of the positive feelings it evokes in the 
collective memory of Muslim societies, namely the feelings of love, compassion, 
respect, solidarity and the like. It is composed of a small group of people, ranging 
from six to twelve, headed by a person called Naquib al-usra [the usra leader]. The 
formation of the usra usually takes into account geographic proximity to facilitate 
attendance and allow for the development of a strong relationship between the 
members located in the same vicinity. When the number of the usra members 
exceeds twelve, it is split into two small groups. This development is encouraged 
and appreciated, for it is regarded as a sign of the presence of a significant degree 
of dynamism and motivation within the group. Furthermore, besides providing an 
opportunity for other members to assume leadership positions, it contributes to the 
continuous growth of the movement as a whole.63  
The usra used to meet twice a week.64 One meeting consists of performing the 
night prayer together, Quran recital, remembrance of God besides, of course, the 
obligatory prayers. It usually lasts about twelve hours, like an-nasiha gatherings, 
but, unlike the latter, it only involves a small group. The frequency of these 
meetings continued thus for over two decades. Then, given the increasing number 
of activities in which the members are required to participate and, to a certain 
extent, to make up for a shortage of leaders due to the rapid growth of the 
movement and of meeting places because most members are still young and do 
not have their own property, some changes have been introduced in the latest 
version of the movement‟s structure. The usra is now to meet every fortnight: one 
session is focussed on spirituality training and the next is devoted to learning and 
so on.65 
The branch, called shu‟ba in Arabic, is the second unit in the movement‟s 
organizational structure and is composed of a number of “families”, between six 
and eleven. It used to hold a general assembly every month, but in the new 
version, every two months. All the members of the “families” belonging to the same 
branch are required to attend the general assembly which lasts about twelve hours. 
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It consists of the usual spiritual and moral components besides a discussion of a 
topic listed in the programme of study to be pursued.66 
8.6 Conclusion 
Education in the movement‟s strategy for social and political change is of great 
importance, much in the same way as political action. The reason is that education 
has as its object of concern what is considered the decisive factor for the success 
or failure of any reform: the human being. Thus, no reform, in the view of al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan, can be achieved unless it starts with reforming the human being who is 
both the end and the means of the aspired change. To focus mainly on political 
action can hardly make any difference, even if it manages to upset authoritarian 
rule. According to the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, “to change structures is not 
enough to install a brotherly social order; we have to change the behaviour of the 
individual.”67 Otherwise, it would merely mean replacing one group with another 
with the same old mentalities, and this would not solve the challenging problems in 
Morocco or in any other Arab country for that matter. For this reason, al-Adl wal-
Ihsan thinks that the need for education and training to build the character of the 
Muslim believer, able to assume their full responsibility, is crucial and constitutes 
one of the two major fronts in the movement‟s strategy for comprehensive reform.  
However, not any form of education, in the view of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, can serve this 
daunting task. What seems to readily come to mind when the term education is 
evoked is imparting or acquiring knowledge and skills. In the view of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, this is just one dimension of education; the other dimension which is missing 
in many Islamic groups‟ discourse or praxis or both has to do with the moral and 
the spiritual. The dire consequences of such neglect are too obvious to be denied: 
divisions for no good reasons, failure of a number of good initiatives and 
unbalanced attitudes ranging from violence at one extreme to utter submission to 
corrupt rulers at the other. This seems to have spurred Sheikh Yassine to propose 
what he believes to be a model able to overcome the existing gap and its adverse 
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effects, “a model,” as he describes it, “congenial and propitious for the total 
efflorescence of man, inspired and enlightened by Revelation received by the 
Prophet and exemplified in his life and in the community he founded.”68 
Education, as Yassine and his group understand it, especially in its moral and 
spiritual dimension, is not achieved by reading books by prominent scholars, or 
attending lectures given by eminent thinkers or listening to fine talks or moving 
sermons by eloquent preachers. These may be helpful but are not enough. Their 
effect is temporary; they may move the audience to tears or ignite their enthusiasm 
for a while but emotions subside too quickly and rarely, if ever, translate into 
composed behaviour and well-thought action. The form of education advocated by 
Yassine and his group is said to focus on character building with the intention to 
help people to adopt “an attitude, a vision, [and] a will,”69 that makes them assume 
their responsibility towards themselves and their society without being provoked at 
the slightest incident or distracted by immediate petty ambitions.  Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, 
however, has not, in this regard, invented anything; it is just using what already 
exists in store, that is, the Islamic culture: Quran recital, God‟s remembrance, night 
prayer, I‟tikaf… and other acts and means recommended by the Prophet himself. 
The contribution made by Sheikh Yassine is that he has been able to include these 
components in a coherent framework that combines moral and spiritual pursuit and 
political action. And this is what appears to be one of the most distinct features of 
al-Adl wal-Ihsan.     
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Chapter 9 General Conclusions 
This research, by focussing on the emergence of al-Adl wal-Ihsan in the early 
1980s, its development, its attitude towards issues of special interest and its 
strategy to take root in society and press for social and political reform in Morocco, 
sought to achieve a better understanding of a Moroccan Islamic experience and of 
the reasons behind its rise and rapid growth to become, despite the obstacles it 
has faced over the last three decades, “an established force in the country‟s social 
and political firmament.”1 This chapter summarizes the main arguments discussed 
in the forgoing chapters at the methodological as well as the substantive levels and 
ends with a brief presentation of the expected scenarios and some ideas for future 
research.  
9.1 Interpretations and misinterpretations 
In the introductory chapter to this thesis, we examined a number of theories to see 
how close they have come to comprehend the Islamic revival. We saw there that 
despite their important contributions to a debate which has been going on for 
nearly four decades or so, they have been unable to generate an adequate 
understanding of the Islamic phenomenon. This is not because the latter is hard or 
impossible to explain, but rather because the approaches often used are not apt for 
studying such a phenomenon. A basic error incurred by these approaches, as one 
critic has pointed out is that “they tend to occlude by assumption and argument 
ideas central to the appeal of fundamentalists‟ ways of seeing the world.”2 It is no 
wonder, then, that different, and even contradictory, theories3 should continue to 
proliferate, obfuscating even more the issue rather than clarifying it and, in certain 
cases, spurring alarmist, if not extreme, views and recommendations. In some 
accounts Islamists are described as “religious Stalinists”4 representing the surge or 
the “scourge” of the “Green Peril”, an image reminiscent of the Cold War discourse 
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on what was referred to as the “Red Menace” and the “Yellow Peril”5. Various 
terms to the same effect have been used to designate the Islamic resurgence in 
order to come to the conclusion that it is “a phenomenon to be contained or 
overcome.”6 
To be sure not all critics have pursued this line of analysis. Roxanne Euben, for 
instance, from whom this research has benefited, particularly at the methodological 
level, demonstrates in her book, Enemy in the Mirror, why rationalist approaches 
have failed to generate a better understanding of the Islamic phenomenon which, 
in her view, “is becoming more rather than less powerful.”7 She contends that 
“stories [that] function to discredit adherents [i.e. Islamists] as fanatical lunatics or 
agent of regressive chaos, or to reduce fundamentalist ideas to mere conduits, 
they all miss the opportunity to understand the appeals of fundamentalism.”8 To 
allow for such an opportunity, or, as she puts it, “to provide a window into a world 
often distorted by our [i.e. Westerners‟]own cultural experiences and anxieties,”9 
and achieve a better understanding of the Islamic revival, Euben advocated a 
dialogic model of interpretation whereby Islamists are presented on their own terms 
rather through categories alien to their worldview and inattentive to cultural 
differences.10 
I need not repeat here the arguments exposed in the first chapter to demonstrate 
the validity of this approach to studying al-Adl wal-Ihsan, or any other Islamic 
movement for that matter. Rather, I would focus here on how this approach has 
enabled us to produce an account that I argue reflects as far as possible what is 
perceived to be the true nature of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and the real motives behind its 
emergence and rapid growth. Using a variety of reliable sources and taking into 
account the worldview to which the movement adheres, I argued that its 
appearance cannot be explained by any of the theories anchored in the secularist 
framework of analysis. 
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By contrast, if seen from an Islamic perspective and through Islamic categories and 
terms, it should be easier to come to the conclusion that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is in 
consonance with the social and cultural environment in which it emerged, an 
environment whose Islamic identity has been established since Islam found its way 
to North Africa in the seventh century.11 It cannot, therefore, be viewed as an 
“intruder” or an anachronistic phenomenon with which the Moroccan society is at 
odds. It also squares with the basic characteristics of a modern Islamic movement, 
as defined in chapter one, such as modern organization, political engagement and 
the quest for social and political reform from a reasoned perspective based on 
Islamic sources. It cannot, therefore, be considered, as some accounts claim, “a 
confrerie” or a Sufi order12 for the simple reason that the latter does not display the 
features just mentioned, particularly political engagement. Sufis, as we saw in 
Chapter 4, only focus on spiritual matters. Also the way al-Adl wal-Ihsan is 
organized and managed, with its various governing bodies and committees and a 
variety of activities and techniques for recruitment and mobilization as well as other 
aspects discussed in more detail in Chapter 3 and 8, all make the differences 
between al-Adl wal-Ihsan as a modern Islamic movement in its own right and a 
traditional Sufi order crystal clear. 
If al-Adl wal-Ihsan can neither be conflated with a Sufi order nor seen as an odd 
phenomenon, the interpretations which regard it as a mere response to the failures 
of the regime in place to cope with the country‟s social and economic crises and 
nothing else do not hold either. This does not mean that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is not 
concerned with these socio-economic problems. The movement of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan, or any other Islamic group in the sense used in this research -which by the 
way represents the mainstream viewpoint- does not operate in a vacuum or is set 
for no purpose or for purposes that have nothing to do with this worldly life. Far 
from it; but to claim that it is a mechanical reaction to the inability of the ruling elite 
to solve or alleviate the prevailing crises excludes from the analysis a central 
dimension of the worldview to which Muslims in general subscribe, that is, the 
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belief in God and the moral obligation “to enjoin good and forbid evil”, a principle 
which Islamic sources have dealt with extensively.13 
It follows that when the leader of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, for example, addressed an open 
letter to the late king, Hassan II, it was not motivated just by the desire to draw the 
latter‟s attention to the increasing problems plaguing the country, but also by the 
feeling to implement an Islamic duty. Thus to explain such an initiative by the kind 
of interpretations we saw in Chapter 2 which downplayed this moral consideration 
cannot be convincing from an Islamic perspective. Even from a realistic point of 
view, some explanations appear to be problematic. To claim, for instance that 
Yassine‟s letter was spurred by his ambition to construct “his image as a 
charismatic leader”14 appears to be far from the reality. It is no safe game to 
address a monarch like Hassan II the way Yassine did; otherwise, many would 
have done the same. 
Drawing on the dialogic model of interpretation has, furthermore, enabled us to 
demonstrate that although al-Adl wal-Ihsan is engaged with issues and concepts, 
like the ones we studied in Chapter 4, it is not disconnected from the modern world 
and its concerns. Indeed, as Chapter 5 demonstrates, it has not hesitated to 
express its views on a number of modern issues. Again because it is read through 
the lens of approaches embedded in, and constrained by the assumptions of the 
rationalist tradition and discourse, its attitude towards some of these issues such 
modernity, democracy and women‟s rights is not well understood. It is not clear 
why Yassine and his group are depicted in some accounts as being against 
democracy, modernity and women. “To be against” evokes the opposite image, 
that is, dictatorship, archaism, misogyny and persistent nostalgia to the age of “the 
camel and the tent”. This image, as I have argued, is more a kind of caricatured 
representation of what would some authors call “the Other” rather than an 
adequate attempt to analyze and understand their viewpoints. 
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It is true that there are some strands within Islamic phenomenon which may have 
extreme views on such issues, but they do not represent mainstream Islam, nor 
can they aspire to anytime in the future, in Morocco or elsewhere. Since they do 
not represent the overwhelming Islamic trend, there is no reason why they should 
be inflated in some analyses to the point of obfuscating the whole Islamic 
landscape. Extremism has always existed and will most probably continue to exist 
in all cultures and religions, however peace-loving these may be, but it seems that 
human societies have always known how to guard against and overcome bigotry 
whatever its shape and hue, religious or otherwise. 
Perhaps some critics understood from Skeikh Yassine‟s critique of modernity which 
is admittedly harsh sometimes that he rejected it wholesale, which, as I 
demonstrated in Chapter 5, is not the case. If he criticized what is called the “dark 
side” of modernity, he also praised its achievements and insisted that Muslims 
should learn and welcome its technological and scientific fruits. Thus, the fact that 
he was critical of its negative aspects does not entail that he was oblivious of its 
“bright side”, nor does it mean that there are only two options: either to accept it 
unconditionally or reject it wholesale. Between the two extremes there is a large 
space where sensible people could debate what is good for humanity. 
Furthermore, Yassine was not alone to level scathing criticism to modernity. Many 
Western scholars, as Euben has pointed out, have also made the same “from 
relatively diverse political and moral perspectives.”15 Such being the case, it is 
tempting to agree with the very point she makes regarding Qutb‟s critique of 
modernity as coming from someone who despite “his profound engagement with 
specifically Islamic debates about reason, interpretation and revealed law, […] is 
also participating in a conversation that we, as Western students of politics not only 
recognize, but in which we participate.”16 The same could be said about democracy 
and the status of Muslim women. If Yassine criticized aspects of the trajectory that 
some secularists would like the Muslim woman to take, it does not mean that he 
and his group advocate the subjugation of women or condone the abject situation 
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in which ignorance and traditions alien to the letter and spirit of Islam have placed 
them;17 nor does it entail that they stand for political tyranny by their criticism of 
some aspects of democracy. On the contrary, though he underlined the 
weaknesses and the limits of democracy, he also stressed its strengths and even 
recognized its potential to allow for a smooth transition from the prevailing dark 
absolutism.18  
If the movement of al-Adl wal-Ihsan cannot be explained, as we have argued, as “a 
mechanical response to structural pressures,” or a consequence of the 
unavailability of other channels to express social and political grievances, or as an 
irrational phenomenon hailing from, and triggered by, a society in crisis, then how 
can we define it? My simple answer to this question is that it is just a natural 
response from an Islamic point of view to legitimate demands, of material and 
moral order, motivated, before anything else, by religious drives. This does not 
mean, as I explained above, that the desire to improve social and political 
conditions is excluded or deemed of little value, but rather to stress, as I have 
argued in this thesis, that seeking improvement of socio-political conditions is not in 
and by itself sufficient enough to convincingly explain its rise and its rapid growth, 
in a relatively short time, to become, as Lise Storm has pointed out, “the largest 
Islamic movement in the country.”19 
By saying that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is “a response”, I mean that it is not and should not, 
at any moment, be regarded as the only or the sole legitimate response. It is one 
group among others which do exist and equally qualify as Islamic initiatives. Hence 
the idea of pluralism in Islamic activism should not be frowned upon. In fact, it is 
permitted, as we saw in the first chapter, by Islamic texts themselves. There seems 
to be no reason, therefore, why some observers should be surprised that Islamists, 
despite having the same frame of reference, should differ. One critic goes even to 
state that there is not one Islam but several.20 My argument here, as discussed in 
Chapter 1, is that such a claim does not hold. Instead, we can speak about 
different interpretations, resulting from differences in intellectual, moral and spiritual 
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capacities and in circumstances and the impact of all of these factors on the use of 
the tool of Ijtihad; yet, they all share the basic Islamic fundamentals [Usul]. 
The error in the analyses which speak about “many Islams” is that they fail to 
distinguish between two spheres in Islam: one is open to interpretation and which, 
as I demonstrated in Chapter 1, is vast indeed; and the other which is limited and 
encompasses only those Islamic principles which are conclusive in both meaning 
and transmission. This does not make Islam an amorphous belief system liable to 
be interpreted the way one pleases, nor does it entail that all Muslims should be 
thrust into a single mould. We saw there that there are rules which maintain the 
core and the bases of Islam intact but in the mean time open the door wide open 
for the Muslim mind to be constantly active and creative in its quest to cope with or 
adapt to changing circumstances. To what extent Muslims have lived up to this 
reality is another story which, for reasons of space, we only touched upon in our 
discussion of the concept of ijtihad in Chapter 4. 
Having identified the sources of misinterpretations and wrong perceptions which, I 
argue, are due to the use of approaches informed by a secularist vision which no 
longer sees any place for religion in political life and tried to demonstrate how to 
achieve a better understanding of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, or any other Islamic group for 
that matter, let us now turn to the major question which we investigated in this 
research, that is, why should one response, based on Islamic sources and ijtihad, 
to what is perceived legitimate demands, rise to prominence more than others? 
More precisely, how can we explain the appeal and the rapid growth of al-Adl wal-
Ihsan in an environment already populated by different Islamic groups? The 
answer as it unfolded in the foregoing chapters relates to the following issues: 
charisma and structures, coherent theoretical framework, an alternative strategy 
and special emphasis on tarbiya [education]. Let us summarize what our 
discussion has led us to with respect to each issue.  
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9.2 Charisma and structures 
This study demonstrates that one of the distinctive features which played a crucial 
role in whatever achievements the movement was able to accomplish has to do 
with leadership and organization. Headed by a man of such talents, genuine piety 
and a wide knowledge of both Islamic and Western culture, al-Adl wal-Ihsan was 
able to draw the attention of the Moroccan public since its early days. The 
qualifications and qualities of the movement‟s founding leader made him in the 
eyes of many Moroccan people a figure that commanded respect and even 
admiration. Even those who disagreed totally or partially with his line of thinking 
recognized his talents, sincerity and his courage to say “no and in powerful 
ways,”21 to despotic rule, as evidenced by his two audacious open letters to 
Hassan II and King Mohamed VI, respectively.22 His funeral, considered the largest 
–or the second largest– in the modern history of Morocco, for it was attended not 
only by the movement‟s members and sympathizers but also by people of all 
stripes and of various persuasions, including the left, may be an indication that 
Morocco has indeed lost an opposition figure of high calibre, whatever one may 
think of his views and stances. 
What is worthy of note is that Yassine seemed to have those specific attributes 
which make a public figure in an Islamic society qualify as charismatic. To illustrate 
this point, let us look at the following passage: 
The influence of any public figure or trend was […] measured by the degree to 
which he partook in Prophetic charisma through achieving the right combination of 
qualities and qualifications. The key element, of course, was the spiritual worth of 
the man: his integrity and personal embodiment of the divine message. Thus the 
qualifications of the founders of the six major schools of legal thought in Islam 
were not merely their intellectual capacities and through knowledge of the law, but 
also their personal integrity and personal piety. They were renowned for their 
intense religiosity, and had often to prove their incorruptibility under ordeal. All 
reformers had to show this essential combination of qualities to get a hearing.23  
If we go back to Chapter 2, where a brief life story of Yassine is provided, we will 
immediately recognize the relevance of the text just cited to Yassine‟s personality 
and experience. Besides his intellectual capacities and wide knowledge, his 
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“intense religiosity”, as evidenced by his Sufi experience, and the ability to stand up 
alone to an autocratic monarch and the cost he had to pay to take such a stance –
more than five years of imprisonment and a decade under house arrest– all seem 
to support the idea that he had achieved “this essential combination of qualities to 
get a hearing.” Many people believed his integrity and felt that he had given proof 
to be trusted for “irshad” [guidance in the Islamic sense of the word] and for 
leadership in the struggle for social and political reform.24 Thus it is no 
exaggeration to conclude that he represented a major factor in the movement‟s fast 
expansion. 
Does this mean that al-Adl wal-Ihsan was totally dependent on its leader? In the 
view of some the answer is a resounding “yes”. They claim that he used to make 
all the decisions and that the members were only executing the orders they 
received from their “boss” who ran the movement “as his personal fiefdom.”25 
However, as we saw in Chapter 3, senior members of the movement dismiss these 
claims as unfounded. They assert that although Sheikh Yassine was the central 
ideologue and spiritual guide, he never played “the flawless leader”, nor did he 
appreciate the idea of staying “on top of everything” or having “the last word in 
everything”. On the contrary, his style of leadership let the movement assume its 
full responsibilities since the early days of its foundation, for he was of the view that 
a leader, at any level of the organization, should encourage others to think and 
take the initiative and not think or act in their place. He also stressed, they argue, in 
his speeches and writings that the daunting challenges facing the current 
endeavours to reform Muslim societies are such that they require the cooperation 
and contribution of all and not just one or a few people whatever their qualifications 
and skills.26 
According to reliable sources Yassine started, in around the third year after 
launching his association in 1981, to withdraw gradually until he stopped attending 
the regular meetings of the Guidance Council, the highest governing body of the 
movement. The move was apparently taken to set an example to the movement‟s 
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leadership. Although the latter continued to see him from time to time to keep him 
informed or to discuss with him some issues of special importance, they assert that 
he would never impose anything on them or nominate, as some critics claimed, 
any official of a branch, region, province or whatever. If he had a suggestion, he 
would submit it to debate and he would never go against the majority. Consultation 
in his view is not a speech to be learnt by heart, but a principle that should be 
cultivated and observed at every level of the organization.27 
This positive image is highly contested by some critics and particularly Yassnie‟s 
detractors who contend that he “was the movement”28 and that whatever 
achievements there were depended on his being at the helm. Some of them went 
even to predict that the movement would soon fade away after his disappearance. 
My contention is that it is highly improbable that thousands of members, many of 
whom are highly educated (university teachers, engineers, doctors, etc.) should be 
willing to be led by the nose like a flock of sheep29. They are not compelled to join 
the movement in the first place, and nothing can force them to stay if they are not 
happy with the movement‟s leadership, particularly because there are other 
options, that is, other Islamic groups like Unity and Reform and PJD and others. 
Thus if they felt they are stifled or marginalized or have made the wrong choice, 
nothing could deter them from quitting immediately. 
Whatever the case may be -whether we accept the movement‟s narrative or that of 
its opponents- there is general agreement that Yassine‟s charisma was central in 
the quick expansion of the movement, for it not only inspired the members to work 
hard and be at their best but it also encouraged others to join. Such being the 
case, one cannot deny that there are risks. Unless there are structures and a clear 
vision, parties and social and political movements which grow around a central 
figure, as some analysts have rightly noted, tend to go into a period of disarray, if 
not to disintegrate, after the disappearance of their founding leaders. An oft-cited 
example is the case of Muslim brotherhood after the assassination of its 
charismatic leader Hassan Banna in 1949; it remained without leadership for nearly 
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three years.30 My understanding from the interviews I had with Sheikh Yasine is 
that he was not unaware of such risks and that apparently in order to forestall 
something of the sort, he encouraged early on structures and practices and 
insisted on internal consultation [shura] with a view to build a coherent, enduring 
force able to carry on with its mission and not disperse when a person or a group 
of persons passed away.  
In addition to the factor of charismatic leadership, the way in which the movement 
has coped with the regime‟s repressive policies and handled the issue of 
organization has also helped to sustain its growth. As is well-known, one of the 
daunting challenges that every social and political movement has to deal with is not 
just to convince some people to join in, nor even to secure their loyalty; the real 
challenge is to generate sustained enthusiasm, active involvement and 
commitment to the required tasks, whatever the obstacles. It is not enough to have 
a thousand members, for example, but the question is how they can be motivated 
to contribute actively to the promotion of the organization‟s objectives without being 
offered any material incentives. To meet this challenge, al-Adl wal-Ihsan, as we 
saw in Chapters 3 and 8, has used a variety of resources and developed or 
adapted new techniques to enhance its mobilization capabilities. It has incessantly 
sought to modify, update or rethink its structures and diversify its activities so that 
every individual can find a place and get involved. This may explain why some 
researchers consider that the strength of the movement lies rather in its 
organization.31 This is not to say, however, that its strategy has always worked 
well, but the importance of what has been achieved cannot be denied. The irony, 
however, is that the Moroccan regime, without intending it of course, has assisted 
to boost the movement‟s efficacy in this respect! Its repeated crackdowns have 
provided the motivation for people to sympathize with the movement on the one 
hand and on the other have helped, as group dynamics theory argues,32 to 
maintain the psychological conditions that make members get more implicated and 
seek more support.  
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9.3 A coherent theoretical framework 
Another factor which, as some authors have remarked,33 played a crucial role in 
the rise and rapid growth of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is related to the theoretical framework 
on which it is based. In the 1970s and 1980s a major problem which faced many 
Islamist groups in Morocco is that they lacked clear answers to many pertinent 
questions. Sometimes involvement in politics was regarded as too premature 
because of the perceived low level of political awareness among the people, and 
sometimes it was even seen as a distraction from what the true objectives of an 
Islamic movement should be, whereas in the view of others the reverse was more 
appropriate on the grounds that Islamic values were nowhere to be revived unless 
Muslims got deeply involved in political activism. At one moment the use of force 
was considered an option to implement the required reform; at another it was 
rejected and more emphasis was put on peaceful means. Some groups could not 
decide whether they should focus on quality and promote an elitist group or 
whether they should target the masses and be more flexible and inclusive, whether 
they should work in the open or go underground, whether all sectors should be 
targeted or some sectors like the police and the army should be avoided… These 
are just samples of the plethora of questions that required clear answers at the 
time.34 Though some of them may appear commonplace or even banal today, the 
situation was different in those days. No wonder that disagreement over a number 
of issues occurred, causing splits in some groups and many problems for others.  
Al-Adl wal-Ihsan, however, did not face similar impediments because a 
comprehensive view which, though it cannot be claimed to be ideal or above 
criticism, was already in place. Sheikh Yassine had spent years to work it out 
before he started to write about it in his journal Al-Jamaa in 1980, that is, a few 
months earlier before the foundation of his association. Thus, contrary to other 
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groups which were hesitant and even crippled for some time because they could 
not decide which way to go,35 al-Adl wal-Ihsan, then called Usrat al-Jamaa, was 
operational the moment it was set up. The slogan it raised from the very beginning, 
often referred to as “The 3 NOs”: no to violence, no to underground activism, no to 
any ties, financial or organizational, with any foreign party, seemed to have an 
important effect on its expansion.36 Instead of being on the defensive or under the 
constant fear of being “uncovered”, as if they had been engaged in illegal activities, 
the members, as discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, were emboldened by the feeling 
that their objectives were legitimate and consequently why they should be denied 
the right to pursue them. The ensuing logic was: why should we hide if what we are 
after is legitimate? Why should we seek to impose anything on people if what we 
are proposing is good for them? This position, hardly appreciated among some 
Islamists at the time, not only secured, as I argued, a good psychological start for 
the movement and facilitated its growth, but also obstructed infiltration and 
manipulation and helped the movement to maintain its coherence and 
independence. 
In addition to some pertinent organizational choices, other factors also come into 
play to explain the movement‟s appeal, namely the claimed middle course it has 
taken regarding a number of issues, modern and Islamic. As Chapters 4 and 5 
demonstrate, the movement advocates an approach that seeks to stay away from 
the two extremes: rejectionism and uncritical acceptance. Thus, it accepts 
democratic mechanisms without reservations, but it refuses that Islam should be 
chased from political life, it hails modernity achievements but not its “dark side”, 
and it argues for positive interaction with the modern world and for the necessity of 
learning from its experiences, but it stresses on the right of Muslim societies to 
pursue the trajectory that suits them to achieve progress and development. The 
same logic is also maintained to tackle the issue of women‟s rights which are 
believed to be guaranteed by Islam but tampered with under authoritarian rule. 
Accordingly, the focus becomes, or should become, how to breathe life in these 
rights and strive to make them a reality. According to al-Adl wal-Ihsan, this 
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necessitates, among other things, that women should get engaged in organized 
action and not wait for others to conduct the struggle for them. Indeed, by 
incorporating women in the movement since the early years of its foundation, it is 
not surprising that they should make at least half its present membership.37 
Concerning some hot Islamic issues such as Sufism, ijtihad and perception of 
society, which we discussed in Chapter 4, Sheikh Yassine appears to have 
registered some points which seem to have a boosting effect on the expansion of 
his movement. His ability to argue for certain options in some cases and to offer 
alternatives in others seems to have won the interest and the support of many 
people. For instance, before the foundation of al-Adl wal-Ihsan, many young 
people yearning for spiritual fulfilment had only two options neither of which 
deemed satisfactory: traditional Sufism and what it all entails (withdrawal from 
society, obedience to, if not support of, the corrupt regime, controversial religious 
practices, etc. ); or a rebellious but hollow Islamic activism. Sheikh Yassine tried to 
offer a model that averts the weaknesses of both options and made of the spiritual 
and ethical component the beading cord that threads all the aspects of his brand of 
Islamism. 
Some critics are confused at what they consider “a strange mix”, which makes 
Yassine and his movement hard to classify,38 but if seen from an Islamic 
perspective, it is just a form of ijtihad that tries to give due consideration to each 
dimension of Islam, without stressing one at the expense of the others. To what 
extent he succeeded to achieve such a goal is not our concern here, but what 
should be noted is that his model seems to have found a good hearing and all the 
more so because it was buttressed by the living example he represented (his piety, 
his continuous opposition to the monarchy and the price he had to pay for his 
refusal to be coopted) and the individual experiences of those who got involved. No 
sooner had they “discovered” the spiritual warmth of the meetings they attended 
than they, in turn, started to encourage others, starting with parents, relatives, 
friends and neighbours, to come along and live the experience and then judge for 
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themselves.39 No one, to the best knowledge of this author, has ever pointed to the 
importance of this factor in the quick expansion of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. 
Another factor which also should be taken into account concerns the movement‟s 
perception of the current Muslim societies. Whereas some groups, influenced by 
what they understood, rightly or wrongly, from the term jahiliya used by Mawlana 
Mawdudi and Sayid Qutb to describe Muslim societies, Sheikh Yassine employed 
an alternative concept, fitna [trial, tribulation] to argue for a completely different 
perception. In his view, as explained in Chapter 4, Muslim societies, however loose 
their attachment to Islam, cannot be described as unbelievers, nor can be divided 
into two distinct blocks: the good guys and the bad ones. Muslim societies are 
undoubtedly in need of reform and reformers but certainly not “judges” engaged in 
the sole business of passing judgement on others.40 Muslim societies, according to 
Yassine, are in need of “compassion” and “rifq” [gentleness] and of time and 
patience in order to cope with the heavy legacy of centuries of despotic rule.41 This 
perception which promotes reconciliation with society and understanding, but not 
condoning, has had positive results on the reputation of al-Adl wal-Ihsan. Many 
parents, noting that joining al-Adl wal-Ihsan had a positive impact on the behaviour 
of their “committed youth”, appreciated the work undertaken and, if they 
themselves did not become active members, they would offer support for the 
movement in one form or another.42 
9.4 An alternative reform strategy 
How to resolve the problem of authoritarianism was a question that imposed itself 
shortly after Morocco‟s independence in 1956, particularly when it became clear 
that the monarchy was determined to wield untrammelled powers to govern the 
country as it saw fit. Since then many attempts have been made, ranging from 
trying to get rid of the monarchy altogether to seeking change from within. 
Unfortunately, none of those attempts has succeeded, and, as demonstrated in 
Chapter 6, the sad point is that the Makhzenian strategies seem to have been very 
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effective in not only neutralizing “revolutionaries” as well as “reformists”, but also in 
divesting them of whatever good reputation they had built up over many years of 
political activism. Thus, these forces appear to have lost in both ways: they neither 
managed to curb the monarchy‟s sweeping powers, nor did they preserve their 
credibility. 
In an attempt to avoid the errors and pitfalls of the other two major options which 
have been tried so far, Al-Adl wal-Ihsan has opted for an alternative strategy which 
seeks gradual comprehensive change through peaceful means. Though this may 
seem hard to conceive, al-Adl wal-Ihsan has presented what it claims to be a 
coherent view based on Islamic sources, human experience and a careful analysis 
of the Moroccan history and situation. As discussed in Chapter 7, it has even 
proposed what could be described as a road map to press for change in a more 
peaceful manner and avoid the violent scenarios which have taken place in many a 
country. The gist of its proposal is that it would start with consensus building 
around a national pact and end with a new constitution and general elections, 
without excluding other ideas that may emanate from free public debate. Ample 
clarifications have been provided to stress the viability of the proposed course of 
action. Though some people contend that the movement‟s strategy seems to be 
leading nowhere, claiming that there is no indication that the monarchy will, any 
time soon, consider making any serious move to allow for the emergence of a 
democratic system, others, however, are of the view that the movement has 
chosen the right path. It is not our concern to say who is right and who is wrong, 
but one thing for sure is that the movement‟s choice has picked up significant 
support. Thus, it is not surprising that it should constitute an important source for 
the strong appeal the movement has enjoyed over the last three decades.  
What appears to make the movement‟s strategy look even more appealing is that it 
combines, in a unique way, political action and moral and spiritual promotion. Thus, 
as it has devised a plan for political action, it has also provided, as we saw in 
Chapter 8, a character building programme, with special emphasis on the ethical 
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and spiritual dimension. This stems from its belief in the priority of tarbiya 
[education] to reform the individual whom it considers the decisive factor in the 
success of any project. Though not all Islamists subscribe to the way in which 
tarbiya is understood and practiced by the movement, they do not deny its 
importance. Their problem, in my view, is that they have not translated what they 
understand by tarbiya into a programme able to yield palpable results. 
By contrast, al-Adl wal-Ihsan seems to have achieved a remarkable success in this 
respect. Instead of engaging in what it considers polemical discussions of little or 
no value, it lays much emphasis on the know-how. A detailed programme, as 
explained in Chapter 8, has been put in place and various measures are taken to 
create a suitable environment for the proposed programme to be fulfilled and bear 
fruit. Indeed, the spiritual activities and the numerous majalis [meetings] which the 
members are strongly encouraged to attend have had an undeniable impact on the 
sustained coherence of the movement, on its disciplined organization and, above 
all, on its rapid growth. It is worth noting that what some outsiders may see as “a 
heavy moral and spiritual dose” does not seem to compromise or marginalize 
political action. A certain balance has so far been maintained in what appears to be 
a unique Moroccan Islamic experience. 
9.5 Recap and perspectives for the future   
It follows that the rapid growth of al-Adl wal-Ihsan and the strong appeal it has 
maintained over the last thirty years or so in the Moroccan society cannot be 
attributed to any one factor. As this study has tried to demonstrate, several factors 
come into play in the making of this Moroccan experience. It is true that they 
cannot be placed on the same level of importance, but it is hard to isolate them and 
tell in percentage terms which has a boosting effect on the expansion of the 
movement more than which. It would, thus, be safer to conclude that all the factors 
raised in this study have combined to produce a brand of Islamism that many 
Moroccan people have found very appealing. The question is: how long will those 
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factors be sustained to secure the continuous popularity of the movement? Will it 
be affected now that its “architect” and central ideologue is no more? 
Actually this question was raised several times well before the death of Sheikh 
Yassine. Whenever rumours circulated about his imminent death because of some 
real or imagined illness, questions about the future of the movement made the 
headlines: What would happen to al-Adl wal-Ihsan after the disappearance of its 
founding leader? Who would succeed him? How long would it stay united? And so 
on. Then analysts and journalists would start to analyze and categorize. Some 
spoke of the hawks and the doves within the movement, the old and the new 
generations, and the old guard who would stay the course and the young who 
would prefer to get involved in the game and have a slice of the cake, whereas 
others offered more pessimistic scenarios, predicting the imminent disintegration of 
the movement into rival splinter groups, as happened to some organizations in the 
aftermath of an influential leader‟s demise or absence. 
When Yassine‟s death was announced on 13th December 2012 -and it was not a 
rumour this time- the burning question about the fate of al-Adl wal-Ihsan 
resurfaced. Putting aside the less serious writings or those spurred by some sense 
of schadenfreude, some respected academics did speak about the real challenge 
the movement would be facing after the death of Yassine. Michael Willis, fellow in 
Moroccan and Mediterranean studies at Oxford University, pointed out that “the 
movement grew around him [Yassine], all members read his writings, he was at the 
centre of things.”43 This is apparently to underline the gravity of the loss that al-Adl 
wal-Ihsan suffered, but he added that “the movement had been preparing for his 
death for the last decade or so –there are structures in place.”44 Other observers 
wonder whether “the movement will reconsider a cornerstone of Yassine‟s thinking 
–the rejection of the monarchy‟s religious and political legitimacy,”45 whereas some 
analysts could not tell for sure whether the movement would maintain “its political 
might.”46 
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To be sure there are real challenges ahead; however; predictions about the 
movement‟s imminent demise appear unrealistic. The smooth election of Sheikh 
Mohamed El Abbadi as successor to Yassine shortly after the latter‟s death may be 
an indication that should allay some scepticism. It was indeed the first test 
regarding an issue which had provided, for nearly two decades, much fodder to 
many articles and interviews, not to mention gossip papers. The fact that it was 
overcome without any problems seems to endorse the movement‟s claim that it 
had installed structures and organizational practices that foster a vision and a line 
of thinking rather than personality cults. It also indicates that al-Adl wal-Ihsan is 
here to stay and will most probably continue to be a force to be reckoned with47. It 
seems that there is nothing that would make sober-minded observers dismiss such 
a prospect as unfounded. If the Muslim Brotherhood, to cite but one example, 
despite all the ordeals it has gone through over nearly nine decades and the 
problems it is still facing, has nonetheless survived and continues to pose a real 
challenge to incumbent rulers in Egypt and in the Middle East, there is no reason 
why a well-established, large movement like al-Adl wal-Ihsan, which has coped 
successfully with all the repressive measures to which it has been subjected since 
its inception,  should not survive and, why not, even thrive. 
This does not mean that other “less bright scenarios” are totally excluded; big 
surprises in the trajectory of social, political and religious movements are possible 
in both the positive as well as in the negative sense. That said, the real challenge, 
in my view, for al-Adl wal-Ihsan is not to survive but to thrive, that is, to sustain it 
popularity and continue to increase its support base and be trusted in its approach 
to social and political reform. This would be possible only if the assets (leadership 
and organization, ideological coherence, emphasis on tarbiya…) which mediated 
its rise and rapid growth are maintained if not further improved. Should any of them 
be perturbed in any way and to any degree, the movement would be affected 
accordingly. Will the movement continue to emphasize on tarbiya as it used to do 
during the life of Sheikh Yassine? Will it continue to be well organized and maintain 
its ideological coherence? Even the choice of a successor may not be all that 
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matters. The real question is to see to what extent, for example, the new 
leadership will be able to carry out the same function as the old one.  In any case, 
some time is certainly needed before we can know for sure or any assessment can 
be ventured.  
9.6 Suggestions for future research 
This study does not claim that the explanation it has offered cannot be challenged 
or above criticism, nor has it sought to explore, for practical reasons, everything 
that should be known about al-Adl wal-Ihsan. Thus there are still other issues that 
are worthy of further research such as the concept of bay‟ah [oath of allegiance], 
an issue about which there is much discussion in Islamic thought and which, to this 
day, has been used and misused in political struggles and disputes over 
legitimacy. How does al-Adl wal-Ihsan view this issue and how does it envisage its 
practical translation in the modern era? The concept of jihad, another controversial 
term, is also worthy of investigation to see how it is understood by a large 
movement like al-Adl wal-Ihsan. Although there is a short piece of research on this 
subject carried out a few years ago, its author admitted that he had mainly relied 
on two of Yassine‟s books and thus may have missed aspects crucial to an 
adequate understanding of the subject.48 There is also the issue of international 
relations in the thought of al-Adl wal-Ihsan in which many policy makers, especially 
in this region of the world –North Africa–, may be very interested. The possibility of 
having to interact one day with an Islamist interlocutor at the helm of power or as a 
major participant in the making of decisions that may have their repercussions in 
the Mediterranean region should not be totally ruled out. Therefore, it is important 
to know the views of this potential new comer in this respect. It may also be of 
interest to undertake research comparing how tarbiya [education] is understood 
and practised by al-Adl wal-Ihsan and at-Tawhid wal-Islah [Unity and Reform], 
another important Islamic group in Morocco. There are other subjects which could 
also be considered for further research.  
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However, one particular subject which has to do with the relation between da‟wa 
[the call to Islam] and the state is, to my mind, of special interest. Its importance 
lies in the absence of a modern Islamic model with which Islamists could identify. 
The only ideal experience to which they all refer dates back to the first century of 
the Islamic calendar, that is, 14 centuries ago. Owing to the drastic changes in the 
circumstances of Muslim societies, most Islamists are of the view that it cannot be 
copied literally, nor is it necessary to do so. Islam does not specify any one 
particular form of government but it does insist on certain principles and values. As 
long as those principles and values are observed, it does not matter much which 
form of government is adopted.  
That said, the big challenge for modern Islamic movements is to work out “a 
formula through which modern life could be subsumed under Islam, and thus heal 
the schism in the psyche of the Islamic community.”49 Although some attempts 
have been made, the outcome, notwithstanding the prevailing hard circumstances, 
is far from satisfactory. Sheikh Yassine has devoted a significant space in his 
writings to this issue and it may be interesting to know what he proposes to cope 
with what appears to be a thorny subject in Islamic thought. The question is not 
only to put forward an arrangement that fits the current modern circumstances, but 
especially to prevent the state from being captured and monopolized by any reform 
movements, al-Adl wal-Ihsan or any other Islamic or non-Islamic group for that 
matter. Something of the sort did occur in the past several times, in Morocco and 
elsewhere, and whenever that transformation happened to the extent that “the 
reform movement became the state and the latter became the former”, it did not 
take long before principles were compromised and degeneration and decline set 
in50. So, how to secure the continuous presence and independence of da‟wa, 
represented by mainstream Islam, and in the meantime preclude the hegemony 
and tyranny of the state? To what extent can Yassine‟s ideas on this topic provide 
a basis for an arrangement applicable to modern life and able to win the trust and 
confidence of the majority of the people? A cursory reading of Yassine‟s writings 
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may suggest scores of questions that need to be explored, which means that there 
is still ample opportunity for further research. 
What is worthy of note, however, is that whatever topic is picked up for research, 
certain requirements are highly recommended. First of all the importance of Arabic 
language cannot be over-stressed. Most of Yassine‟s writings and the documents 
issued by his movement are in Arabic and unless one has an adequate knowledge 
of Arabic language, one is bound to rely on others for his or her understanding. As 
we have seen in this thesis, mediators are not always, if ever, neutral or competent 
to render what they have read accurately. In Chapter 2 we saw examples of 
flagrant mistranslations which nonetheless were used to make a point or to draw 
some wrong conclusions. Therefore, in order not to read through the lens of others 
and to deal directly with the sources, the question of Arabic language cannot be 
avoided. 
The second important requirement is to have access to reliable sources and to be 
aware of some considerations in order to benefit from them. I need not repeat here 
my discussion in Chapter 1 about the errors incurred by some researchers who, for 
example, failed to distinguish between the constant and the changeable in the 
thought of al-Adl wal-Ihsan or who failed to take into account the date of 
composition and of publication of certain books or documents. This is important in 
order not to base one‟s analysis on the wrong data. Many false perceptions 
emerged not because some researchers were not smart enough but rather 
because they did not know how or where to go to get the right information. 
A third requirement is to have some knowledge of the frame of reference to which 
all Islamists claim to subscribe, particularly the major Islamic sources, the Quran 
and the Sunnah of the Prophet, and also the history of Islamic thought. What is 
considered a “new phenomenon” may not be so, for it may be a recurrent effort in 
consonance with earlier Islamic events of a similar nature. In this study I argued 
that the rise of al-Adl wal-Ihsan is not alien to the environment in which it emerged; 
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on the contrary, it is a familiar phenomenon, just like any other Islamic groups, in 
an Islamic context. The difference between such groups, however, lies in the vision 
and the method that each group has elaborated under the Islamic paradigm and 
the extent to which they respond to the people‟s needs. 
A last but not least requirement has to do with the approach of analysis. Unless 
Islamists are presnted on their own terms and unless prejudices and biased 
stances are overcome, and so are approaches anchored in a vision which sees no 
place for religion in politics, theories and explanations may continue to proliferate, 
but they will not be of any help to understand al-Adl wal-Ihsan or any other Islamic 
group for that matter. 
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